Document Type
Article
Publication Date
3-2006
Journal Title
Michigan Law Review
ISSN
0026-2234
Abstract
Boilerplate can be exciting. It is this, perhaps hard-to-swallow, proposition that the present analysis attempts to convey. Particularly in invoking the work of Thomas Schelling on the role of focal points in coordination games, it offers what can be characterized as a "strategic" theory of boilerplate, in which boilerplate plays an active, even aggressive, role.
Contrary to the relatively inert quality of boilerplate implied by conventional treatments in the legal literature, boilerplate may serve essential signaling and coordination functions in contract bargaining. In appropriate circumstances, its proposed usage may be a valuable weapon in the arsenal of a bargaining party, helping it to secure negotiating advantage and success over its counterparty.
First Page
1033
Last Page
1073
Num Pages
41
Volume Number
104
Issue Number
5
Publisher
University of Michigan Law School
Recommended Citation
Robert B. Ahdieh,
The Strategy of Boilerplate,
104
Mich. L. Rev.
1033
(2006).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/1206