From "Federalization" to "Mixed Governance" in Corporate Law: A Defense of Sarbanes-Oxley

Authors

Robert B. Ahdieh, Texas A&M University School of LawFollow

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

7-2005

Journal Title

Buffalo Law Review

ISSN

0023-9356

Abstract

Since the very moment of its adoption, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been subject to a litany of critiques, many of them seemingly well-placed. The almost universal condemnation of the Act for its asserted 'federalization' of corporate law, by contrast, deserves short shrift. Though widely invoked - and blithely accepted - dissection of this argument against the legislation shows it to rely either on flawed assumptions or on normative preferences not ordinarily acknowledged (or perhaps even accepted) by those who criticize Sarbanes-Oxley for its federalization of state corporate law.

Once we appreciate as much, we can begin by replacing the misleading rhetoric of 'federalization'. More importantly, we might begin to conceptualize a theory of corporate law that is both more effective in advancing our desired ends and perhaps closer to market realities than the competing paradigms presently in ascendance. In this spirit, I offer a model of jurisdictional redundancy - in which federal mandatory rules intertwine with state enabling rules, to create a more indeterminate regulatory regime than we might otherwise pursue. Such a scheme of 'mixed governance' may deprive legal scholars of the opportunity to draw clear distinctions, but may allow the regulation of corporate governance to operate more effectively, and to evolve more efficiently over time.

First Page

721

Last Page

756

Num Pages

36

Volume Number

53

Issue Number

3

Publisher

State University of New York at Buffalo School of Law

Recommended Citation

Robert B. Ahdieh, From "Federalization" to "Mixed Governance" in Corporate Law: A Defense of Sarbanes-Oxley, 53 Buff. L. Rev. 721 (2005).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/1204

File Type

PDF