Private protection against crime and public policing: Political economy considerations

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

11-2022

Journal Title

Economics Letters

ISSN

0165-1765

DOI

10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110858

Abstract

Private protection and public policing interact in combatting property crime. While private protection can be tailored to property values by owners, the level of public policing is chosen by elected officials for society as a whole. When the median voter’s property is less valuable than the average property value, the equilibrium level of public policing is excessive (too small), compared to the level that maximizes the collective welfare of property owners, when private protection and public policing are substitutes (complements); but this relationship can be reversed when offenders’ utilities are included in the social welfare function.

First Page

110858

Volume Number

220

Publisher

Elsevier

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