Texas Wesleyan Law Review
Document Type
Article
Abstract
This essay likely raises more questions than it answers, but I do offer the following, somewhat pragmatist, conclusions: (1) patents should not cover collective knowledge in the first place, because patents, if at all justifiable, should serve only as an incentive to innovate, not a tool to exploit existing methods; (2) to the extent patents and other intellectual property protections granted to outsiders do continue to extend over such knowledge, there are methods for (and suc- cess stories of) groups that have been able to take control of and reap the benefits of their collective knowledge; (3) under the most egregious circumstances, fraud and unfair competition claims may afford adequate protection outside of intellectual property law; and (4) efforts, such as "defensive publication," to preclude patents because of "prior art" should be construed liberally to preempt patent eligibility in specific cases.
DOI
10.37419/TWLR.V15.I2.4
First Page
335
Last Page
356
Recommended Citation
Daniel A. Green,
Indigenous Intellect: Problems of Calling Knowledge Property and Assigning It Rights,
15
Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev.
335
(2009).
Available at:
https://doi.org/10.37419/TWLR.V15.I2.4