A Note on the Effects of State-Dependent Benefits on Optimal Law Enforcement

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

5-2010

Journal Title

Review of Law & Economics

ISSN

1555-5879

DOI

10.2202/1555-5879.1411

Abstract

In the Beckerian crime and deterrence model, maximal fines are optimal. Many models have identified conditions under which this conclusion no longer holds. This note adds to the existing literature by presenting an extension to the standard crime and deterrence model, and shows that if criminals' benefits are state-dependent in a particular way, then maximal fines need not be optimal. It also provides a formal framework for analyzing state-dependent benefits within the context of crime and deterrence.

First Page

97

Last Page

106

Num Pages

10

Volume Number

6

Issue Number

1

Publisher

De Gruyter

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