The Optimal Standard of Proof with Adjudication Avoidance

Authors

Murat C. Mungan, Texas A&M University School of LawFollow

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

10-2019

Journal Title

Review of Law & Economics

ISSN

1555-5879

DOI

10.1515/rle-2019-0019

Abstract

Actors, whether guilty or innocent, may invest in costly measures to reduce their likelihood of being audited. The value of these investments are increasing in the probability with which they expect to be found guilty conditional on being audited. Because strengthening the standard of proof reduces the probability of conviction, it also lowers the investments by actors to reduce their likelihood of being audited. Therefore, when balancing such avoidance costs and deterrence effects, it is optimal to employ a stronger standard than that which maximizes deterrence, namely stronger than preponderance of the evidence.

First Page

20190019

Volume Number

16

Issue Number

1

Publisher

De Gruyter

Recommended Citation

Murat C. Mungan, The Optimal Standard of Proof with Adjudication Avoidance, 16 Rev. L. & Econ. 20190019 (2019).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/1845