Document Type
Article
Publication Date
1-2008
Journal Title
Supreme Court Economic Review
ISSN
0736-9921
Abstract
In this paper, we argue that social decision-making is subject to a fundamental conflict between consistency and completeness. We show that a consistent welfarist method of policy assessment, that is, one that never violates the Pareto principle, may be incomplete in the sense of being incapable of providing a solution to important social welfare problems.
First Page
117
Volume Number
16
Publisher
University of Chicago Press
Recommended Citation
Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Nuno Garoupa,
The Unsolvable Dilemma of a Paretian Policymaker,
16
Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev.
117
(2008).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/467