Wrongful convictions and the punishment of attempts

Authors

Murat C. Mungan, Texas A&M University School of LawFollow

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

6-2015

Journal Title

International Review of Law and Economics

ISSN

0144-8188

DOI

10.1016/j.irle.2015.01.001

Abstract

This article presents economic models of law enforcement where the punishment of attempts leads to an increased risk of wrongful convictions. Consideration of these risks weakens the case for punishing attempts. Specifically, attempts ought to be punished less frequently than suggested in previous literature, and even when the punishment of attempts is desirable, they typically ought to be punished less severely than accomplished crimes. Purely deterrence related rationales as well as rationales based on costs associated with wrongful convictions support this conclusion. The presence of wrongful conviction costs also implies that a degree of under-deterrence is optimal and that incomplete attempts ought to typically be punished less severely than complete attempts.

First Page

79

Last Page

87

Num Pages

9

Volume Number

42

Publisher

Elsevier

Recommended Citation

Murat C. Mungan, Wrongful convictions and the punishment of attempts, 42 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 79 (2015).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/1883