Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2-2021
Journal Title
Journal of Public Economic Theory
ISSN
1467-9779
DOI
10.1111/jpet.12472
Abstract
This article questions whether excessive policing practices can persist in an environment where law enforcement policies are subject to political pressures. Specifically, it considers a setting where the police decide whether to conduct stops based on the suspiciousness of a person's behavior and the potential liability for conducting a wrongful stop. We establish that the liability level that results in a voting equilibrium is smaller than optimal, and consequently, that excessive policing practices emerge in equilibrium.
First Page
141
Last Page
157
Num Pages
17
Volume Number
23
Issue Number
1
Publisher
Wiley Periodicals, LLC
Rights
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License, which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made.
Recommended Citation
Tim Friehe & Murat C. Mungan,
The political economy of enforcer liability for wrongful police stops,
23
J. Pub. Econ. Theory
141
(2021).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/1834
File Type
Included in
Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, Law and Economics Commons, Law and Politics Commons, Law and Society Commons, Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons
