Document Type
Article
Publication Date
4-2002
Journal Title
Columbia Law Review
ISSN
0010-1958
Abstract
Antitrust law represents the principal legal tool that the United States employs to police private markets, yet it often relegates quality and nonprice considerations to a secondary position. While antitrust law espouses the belief that vigorous competition will enhance quality as well as price, little evidence exists of the practical ability of courts to deliver on that promise. In this Article, Professors Hammer and Sage examine American health care as a vehicle for advancing understanding of the nexus among competition, quality, and antitrust law. The Article reports the results of a comprehensive empirical review of judicial opinions in health care antitrust litigation between 1985 and 1999, with specifc attention to courts' handling of quality and other nonprice concerns. Professors Hammer and Sage conclude that, although antitrust law cannot be expected to serve as the sole oversight mechanism for industries as complex and quality dependent as health care, courts have been successful incorporating some nonprice factors into antitrust analysis.
First Page
545
Last Page
649
Num Pages
105
Volume Number
102
Issue Number
3
Publisher
Columbia Law School
Recommended Citation
Peter J. Hammer & William M. Sage,
Antitrust, Health Care Quality, and the Courts,
102
Colum. L. Rev.
545
(2002).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/1749