Document Type
Article
Publication Date
10-2015
Journal Title
West Virginia Law Review
ISSN
0043-3268
Abstract
Behavioral public choice is the study of irrationality among political actors. In this context, irrationality means systematic bias, a deviation from rational expectations, or other departure from economists’ conception of rationality. Behavioral public choice scholars extend the insights of behavioral economics to the political realm and show that irrational behavior is an important source of government failure. This Article makes an original contribution to the legal literature by systematically reviewing the findings of behavioral public choice and explaining their implications for the law and legal institutions. We discuss the various biases and heuristics that lead political actors to support and adopt bad laws and describe how irrationality influences specific areas of the law, including tax, antitrust, consumer protection, corporate, and employment law. We also discuss various proposals for minimizing the effects of irrationality on public policy. Our goal is to introduce this new field of research to legal scholars, most of whom have previously ignored it. Familiarity with behavioral public choice will help legal scholars better understand the types of policies that are likely to emerge from real-world political processes and will facilitate efforts to promote realistic policy reform.
First Page
199
Last Page
266
Num Pages
67
Volume Number
118
Issue Number
1
Publisher
West Virginia University
Recommended Citation
Gary M. Lucas Jr. & Slaviša Tasić,
Behavioral Public Choice and the Law,
118
W. Va. L. Rev.
199
(2015).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/720
Included in
Behavioral Economics Commons, Law and Economics Commons, Political Economy Commons, Political Science Commons