A Note on Productive and Dynamic Inefficiencies of Intermediate Regulatory Sanctions
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
12-2019
Journal Title
B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy
ISSN
1935-1682
DOI
10.1515/bejeap-2019-0122
Abstract
This article shows that regulatory sanctions that fall into an intermediate range can generate subtle problems not apparent in simple enforcement models. Assuming that firms may ultimately face different noncompliance detection probabilities, we highlight that intermediate sanctions may conflict with aspects of both static and dynamic efficiency.
First Page
1
Last Page
8
Num Pages
8
Volume Number
20
Issue Number
1
Publisher
De Gruyter
Recommended Citation
Tim Friehe & Murat C. Mungan,
A Note on Productive and Dynamic Inefficiencies of Intermediate Regulatory Sanctions,
20
B.E. J. Econ. Analysis & Pol'y
1
(2019).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/1846