How May the United States Leverage Its FATCA IGA Bilateral Process to Incentivize Good Tax Administrations Among the World of Black Hat and Grey Hat Governments? A Carrot & Stick Policy Proposal

Authors

William Byrnes, Texas A&M University School of LawFollow

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2-2017

Journal Title

Emory International Law Review

ISSN

1052-2840

Abstract

Professor William Byrnes examines whether it is prudent for taxpayers to trust the governments of the 117 countries that scored a fifty or below on Transparency International’s corruption index. The complete information system invoked by the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) encourages, even prolongs, the bad behavior of black hat governments by providing fuel (financial information) to feed the fire of corruption and suppression of rivals. Professor Byrnes recommends that the United States leverage a “carrot-stick” policy tool to incentivize bad actors to adopt best tax administration practices.

First Page

1033

Last Page

1049

Num Pages

17

Volume Number

31

Issue Number

Recent Developments

Publisher

Emory University School of Law

Recommended Citation

William Byrnes, How May the United States Leverage Its FATCA IGA Bilateral Process to Incentivize Good Tax Administrations Among the World of Black Hat and Grey Hat Governments? A Carrot & Stick Policy Proposal, 31 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 1033 (2017).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/1095

File Type

PDF