Conditional Privacy Rights

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2017

Journal Title

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics

ISSN

0932-4569

DOI

10.1628/093245616X14785139251468

Abstract

People have subjective valuations of privacy. Thus, absent further considerations, efficiency requires that a person be afforded privacy if, and only if, his subjective valuation of privacy exceeds the social value of the information that would be disclosed through a violation of that person's privacy. Absolute regimes that either always allow privacy, or never allow privacy, cannot achieve this result. This article shows that a conditional privacy regime can lead to efficient separation among people based on their subjective valuations of privacy. Moreover, this regime need not inefficiently distort information collection incentives or incentives to refrain from various acts that may generate collectible information.

First Page

114

Last Page

131

Num Pages

18

Volume Number

173

Publisher

Mohr Siebeck

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