Document Type
Article
Publication Date
1-2009
ISSN
1740-1461
DOI
10.1111/j.1740-1461.2009.01147.x
Abstract
In this paper we test to what extent the Kelsenian-type of constitutional judges are independent from political parties by studying of the Portuguese Constitutional Court. The results yield three main conclusions. First, constitutional judges in Portugal are quite sensitive to their political affiliations and their political party's presence in government when voting. Second, peer pressure is very relevant. Third, the 1997 reform that was enacted to increase judicial independence has had no robust statistically significant effect.
First Page
381
Last Page
404
Num Pages
24
Volume Number
6
Issue Number
2
Publisher
Blackwell Publishing
Recommended Citation
Sofia Amaral-Garcia, Nuno M. Garoupa & Veronica Grembi,
Judicial Independence and Party Politics in the Kelsenian Constitutional Courts: The Case of Portugal,
6
J. Empirical Legal Stud.
381
(2009).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/622