Private protection against crime and public policing: Political economy considerations
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
11-2022
Journal Title
Economics Letters
ISSN
0165-1765
DOI
10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110858
Abstract
Private protection and public policing interact in combatting property crime. While private protection can be tailored to property values by owners, the level of public policing is chosen by elected officials for society as a whole. When the median voter’s property is less valuable than the average property value, the equilibrium level of public policing is excessive (too small), compared to the level that maximizes the collective welfare of property owners, when private protection and public policing are substitutes (complements); but this relationship can be reversed when offenders’ utilities are included in the social welfare function.
First Page
110858
Volume Number
220
Publisher
Elsevier
Recommended Citation
Tim Friehe & Murat C. Mungan,
Private protection against crime and public policing: Political economy considerations,
220
Econ. Letters
110858
(2022).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/1829