Document Type
Article
Publication Date
1-2009
Journal Title
Berkeley Journal of International Law
ISSN
1085-5718
Abstract
In recent decades, many countries around the world have institutionalized judicial councils, institutions designed to enhance judicial independence and accountability. Our paper, the first comparative inquiry into this phenomenon, has two aims. First, we provide an economic theory of the formation of judicial councils and identify some of the dimensions along which they differ. Second, we discuss the national experience of several legal systems in light of our theory.
First Page
53
Volume Number
27
Publisher
University of California Berkeley School of Law
Recommended Citation
Nuno Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg,
The Comparative Law and Economics of Judicial Councils,
27
Berkeley J. Int'l Law
53
(2009).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/539