Horses or Unicorns: Can Paying for Performance Make Quality Competition Routine?
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2006
Journal Title
Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law
ISSN
0361-6878
DOI
10.1215/03616878-2005-005
Abstract
The competitive benefits of pay-for-performance (P4P) financial incentives are widely assumed. These incentives can affect health care through several mechanisms, however, not all of which involve competition. This insight has three implications. First, federal antitrust enforcement should continue to scrutinize P4P arrangements. Second, government needs to play a larger role in P4P than through antitrust oversight. Third, widespread enthusiasm for a particular health policy reform does not relieve policy makers of the obligation to understand its theoretical basis.
First Page
531
Last Page
556
Num Pages
26
Volume Number
31
Issue Number
3
Publisher
Duke University Press
Recommended Citation
William M. Sage,
Horses or Unicorns: Can Paying for Performance Make Quality Competition Routine?,
31
J. Health Pol. Pol'y & L.
531
(2006).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/1721