Document Type
Article
Publication Date
1-2026
Journal Title
Journal of the Copyright Society
ISSN
0886-3520
Abstract
Economic analysis has long been used to justify copyright regulation. Long before the Statute of Anne, the Stationer’s Guild told the story of the copying competitor, who in the absence of regulation, would copy every original book and offer it for less. In the story, the coping competitor would, in the absence of regulation, deprive the original author of an opportunity to recoup their authorship investment, and so lead to a world where no books at all would be published. To ensure sufficient incentives for authorship, some degree of copyright regulation was thought essential. At the same time, in the traditional account, too much copyright would unduly raise the prices for, or otherwise limit access to, creative works. In combination, these two concerns led to the familiar balance between incentives and access. In the 1950s, William Blaisdell of the Copyright Office eschewed this traditional economic framework and offered an alternative economic justification for copyright: Copyright creates national wealth. Later work built on his approach to argue that copyright creates jobs and a favorable balance of trade as well. This article critiques Blaisdell’s approach and shows that the argument that copyright creates national wealth or jobs or a favorable balance of trade is without merit.
First Page
183
Last Page
212
Num Pages
30
Volume Number
73
Issue Number
1
Publisher
The Copyright Society
Recommended Citation
Glynn Lunney,
Reflections on the Use and Misuse of Economic Analysis in Copyright,
73
J. Copyright Soc'y
183
(2026).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/2428