Document Type
Article
Publication Date
1-2005
Journal Title
Journal of Law, Economics & Policy
ISSN
1553-4367
Abstract
Explosive growth in credit, debit, and other card payment systems in recent years has produced a parallel growth in private dispute resolution systems based on the web of contracts entered into by merchants, merchant acquirers, consumers, card issuers, card associations, and transaction processors. These contracts have produced legal systems based on contract and the enforcement of which rests primarily on reputational constraints. To cost-effectively resolve disputes, these private legal systems have evolved innovative procedures using resources at the lowest-possible level, including incentive-payments for producing information and rigid deadlines for parties' actions. This paper describes and analyzes these legal systems and their procedures as a potential model for resolving other categories of disputes.
First Page
393
Volume Number
1
Publisher
George Mason University School of Law
Recommended Citation
Andrew P. Morriss & Jason Korosec,
Private Dispute Resolution in the Card Context: Structure, Reputation, and Incentives,
1
J.L. Econ. & Pol'y
393
(2005).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/133