Punishment menus and their deterrent effects: an exploratory analysis

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

8-2024

Journal Title

European Journal of Law & Economics

ISSN

0929-1261

DOI

10.1007/s10657-024-09812-0

Abstract

Conventional wisdom suggests that allowing offenders to choose alternative punishments to a previously existing punishment cannot enhance deterrence, because offenders can simply select the least costly option available. After reviewing the deterrence research literature, we argue that punishment menus may encourage individuals to focus more on how they construe the wrongdoing and view the ethical gravity of their actions. We experimentally test whether people may perceive punishment menus as more deterrent than stand-alone sanctions available within the same menu. Our results suggest that this is possible, and that changes in people’s perceptions are often mediated by the mindset (e.g., calculative, ethical) they adopt to evaluate punishment schemes as well as their impressions of the seriousness of the illegal act.

First Page

1

Last Page

19

Num Pages

19

Volume Number

58

Issue Number

1

Publisher

Springer Science+Business Media, LLC

Link to Full Text

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