Regulatory Effectiveness & Offshore Financial Centers

Authors

Andrew P. Morriss, Texas A&M University School of LawFollow
Clifford C. Henson

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

1-2013

Journal Title

Virginia Journal of International Law

ISSN

0042-6571

Abstract

Onshore jurisdictions, such as the United States, United Kingdom, France and Germany, are critical of offshore financial centers (OFCs), such as Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, and the Channel Islands. Arguments against OFCs include claims that their regulatory oversight is lax, allowing fraud and criminal activity. In this article, we present cross-jurisdictional data, showing that OFCs are not lax. We also provide qualitative analyses of regulatory effectiveness, demonstrating that input-based measures of regulation are inappropriate metrics for comparing jurisdictions. Based on both quantitative input measures and a qualitative assessment, we reject the onshore critique of OFCs as bastions of laxity.

First Page

417

Volume Number

53

Publisher

University of Virginia School of Law

Recommended Citation

Andrew P. Morriss & Clifford C. Henson, Regulatory Effectiveness & Offshore Financial Centers, 53 Va. J. Int'l L. 417 (2013).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/325