An economic theory of optimal enactment and enforcement of laws

Authors

Thomas J. Miceli
Murat C. Mungan, Texas A&M University School of LawFollow

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

12-2021

Journal Title

International Review of Law and Economics

ISSN

0144-8188

DOI

10.1016/j.irle.2021.106029

Abstract

We consider a government’s interrelated decisions of enacting laws prohibiting harmful behavior and choosing how aggressively to enforce those laws. There are three broad policies available to the government in this regard: not prohibiting the act at all, enacting a law and enforcing it, and enacting a law and not enforcing it. When enactment is costly and a fraction of the population reflexively complies with the law once its enactment has been announced (reflecting an expressive function of law), all three policies may be optimal, depending on the severity of the harm from the act and the fraction of reflexive compliers.

First Page

106029

Volume Number

68

Publisher

Elsevier

Recommended Citation

Thomas J. Miceli & Murat C. Mungan, An economic theory of optimal enactment and enforcement of laws, 68 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 106029 (2021).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/1835