Document Type

Article

Publication Year

2009

Journal Title

Berkeley Journal of International Law

Abstract

In recent decades, many countries around the world have institutionalized judicial councils, institutions designed to enhance judicial independence and accountability. Our paper, the first comparative inquiry into this phenomenon, has two aims. First, we provide an economic theory of the formation of judicial councils and identify some of the dimensions along which they differ. Second, we discuss the national experience of several legal systems in light of our theory.

First Page

53

Included in

Law Commons

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