Texas Wesleyan Law Review
The Relational Constitution of Remedy: Co-Operation as the Implicit Second Principle of Remedies for Breach of Contract
Whereas the principle of protecting the claimant's expectation is, of course, so well known as to be trite law (until recent developments in the law of restitution in particular have called it into question in England and Wales), the second principle is, to say the least, obscure. Though it is my basic claim that the specific legal rules constituting the second principle do already exist, the principle is not merely not recognised but is denied by those who understand breach as amoral or immoral, and this failure of recognition may be taken to extremes of antagonism in the attitudes and conduct of the parties (and their advisers) to strenuously contested commercial litigation. It is not the least ambitious of my aims that I intend my argument to have the clear implication for those parties that they should eschew this antagonism, which fails to represent, not merely their counterparts', but their own best interest, were they adequately self-conscious of it.
The Relational Constitution of Remedy: Co-Operation as the Implicit Second Principle of Remedies for Breach of Contract,
Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev.
Available at: https://doi.org/10.37419/TWLR.V11.I2.13