Document Type
Article
Publication Date
5-2026
Journal Title
Penn State Law Review
ISBN
0012-2459
Abstract
Throughout its history, the RICO statute has presented lawyers with something of an interpretive parlor game. It is indefinite along multiple dimensions and thereby given multiple interpretations, even down to the word level. In Medical Marijuana v. Horn, the Supreme Court set out to define one of RICO's civil-standing provisions: Namely, whether the statute's "injury to business or property" requirement can be satisfied when a plaintiff suffers both economic and personal injuries. In a 5-4 decision, members of the Court engaged in an interpretive battle over the meaning of the phrase and succeeded only in holding that civil RICO does not necessarily bar all claims for damages deriving from personal injuries. The Court can perhaps be forgiven for its skimpy holding, given that the record in the case was messy and contradictory (and was therefore not cert-worthy). But more troublesome is that everyone involved missed the point at which Horn, the plaintiff, suffered a possible RICO injury. For that and other reasons, the case is a muddle that will merely revive, rather than settle, disagreements in the lower courts.
First Page
671
Last Page
698
Num Pages
28
Volume Number
130
Issue Number
3
Publisher
Penn State Dickinson Law
Recommended Citation
Randy D. Gordon,
Defining Civil RICO's "Injury to Business or Property" Requirement: The Supreme Court Takes a Few Steps, Says It Punts, but Actually Fumbles,
130
Penn State L. Rev.
671
(2026).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/2364
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