Mimicking, errors, and the optimal standard of proof
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
1-2019
Journal Title
Economics Letters
ISSN
0165-1765
DOI
10.1016/j.econlet.2018.10.002
Abstract
Criminals often engage in costly avoidance to lower their likelihood of being detected and sanctioned. Such avoidance, in turn, affects the optimal enforcement policy. This paper studies how the optimal standard of proof is affected by a specific type of avoidance, namely investments by guilty defendants to mimic innocent individuals. We show that when mimicking is possible the optimal standard of proof is weaker than preponderance of the evidence. This stands in contrast to much of the literature, which shows that non-deterrence costs usually cause the standard of proof to be stronger than preponderance. Thus, it is important not to ignore criminals’ secondary behavior when determining the optimal standard of proof.
First Page
18
Last Page
21
Num Pages
4
Volume Number
174
Publisher
Elsevier
Recommended Citation
Murat C. Mungan & Andrew Samuel,
Mimicking, errors, and the optimal standard of proof,
174
Econ. Letters
18
(2019).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/1851