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DEVELOPING A FRAMEWORK FOR EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON THE COMMON LAW: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND CASE STUDIES OF THE DECLINE OF EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL

Andrew P. Morris

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In the twentieth century we have become increasingly sensitive to the fact that even in the sciences that depend crucially upon measurement (whether these include all sciences or only a majority of them), measurement alone is not enough. To serve the purposes of science, the measurement must be susceptible to comparison. And comparability of measurements requires some common understanding of their accuracy, some way of measuring and expressing the uncertainty in their values and the inferential statements derived from them.

I. INTRODUCTION

Through the use of statistical and econometric techniques, social scientists can offer powerful new insights into the causes and effects of changes in the law. Despite a long tradition of empirical research by both economists and political scientists into diverse political institutions, investigations of the common law using methods more sophisticated than simply counting cases or votes is a relatively recent development.2 Given the natural laboratory provided by the heterogenous development of the common law in the multitude of jurisdictions in the United States, the lack of such research is surprising. Extending this scholarly tradition to common law subjects promises great rewards. Changes in the common law have significant effects on virtually every aspect of modem life. Just in the last fifty years, for example, there have been far-reaching developments in employment law, landlord-tenant law, and tort

law. Evaluations of the effects of these changes would provide valuable information to legislatures and courts considering such changes. Even greater benefits are possible for the development of the economic analysis of law, where empirical work on the common law has lagged far behind theoretical work.

The difficulty of accurately dating changes in the common law partly explains the absence of research into their causes and consequences. Unlike statutes, common law changes are often unannounced or hidden beneath layers of obscure language. Although courts sometimes do make an explicit innovation, in many instances courts characterize the change simply as the application of existing precedent to slightly different factual circumstances. The many sources of the common law introduce further complications. Not only may a decision come from different levels of a state’s courts, but federal courts may decide questions of state law prior to the state courts in some circumstances. Finally, the development of the common law is an iterative process. Courts may change their interpretation of existing precedent or explicitly overrule it. What appears to be one rule may turn out years later to be an entirely different rule.

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4. In M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 596 S.W.2d 681 (Ark. 1980), for example, the Arkansas Supreme Court found no wrongful discharge claim on the facts before it but nevertheless indicated that different facts might lead it to recognize a public policy exception to the employment-at-will rule. I count Counce as adopting a public policy exception because I view it as creating a strong presumption that such an exception would be created. (I have found no cases where a court made a statement like the one in Counce and later rejected a claim on the grounds that the exception did not exist.) See infra Appendix B for additional discussion of Counce. The choice of which opinion should be viewed as the innovation will depend, in part, on the effect which is being studied. If the study is concerned with when a particular jurisdiction has become committed to a particular legal doctrine, then a decision adopting the new rule with certainty may be the appropriate choice. On the other hand, if the issue is when the old rule was no longer certain to apply, then a different opinion, perhaps suggesting in dicta that the court was considering changes, might be appropriate. See, e.g., Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Campbell, 512 So. 2d 725 (Ala. 1987) (adopting the implied contract exception to employment-at-will and portraying the decision as merely an application of existing law rather than as a change in the law). See the dissenting opinion of Justice Maddox for an explanation of how the decision really constituted a change from previous Alabama employment law cases. Id. at 740-52 (Maddox, J., dissenting).

5. See infra part II.B.2 (discussing this issue). Again, the question of what is being measured may help resolve the issue of which opinion to count.

6. Two important examples of such changes are the implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing in employment contracts in New Hampshire and California. The New Hampshire Supreme Court radically rewrote what had been one of the broadest opinions
Social science research on common law issues has suffered from three difficulties:

- inconsistent treatment of opinions;
- incomplete analysis of changes in the law; and
- hidden choices which affect results.

In this Article, I attempt to delineate and resolve various methodological problems that can critically affect research conclusions in this area.

In Part II, I develop eighteen general principles to guide researchers in solving the problem of dating changes. Although there are no simple answers which resolve every problem, researchers' application of these principles will ensure that their decisions about dating changes are appropriate to the problem studied and, just as important, are open to scholarly review.

In Part III, I present my own analysis of the impact of the modern law of wrongful discharge and reanalyze two recent empirical papers by economists which analyzed the impact of the modern common law development of wrongful discharge claims in the United States. This Part not only provides a clear example of the application of the general principles but demonstrates how different choices can affect the results of empirical research.

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7. The development of common law remedies for wrongful discharge provides an ideal set of circumstances for the development of these principles. Not only are there three independent datings of the changes, but the rapidity and widespread nature of the changes mean that the case law illustrates almost every problem researchers are likely to encounter.

The results are both reassuring and a cause for concern. They are reassuring because they suggest that conclusions are not "too" sensitive to debatable methodological choices. Point estimates change, often substantially, but wholesale reversals of conclusions do not occur. The concern stems from the sensitivity of empirical results to the dating method used. Unless researchers use systematic judgments informed by legal reasoning in addition to empirical skill, they are in danger of making critical errors. Although caution is advisable in generalizing from the limited number of empirical examples which space permits here, the results of the case studies are encouraging. They suggest that such studies are reliable if done properly. More importantly, the principles developed here provide researchers with a clear framework for approaching these important choices.

II. METHODOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

Empirical research into the common law has three requirements: (1) the definition of common law events; (2) the choice of a method of dating common law events; and (3) the choice of a structure of analysis. To discuss these issues at a general level requires a considerable degree of abstraction. I will attempt to resolve the tension between generality and specificity by discussing issues generically, with appropriate examples from the employment-at-will area. Some conventions are useful: (1) "Rule X" refers to the rule whose adoption or impact is being studied;9 (2) "Rule X" refers to the adoption of a rule inconsistent with Rule X;10 (3) "Rule Y" refers to the adoption of a rule not inconsistent with Rule X;11 and (4) "Rule Q" refers to one of the other rules of the legal system which have an impact on the court's consideration of a particular case.12

9. In the at-will case, Rule X might be the initial adoption of the at-will rule or the adoption of a particular modern exception to the at-will rule.
10. The New Hampshire experience with Monge and Dorr, see supra note 6, furnishes a good example of this. Dorr's rule (Rule X) was inconsistent with Monge (Rule X) although not all cases are decided differently under them. See supra note 6 and infra note 8. Rule X could also represent a rejection of an exception entirely where Rule X is adoption of the exception.
11. Where Rule X represents a public policy exception, Rule Y might be an implied contract exception.
12. Rule Q might be, for example, the rule that a party must preserve its objection to language in the court's instructions to a jury by noting it at the time. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 51 (detailing the procedure that must be followed when counsel objects to jury
A. Definition of Common Law Events

Defining common law events is much more difficult than defining legislative events. I first examine a systematic attempt by federal courts applying habeas corpus law to define what is a "new rule." It is useful to consider the difficulties the courts have encountered in defining what constitutes a new rule and applying that definition. I then discuss the factors which need to be considered in empirical work.

1. The Jurisprudence of "New Rules"

The Supreme Court has on a number of occasions interpreted the federal Constitution to require states to take (or refrain from taking) certain actions in obtaining criminal convictions. Any rule clearly applies to state court criminal proceedings which begin after the rule is announced. When the state conviction has become final before the rule is announced, however, the applicability of the precedent has been less clear. In *Teague v. Lane*, the Supreme Court held that if the rule is a "new" rule it is not available as a source of law for collateral attacks on convictions finalized before the rule is announced, while if the rule is not "new" it is available for use in collateral proceedings concerning convictions final before the rule is announced. The application of this distinction has proven difficult, however. The fractured nature of the Supreme
Court's opinions and the Court's shifting voting patterns reveal the difficulty of determining a rule's newness.

In Teague and its progeny, the members of the Supreme Court have articulated three somewhat different tests for newness. All three depend on the specificity of the statement of the rule—the more specific the statement, the more likely the rule is to be classified as "new." The starting point of the "newness" jurisprudence is the description by the four-justice Teague plurality:

[A] case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government. . . . To put it differently, a case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final.

In the first Supreme Court case applying the Teague plurality test, Penry v. Lynaugh, a majority labelled one rule (the moral culpability rule) as new, but another rule (the mitigation rule) as not new. Dissenting on the latter, Justice Scalia argued that a "new rule, must include not only a new rule that replaces an old one, but a new rule that replaces palpable uncertainty as to what the rule might be." Teague and Penry, as a majority of the sharply divided en banc Fifth Circuit observed, "do not immediately yield a clearly articulable definition of a 'new rule.'" [D]dictated by precedent" is simply not a useful way to categorize cases for either habeas review or social science. Given enough generality, precedent may appear to dictate most rules; given sufficient particularity, the same

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16. See infra Appendix A for a table of Supreme Court voting patterns on Teague and its progeny.
17. Joining the plurality decision were Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Chief Justice Rehnquist.
18. Teague, 489 U.S. at 301 (emphasis in original).
20. According to the moral culpability rule, the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of mentally retarded persons because they "do not possess the level of moral culpability to justify imposing the death sentence." Id. at 328-29.
21. Id. at 329.
22. The mitigation rule requires that juries must, upon request, be given jury instructions that make it possible for them to give effect to mitigating evidence in determining whether the death penalty should be imposed. Id. at 318-19.
23. Id. at 315.
rules are innovations. As the Fifth Circuit majority argued, the *Teague* analysis is inextricably bound up with the question of the substance of the rule in question itself.26

Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court returned to the question the following term. Beginning with the obvious, the majority in *Butler v. McKellar*27 noted that, aside from the simple case of an explicit overruling of a past holding, “where the new decision is reached by an extension of the reasoning of previous cases, the inquiry will be more difficult.”28 The petitioner, Butler, argued that *Arizona v. Roberson*29 (the holding of which he sought to have applied to his case) had not articulated a new rule but was merely the application of an earlier opinion (*Edwards v. Arizona*)30 to slightly different facts.31 In support of his claim, Butler noted that the majority opinion in *Roberson* had (1) stated that the case was directly controlled by *Edwards* and (2) rejected a request by the state for an “exception” to the rule announced in *Ed-

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26. *Id.* at 1281. The *en banc* dissenters argued that the *Teague* plurality and *Penry* majority recognized that

the process of constitutional interpretation routinely requires courts to articulate extant law and apply established principles of law to different facts and in different contexts. Rules that are the product of this gradual process of refining and developing doctrine are not “new.” To define “new” rules more broadly would depart significantly from the traditional understanding of constitutional jurisprudence as an evolving body of principles rather than jarring series of revolutionary pronouncements.

*Id.* at 1297 (King, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). The *Teague* plurality had cited the holding of *Ford v. Wainwright*, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986), that the Eighth Amendment forbids execution of insane prisoners as an example of a “new rule” without explanation. *Teague v. Lane*, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989). Attempting to explain this example, the dissenters in *Sawyer* argued that the example was of a “new” rule

because of its sweeping and categorical nature, even though such a rule may be premised on a finding that contemporary values, manifested through legislative enactments, already condemn such punishment. The fact that a rule is inherently ground-breaking insofar as it announces a new, categorical rule of substantive eighth amendment law thus appears to outweigh the fact that the rule derives from these indicia of community consensus.

*Sawyer*, 881 F.2d at 1302 (citations omitted).


28. *Id.* at 412-13.

29. 486 U.S. 675, 677-78 (1988) (holding that the Fifth Amendment bars repeated interrogation even for separate investigations after the right to counsel has been invoked).

30. 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981) (holding that the police must refrain from further questioning of suspects in continuous custody once the suspect has invoked his right to counsel).

As a result, petitioner concluded that Roberson was within the "logical compass" of Edwards. The majority rejected this argument, and the notion that a court's statement that it is not announcing a new rule is conclusive, finding instead:

[T]he fact that a court says that its decision is within the "logical compass" of an earlier decision, or indeed that it is "controlled" by a prior decision, is not conclusive for purposes of deciding whether the current decision is a "new rule" under Teague. Courts frequently view their decisions as being "controlled" or "governed" by prior opinions even when aware of reasonable contrary conclusions reached by other courts... That the outcome in Roberson was susceptible to debate among reasonable minds is evidenced further by the differing positions taken by the judges of the Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Seventh Circuits noted previously.[35] It would not have been an illogical or even a grudging application of Edwards to decide that it did not extend to the facts of Roberson.[35]

On the same day Butler was decided, the Supreme Court also applied Teague's analysis in Saffle v. Parks.[36] Saffle produced a "functional" view of Teague under which the courts' task became "to determine whether a state court considering [the petitioner's] claim at the time his conviction became final would have felt compelled by existing precedent to conclude that the rule [petitioner] seeks was required by the Constitution."[37] This formulation has proven to be the most useful of the Court's tests and appears to be the key to the future application of the doctrine.[38]

The Supreme Court expanded on Saffle in Sawyer v. Smith.[39] In Sawyer, a prisoner sought to apply the holding of Caldwell v.

32. Id.
33. Id. at 415 (quoting transcript of oral argument).
34. The Seventh Circuit in United States ex rel. Espinoza v. Fairman, 813 F.2d 117 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1010 (1987), and the lower court in Butler v. Aiken, 846 F.2d 255 (4th Cir. 1988) (subsequent history omitted), had reached opposite conclusions on the issue in the case before the court.
35. Butler, 494 U.S. at 415. One remarkable aspect of this analysis is that the "court" whose characterization is being rejected is the Supreme Court itself.
37. Id. at 488.
Mississippi\textsuperscript{40} to his case. Caldwell created the "responsibility rule" which prohibited the imposition of a death sentence "by a sentencer that has been led to the false belief that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant's capital sentence rests elsewhere."\textsuperscript{41}

In Sawyer's state criminal trial the prosecution had emphasized to the jury that there would be extensive review of their decision.\textsuperscript{42} The prosecutor used this review to argue that the jury should not hesitate to sentence Sawyer to death.\textsuperscript{43} To apply the Teague test, the Court reached for the purpose of the distinction: "[t]he principle announced in Teague serves to ensure that gradual developments in the law over which reasonable jurists may disagree are not used later to upset the finality of state convictions valid when entered."\textsuperscript{44} The goal, therefore, is to separate cases in which the law has evolved past the point at which "reasonable" judges would no longer agree from those cases which simply apply existing principles in a consistent fashion to slightly different facts.

The Sawyer majority found the responsibility rule was a new rule and looked to several factors to make that determination.\textsuperscript{45} First, the Court found that framing the responsibility rule as a general principle "of reliability in capital sentencing [would make] the test meaningless if applied at this level of generality."\textsuperscript{46} Second, the Court noted that no prior case had applied the responsibility rule to prosecutorial argument rather than to a statutory scheme.\textsuperscript{47} Third, the case which announced the rule contained a dissent which argued that there was a "lack of authority" for the approach taken.\textsuperscript{48} Fourth, the majority argued that there were indications that the rule was in fact the opposite of the responsibility rule announced before the Court issued the decision.\textsuperscript{49} Finally, the majority rejected the argument that the issuance of state court opinions adopting similar rules was sufficient to establish the rule, since those opinions applied state law rather than federal constitu-

\textsuperscript{40} 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
\textsuperscript{41} Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 233.
\textsuperscript{42} Id. at 231.
\textsuperscript{43} Id. at 230-32.
\textsuperscript{44} Id. at 234.
\textsuperscript{45} Id.
\textsuperscript{47} Id.
\textsuperscript{48} Id.
\textsuperscript{49} Id. at 237 (explaining that such an argument was permissible.)
tional law.50

In the Court’s next attempt to apply the Teague standard, Wright v. West,51 consensus on the meaning of “newness” continued to elude the Court. Justices Thomas and Scalia and the Chief Justice interpreted Teague as addressing the question of whether the state courts have “interpreted old precedents reasonably, not only [whether] they have done so ‘properly.’”52 Justices O’Connor, Blackmun and Stevens argued:

To determine what counts as a new rule, Teague requires courts to ask whether the rule a habeas petitioner seeks can be meaningfully distinguished from that established by binding precedent at the time his state court conviction became final. Even though we have characterized the new rule inquiry as whether “reasonable jurists” could disagree as to whether a result is dictated by precedent, the standard for determining when a case establishes a new rule is “objective,” and the mere existence of conflicting authority does not necessarily mean a rule is new. If a proffered factual distinction between the case under consideration and pre-existing precedent does not change the force with which the precedent’s underlying principle applies, the distinction is not meaningful, and any deviation from precedent is not reasonable.53

Justice Souter offered a third test:

The crux of the analysis when Teague is invoked, then, is identification of the rule on which the claim for habeas relief depends. To survive Teague, it must be “old” enough to have predated the finality of the prisoner’s conviction, and specific enough to dictate the rule on which the conviction may be held to be unlawful. A rule old enough for Teague may of course be too general, and while identifying the required age of the rule of relief is a simple matter of comparing dates, passing on its requisite specificity calls

50. Id. at 239. Justices Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens dissented, arguing the rule was not a new rule. Their primary argument was that this rule was simply the application of an existing principle to a different set of circumstances. Id. at 246-47 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 2490 n.8.
53. Id. at 2497 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (citations omitted).
for analytical care.\textsuperscript{54}

Most recently, the Court applied Teague in Gilmore v. Taylor.\textsuperscript{55} The petitioner sought review of his conviction on the ground that the jury instructions were improper because their form allowed a jury to convict him of murder "without even considering whether he was entitled to a voluntary manslaughter conviction instead."\textsuperscript{56} The Teague issue was the only issue in Gilmore because the State had conceded that the instructions were unconstitutional under the Falconer v. Lane\textsuperscript{57} standard.\textsuperscript{58} The Court approached the issue this way: "We begin our analysis with the actual flaw found by the Falconer court in the challenged jury instructions."\textsuperscript{59} The Court then proceeded by narrowly stating the precise nature of the Falconer error (the structure of the jury instructions) and compared that error to the precedent upon which the Seventh Circuit had relied in Falconer, Cupp v. Naughten.\textsuperscript{60} Finding that Cupp was "an unlikely progenitor" of the Falconer rule, the Court determined that Falconer had established a new rule.\textsuperscript{61}

The Supreme Court has now provided empirical researchers and habeas petitioners with three not necessarily consistent implementations of the test to determine a rule's newness: (1) the Thomas test: would it have been unreasonable to reach a result before the rule was announced; (2) the O'Connor test: an "objective" test as to the reasonableness of any distinction between an existing rule and new factual circumstances; and (3) the Souter test: a rule must be based on a "specific" prior rule not to be a new rule. What is clear from Teague and its progeny is that the application of the test for newness depends critically on the specificity of the statement of the rule. Where, as in Gilmore, the rule in question can be stated narrowly, it is new. Where, as in the case of the mitigation rule in Penry, the rule is stated more broadly, it is not new.

Although this discussion suggests that the Supreme Court has been unsuccessful in defining "new rule" even in a single area of

\textsuperscript{54} Id. at 2501 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment).
\textsuperscript{55} 113 S. Ct. 2112 (1993).
\textsuperscript{56} Id. at 2116.
\textsuperscript{57} Falconer v. Lane, 905 F.2d 1129, 1130 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that jury instructions which set forth the elements of murder before the elements of voluntary manslaughter violate due process).
\textsuperscript{58} Gilmore, 113 S. Ct. at 2116.
\textsuperscript{59} Id.
\textsuperscript{60} 414 U.S. 141 (1973).
\textsuperscript{61} Gilmore, 113 S. Ct. at 2117.
constitutional analysis so that other courts or researchers can consistently apply the definition, we can draw some useful lessons from these opinions. First, the criterion that defines a "new rule" cannot consist of the announcing courts' own assessment of "newness," either in contemporaneous opinions or ex post. Independent analysis must determine "newness." Second, the test of newness is, as the Fifth Circuit noted, inextricably bound up with the definition of the rule. Defining a new rule requires a comparison with an "old" rule. In some cases, particularly in constitutional law, there are wholly "new" requirements based on, at least arguably, pre-existing principles. In other cases, however, the question is much more difficult. Third, the multiplicity of opinions in this area offers a wide menu of indicators that a researcher can use to identify "new" rules. The choice of indicators must, however, be justified a priori on theoretical principles in each case, and cases where a different choice might have produced different results must be identified. Finally, the definition of a principle for identifying "new rules" is a difficult endeavor.

2. Analysis

As is clear from the above discussion, before we can decide how to evaluate a case we must first define the event with which we are concerned. To do so, we need to look first at the raw material the courts produce for our analysis: written opinions deciding particular cases. Within an opinion, a court typically presents a selective summary of the facts of the case, a statement of legal rule(s), and application(s) of the rule(s) to the facts presented, leading to an order requiring the parties or a lower court to take some action or a refusal to order such an action. The primary function of these opinions in the legal system is to resolve a par-

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63. Trial courts sometimes produce written opinions, but they also generate products such as jury verdicts, injunctions, temporary restraining orders, and other types of orders denying or granting various requests of the parties. Some of these are supported by opinions, but many are not.
64. For example, the lower court may be ordered to dismiss the action, retry the action, take further proceedings "not inconsistent with this opinion," or some other action. In some cases, of course, the court can resolve the entire case without further proceedings and so simply directs the lower court to enter judgment.
65. For example, the court may affirm the lower courts decision.
ticular dispute between the parties. A secondary function is to create a body of precedent to which other courts, lawyers, and the public can refer to prevent future disputes or to resolve disputes without resort to the courts.\textsuperscript{66} The court's actions in furthering its primary function often frustrates this secondary function.

For example, there is a well-known principle which restricts a court to deciding the actual controversy before it and refraining from generalization to other potential fact patterns.\textsuperscript{67} This principle is often honored in the breach, but it still prevents courts in many instances from simply stating: "The rule from now on is to be Rule X, although because the party seeking to establish Rule X has failed to properly preserve its objections to the action of the trial court below, Rule Q governs this case and that party loses." Instead, a court is more likely to say: "Although under other circumstances we might be inclined to apply Rule X, the party seeking Rule X loses in this case because its failure to follow Rule Q prevents us from reaching the issue of whether Rule X applies."\textsuperscript{68} The result is that the presentation to a court of the question of whether Rule X applies can produce a significant range of legal outcomes, which are listed in Table 1. The statements of each of these can, of course, be made with differing degrees of certainty and by varying numbers of members of the court. The court may equivocate in making its suggestion,\textsuperscript{69} bury the discussion in a

\textsuperscript{66} For an extensive discussion and empirical examination of the dual role of precedent, see Landes & Posner, \textit{supra} note 6.

\textsuperscript{67} See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; see also, e.g. Stewart v. M.M. & P. Pension Plan, 608 F.2d 776, 785 (9th Cir. 1979).

\textsuperscript{68} See, e.g., Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co. v. Andrews, 211 F.2d 264, 266 (10th Cir. 1954) (clearly signalling the Tenth Circuit's view that the contract was terminable at-will but noting that "it is a firmly established rule that ordinary errors in instructions are not open to review on appeal unless the matter was brought to the attention of the trial court by exception to the instructions or in some other appropriate manner"); Hodges v. Gibson Prod. Co., 811 P.2d 151 (Utah 1991) (noting that the failure of defendant to properly object to the instruction on a public policy exception precludes appellate consideration of whether the exception existed).

\textsuperscript{69} Compare Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 1089 (Wash. 1984) ("We join the growing majority of jurisdictions and recognize a cause of action in tort for wrongful discharge if the discharge of the employee contravenes a clear mandate of public policy.") with M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 596 S.W.2d 681, 683 (Ark. 1980). In Counce, the court's discussion went as follows:

Ms. Counce first argues that there was a breach of the employment relationship in violation of public policy. This is but another way of saying that M.B.M. breached the contract of employment. She relies to some extent upon cases holding that discharge of an employee for filing a worker's compensation claim, for refusing to 'go out' with her foreman, for going on jury duty, or for refus-
footnote, or simply be cryptic regarding the applicability of Rule X. Similarly, all members of a multimember court may agree, for example, that Rule Q applies and governs the disposition of the case, but a minority may quarrel with the majority's discussion (or lack thereof) of the issue concerning Rule X.  

70. See, e.g., High v. Sperry Corp., 581 F. Supp. 1246, 1248 (S.D. Iowa 1984) ("The terms of the employment relationship between plaintiff and defendant are not before the court. Perhaps plaintiff can prove an employment relationship and other facts giving rise under Iowa common law to a cause of action for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.").

### Table 1 Legal Outcomes of Court Decisions

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<th>Case</th>
<th>Legal Outcome</th>
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<td>Rule X applies&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td>II</td>
<td>Rule X does not apply&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>Rule X might apply to this type of case but does not on these facts&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>Rule X might apply to this type of case, but Rule Q prevents consideration of that question&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>The issue of the applicability of Rule X has been raised by the parties, but Rule Q prevents consideration of that question&lt;sup&gt;e&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>Rule Q applies&lt;sup&gt;f&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td>VII</td>
<td>Rule X applies&lt;sup&gt;g&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<sup>b</sup> Hinson v. Cameron, 742 P.2d 549 (Okla. 1987).
<sup>c</sup> M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 596 S.W.2d 681 (Ark. 1980).
<sup>e</sup> Tombello v. Dunn, 342 N.W.2d 23 (S.D. 1984).
<sup>g</sup> Howard v. Dorr Woolen Co., 414 A.2d 1273 (N.H. 1980) (reinterpreting Monge). (Most cases discussed in detail in Appendix B.)

Even when the subject of the research is court adoption of a rule, as in the Dertouzos and Karoly study of modern exceptions to the at-will rule, the definition of the event is not straightforward. Between Case I and Case II lies a wide range of language indicating different amounts of judicial sympathy for a legal innovation. Even Case I may be stated in language which severely limits the general application of the rule.

72. Empirical research related to the common law is not limited to the question of whether a particular rule has been adopted. The replacement of certainty concerning legal rules with uncertainty may be the event of interest: in the at-will case, my analysis in Part III relied on this formulation. If so, then Case I and Case III may be of equal interest to the researcher.

73. See DERTOuZOS & KAROLY, supra note 2, at 5-7.

74. In an interesting series of cases in the late 1970s, the Alabama Supreme Court considered claims by employees of the American Cast Iron Pipe Company ("ACIPCO") against the company. Duff v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 362 So. 2d 886 (Ala. 1976); Smith v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 370 So. 2d 283 (Ala. 1979); Bierley v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 374 So. 2d 1341 (Ala. 1979); Green v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co.,
The underlying theory of how the legal event is thought to influence the parties whose behavior is of primary interest will heavily influence the definition of the legal event. If we are concerned with the behavior of businesses, for example, then the creation of significant legal uncertainty concerning the future rule in similar cases will be likely to produce behavioral changes even without the occurrence of Case I. If we are concerned about the influence of an innovation in tort law on individuals’ behavior, a quite different analysis would be necessary. If we are concerned with the behavior of other judges, as in the Dertouzos and Karoly analysis of the adoption of exceptions, the existence of Case I may be critical. This discussion points to the first principle for empirical analysis of common law events:

**PRINCIPLE 1:** The researcher must justify *a priori* on theoretical grounds the definition of the common law event to be measured before she can perform the actual measurement.

More formally, one might adopt either of two alternative views of common law decisions. First, one might view the change in the law as an unobserved event, which is observed only when certain other events occur. Alternatively, one might consider the change

\[ y^* = y + \epsilon \]

One would specify any analysis under this assumption as:

\[ y^* = f(X' \mathbf{B}) + \mu \]
in the law to be directly observed. The difference is more than a matter of terminology. In the first case, the search will seek evidence of a shift in the underlying law in cases. In the second case, the search will seek the discovery of an opinion finalizing the shift and more conclusive language in the opinion is likely to be necessary. If the analysis is concerned with the behavior of other parties, the theoretical analysis should specify (1) the path through which common law court decisions are thought to influence the actors of interest; and (2) the type of legal events which are thought to produce this influence. If the analysis is concerned with the behavior of the court system itself, the theoretical analysis should explain how court opinions have defined the event: is mere recognition of a rule's existence enough or is a clear endorsement of the rule necessary?

Beyond this discussion, as required by modern legal analysis, lies a meta-discussion concerning the content of Rule X and how we differentiate Rule X from Rule X. This is not simply a theoretical matter but one with far-reaching practical consequences. Courts do not simply announce Rule X—their language is both richer and more equivocal. As we saw above with respect to the Teague cases, the Supreme Court has been unable to resolve satisfactorily this issue in its habeas jurisprudence.

Even when they do take steps toward a new rule, courts may not fully specify all aspects of the rule until much later. They may allow a new cause of action to proceed to trial, but leave the measure of damages for another day. They may decide that a remedy exists in principle, but may be unwilling to determine its parameters until the record has been developed further. Depending on the characteristic of the rule which matters, this gradual delineation

76. The specification would then be:

\[ Y = f(\mathbf{X}^\prime \mathbf{B}) + \mu \]

77. In Iowa, for example, the Iowa Supreme Court suggested the possibility of a public policy exception to the at-will rule in Abriz v. Pulley Freight Lines, Inc., 270 N.W.2d 454, 456 (Iowa 1978), and again in Northrup v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 372 N.W.2d 193, 196 (Iowa 1985), before conclusively adopting the exception in Springer v. Weeks & Leo Co., 429 N.W.2d 558, 560 (Iowa 1988). See also infra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.

78. See, e.g., Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385, 389 (Conn. 1980) (adopting public policy exception but declining to decide whether “violation of a state statute is invariably a prerequisite to the conclusion that a challenged discharge violates public policy”).
of the law may alter our judgment about when the rule was created.79

Even if the language is unequivocal and definitive, problems still arise when making comparisons between cases. Leaving aside the issue of whether there is a text that contains shared meaning at all,80 since an empirical analysis presumes the existence of such a text, we must decide how to compare the language used by the courts of one state in different opinions81 to the language used by courts of different states. This leads to the second principle:

PRINICIPLE 2: Researchers must define precisely the legal

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79. For example, the potential for punitive damages might be the characteristic of interest, rather than the existence of a particular claim allowing only compensatory damages. Consequently, we might agree that the rule was created when the court conclusively decided on the issue of punitive damages.


Other courts have rejected the New Hampshire Supreme Court's interpretation of Monge. See Cummins v. EG&G Sealol, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 134, 137 (D. R.I. 1988) (citations omitted) (interpreting Dorr as "arguably altering the nature of the action created from one in contract . . . to one in tort"); Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem. Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1031-32 n.3 (Ariz. 1985) (noting Dorr's retreat in a footnote but citing Monge as an example of the farthest reach of an exception to the at-will rule); Magnan v. Anaconda Indus., Inc., 479 A.2d 781, 785 n.16 (Conn. 1984) (noting that "New Hampshire, where the rule was first announced, has since retreated and presently requires that the discharge violate public policy"); Morris v. Coleman Co., Inc., 738 P.2d 841, 849-50 (Kan. 1987) (citing Monge, without mentioning Dorr, as creating an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Perry v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 508 So. 2d 1086, 1089 (Miss. 1987) (noting that New Hampshire had adopted the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in Monge but that in Dorr the court "discarded it in favor of a more limited rule"); Crenshaw v. Bozeman Deaconess Hosp., 693 P.2d 487, 493 (Mont. 1984); Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 838 (Wis. 1983) (reading Monge broadly, without mentioning or citing Dorr, for the proposition that employers have a duty to discharge only in good faith).

The narrow reading in Dorr is also contrary to the pre-Dorr scholarly commentary on Monge. See, e.g., Comm. on Labor and Employment Law, Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., At-Will Employment and the Problem of Unjust Dismissal, 36 The Rec. of the Assoc. of the Bar of the City of N.Y. 170, 183 (1981) (interpreting Monge as requiring good faith in discharging employees); Cornelius J. Peck, Some Kind of Hearing for Person Discharged from Private Employment, 16 San Diego L. Rev. 313, 321 (1979).
Compliance with this principle will allow readers to judge whether the analysis rests on a definitional quirk. It is not, for example, sufficient to state simply that Rule X is under study. Rather it is necessary to illustrate the parameters of the rule with examples and careful analysis.

Readers are not the only beneficiaries of compliance with this principle. Researchers too will benefit from careful explication of the legal boundaries of the rule they analyze. It is difficult to imagine a successful process other than an iterative one: definition of the rule, followed by legal research, redefinition, additional legal research, and so forth. Some rules are easy to distinguish: State A adopts Rule X and State B adopts Rule X; X and X are antithetical as well as inconsistent. Often, however, drawing the distinction between Rule X and Rule X is not so straightforward. There are several potentially distinguishing characteristics: the type of remedy involved, the legal doctrine underlying the claim, or the source of the rule could all be used. Some justification for the choice needs to be offered, and perhaps alternative specifications attempted. This leads to a third principle:

**PRINCIPLE 3:** Researchers should define the legal rule with reference to the underlying theoretical analysis of the effect of the legal change on the court’s behavior.

As the discussion above demonstrates, there cannot be a gener-

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82. Dertouzos and Karoly define a narrow public policy cause of action, a broad public policy/good faith cause of action, and an implied contract cause of action. They also use a tort/contract distinction in some specifications. See DERTOZOS & KAROLY, supra note 2, at 10. Krueger and I rely on a different tripartite division. See Krueger, supra note 8, at 648-50; infra notes 205-11 and accompanying text. Other categorizations are no doubt possible as well.

83. See DERTOZOS & KAROLY, supra note 2, at 8-9 (distinguishing between contract and tort remedies).

84. See Krueger, supra note 8, at 648-50.

85. A court which has consistently adopted other majority rules identified in the Restatement of Torts, for example, is presumably more likely to adopt a majority rule than a minority rule in a torts case where the court has not yet spoken than a court which has more often adopted minority rules in the past.

86. Dertouzos and Karoly, for example, justified the remedy-based approach since tort damages generally exceed contract damages. See, e.g., DERTOZOS & KAROLY, supra note 2, at 8-9. Alternatively, I relied on the doctrinal basis because (i) it has sufficient overlap with the tort/contract remedy to capture much of that distinction and (ii) it more effectively captures, in my opinion, the distinction between disclaimable and nondisclaimable claims.
al answer to the question of what constitutes a common law event for research purposes; the answer for any particular project will depend on the nature of the project. The principles listed provide some guidance to the researcher. The first principle is a caution that appears in other contexts later in this paper: the definition of common law events depends heavily on the context of the question being asked. When researchers examine the question of the influence of common law events, they must be able to specify the channel through which the common law event influences the population being studied. Similarly, scholars must pay attention to the legal details of the opinions in question to determine the range of possible answers. Independently of questions of whether a particular opinion meets the researcher’s criteria for inclusion, the researcher must determine the range of outcomes given in Table 1 which will satisfy her needs. There is simply no substitute for independent legal research to define the common law event. Secondary sources, in particular specialized reporters such as those published by the Bureau of National Affairs, are suitable only as starting points; they cannot reliably define the event. The second principle is that the researcher must be clear about the level of generality at which she is prepared to define the rule. As the disputes in Teague and its progeny demonstrate, any event can become a nonevent and vice versa. The third principle is the obverse of the first. Legal analysis alone is insufficient; scholars must also use the social science motivating the analysis to define the event. The Teague cases demonstrate that legal analysis alone is incapable of defining all but the most obvious common law events.

B. Case Selection

I turn now to the specifics of dating the changes in the common law. Cases produce opinions at different times in their progress and the procedural and substantive differences between those occasions are responsible for many of the problems with dating changes in the common law. Courts also act at different rates among jurisdictions and among different types of cases. These differences are important to consider in evaluating changes since the relative speeds will affect the rates of adoption of changes. To

87. The modern erosion of employment-at-will is a fine example of this issue. One can define the event as the adoption of a public policy cause of action, a tort cause of action, or a broad or narrow tort cause of action.

88. There are no nationwide statistics on the processing times of state trial courts.
identify the problem, consider the path a dispute follows through the court system. Using wrongful discharge law as an example, the development of a common law exception in a particular state (State Z) takes place, in general, as follows: Employer A fires Employee B. B visits Lawyer L and persuades L to accept his case. L accepts the case, files suit against A, and the case of B vs. A enters the legal system. One party prevails at the trial level, either on the merits or for procedural reasons. This process can take from a few months to several years. In most states the trial court opinions, if any, in B vs. A are unpublished documents.

There have been several studies which have examined selected state courts. In 1987, for example, the median time for completion of proceedings in contested civil cases in 39 trial courts was 481 days, with individual courts' medians ranging between 180 and 1019 days. JOHN A. GOERDT, REEXAMINING THE PACE OF LITIGATION IN 39 URBAN TRIAL COURTS tbl. 3.1, at 38 (1991). The median length of time varied with the type of case (424 days for contract cases versus 469 days for tort cases) and cases which involved jury trials took significantly longer (median time 748 days). Id. tbs. 3.2 & 3.9. No time series data is available on court processing times, but comparison with an earlier study of some of the same courts suggests that the time required increased from 1976 to 1987 in some courts and decreased in others. See THOMAS CHURCH, JR. ET AL., JUSTICE DELAYED: THE PACE OF LITIGATION IN URBAN TRIAL COURTS tbl. 3.3, at 27 (1978); GOERDT, supra, tbl. 3.10, at 57. There are no statistics available for earlier periods for state courts.

The broad range of times indicates a problem for empirical research into when the law changed. If cases are delayed at the trial level, the opportunity for an appellate court to create a new rule is also delayed. Although there is no convenient way to control for this effect, researchers need to be aware of it when interpreting their results. Its importance will vary with the question being studied. With tort law changes in comparative negligence, for example, delays will be less important than in employment-at-will since tort cases appear independent of the rule while wrongful discharge cases were rare before the law began to change.

89. This section relates information which legally trained readers are likely to find elementary. Because I hope non-legally trained social scientists will also find this Article useful, I have opted for completeness rather than assume that all readers are aware of all the steps in creating an opinion.

90. The discussion here assumes that the law of State Z will apply. There are often choice of law questions and a court in State Z will apply State Z's choice of law rules to determine which state's substantive law should apply.

91. In some instances (studies of the rate of change of the law, for example) researchers should control for the relative speeds of different states' legal systems. A small state with no intermediate appellate court (Rhode Island) will not only have fewer opportunities to change the law, since fewer cases will be brought, but will resolve those cases at a different rate than a large state with an intermediate appellate court (California). Data on the speed of state court systems is sparse. Where possible, therefore, the notes include time estimates for various proceedings.

92. The employer may prevail by citing the at-will rule in support of the contention that regardless of the truth of B's factual claims, B has no legal claim.

93. Some trial courts decide motions with simple orders stating: "Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted." Others issue formal opinions supporting their actions. A jury ver-
In many states, the appeal of *B vs. A* begins in an intermediate appellate court,\(^9\) where, after a typical delay of a year or more,\(^9\)

dict simply takes the form of a judgment entered by the court.

94. Some states, such as New York, sometimes publish trial court decisions. See, e.g., Chin v. AT&T, 410 N.Y.S.2d 737 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978), aff'd, 70 A.D.2d 791, *appeal dismissed*, 396 N.E.2d 206 (N.Y. 1979) (an important at-will case). Delaware adopted the at-will rule in a trial court opinion, Greer v. Arlington Mills Mfg. Co., 43 A.2d 609 (Del. 1899), and the Delaware Supreme Court did not address the issue until 1982. The first Delaware Supreme Court opinion to address the at-will rule is *Heideck v. Kent Gen. Hosp.*, Inc., 446 A.2d 1095, 1096-97 (Del. 1982). *Heideck* cites only earlier superior court opinions but clearly indicates the rule had been adopted earlier.

95. Delaware, the District of Columbia, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming currently do not have intermediate appellate courts. See infra note 126.

96. Delays have sharply increased in recent years. Although historical data are sparse, there is one early study of federal court delay. In 1928-30, 908 terminated law cases on selected federal district court dockets were examined and the time to termination calculated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt; 1 month</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-2 months</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-3 months</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-6 months</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 months - 1 year</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-2 years</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-3 years</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-5 years</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>≥ 5 years</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Numbers exclude one case which did not have any entry on its docket sheet.) *AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, A STUDY OF THE BUSINESS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS*, Table 79 at 189 (1934). More recently, there were 248,717 civil cases (excluding land condemnation cases) pending in U.S. district courts as of September 30, 1984. Of these, 155,081 (62.4%) were pending for less than one year, 55,204 (22.2%) were pending for one to two years, 21,703 (8.7%) were pending for two to three years, and 16,727 (6.7%) were pending for three years or more. *ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS AND REPORTS DIV., FEDERAL JUDICIAL WORKLOAD STATISTICS DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIOD ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 1984*, tbl. C6.A, at A-20 (1984). These national figures obscure important differences among courts—the three years and over figure varied from 19% in District of Massachusetts to 0.7% in the Eastern District of Tennessee. *Id.* Decisions on motions are also subject to delays. As of September 30, 1984, there were 1628 cases and motions held under advisement over 60 days, 978 more than 60 days and less than six months, 411 between six months and one year, and 239 over one year. *Id.* tbl. II, at 17.

For the 12 months ending June 30, 1989, the following table presents the median times to disposition for the 64,869 diversity cases (of 194,759 total civil cases) terminated during the time period.
### Time to Disposition (Months)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Diversity Case</th>
<th>Time to Disposition (Months)</th>
<th>10% less than</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>10% more than</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All cases</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>64,869</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closed without court action</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>19,441</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closed before pretrial</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27,928</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closed during or after period</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>13,086</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closed after or during trial</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>4,414</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, TWELVE MONTH PERIOD ENDING JUNE 30, 1989, Appendix 1, Table CSA.

There is also some sketchy historical data on time to decision in state cases in the late 19th century.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Avg. Case Length (mos.)</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Avg. Case Length (mos.)</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Avg. Case Length (mos.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>18-24</td>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>10-12</td>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>18-24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>12-36</td>
<td>Maine</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>36-48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.C.</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>12-18</td>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>24-36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>6-24</td>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>12-36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>12-36</td>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>15-30</td>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>West Virginia</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Nebraska</td>
<td>24-60</td>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>New Hampshire</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER AND REPORT WHETHER THE PRESENT DELAY AND UNCERTAINTY IN JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION CAN BE LESSENED, AND IF SO, BY WHAT MEANS, IN REPORT OF THE EIGHTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (1885) at 368-449.

Although there is no comprehensive data on delays, there are some studies which indicate state courts continue to experience substantial variations in case processing times:
a panel\textsuperscript{97} of that court issues an opinion, often widely available although not necessarily formally published in a case reporter. If B (or A) is dissatisfied with the results and has the resources to pay L (or his defense counterpart) additional costs and fees, the case may proceed to additional appellate review—either an \textit{en banc} sitting of the intermediate appellate court or the State Z Supreme Court. After further delay,\textsuperscript{98} the court may decide to grant review or not. If the court grants review, additional delay ensues before it issues an opinion.\textsuperscript{99} Again the court may or may not formally publish the opinion,\textsuperscript{100} although an opinion adopting an exception to the at-will rule is sufficiently important to warrant publication in most cases.\textsuperscript{101} Opinion in hand, A and B most likely depart for the lower courts for, in the oft-used judicial phrase, "further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion."\textsuperscript{102} As the court has issued an opinion, we can allow A and B to litigate in peace and examine the consequences of the decision.

A and B might have taken a slightly different route to court. If

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
Court & All Civil Cases & & \\
& Median length & 90th \%tile & % over 1 year & % over 2 years \\
& (days) & (days) & & \\
\hline
All courts & 417 & 1038 & 51.0 & 21.7 \\
Fastest & 177 & 526 & 2.3 & 5.0 \\
Slowest & 818 & 1708 & 71.0 & 54.0 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

Source: \textit{Goerdt, supra} note 88, at 39, Table 3.2.

\textsuperscript{97} Panels consist of less than the full membership of the court.

\textsuperscript{98} No statistics are available on the extent of this delay.

\textsuperscript{99} No statistics are available on the extent of this delay.

\textsuperscript{100} The number of opinions issued by state supreme courts varies widely across states. In 1989, for example, the number ranged from 65 in Delaware to 751 in Alabama. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, \textit{STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT 1989} 94-98 (1991). This difference partially reflects differences in counting methods. \textit{Id.} at 4.

\textsuperscript{101} The publication history of the opinions in Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem. Hosp., 714 P.2d 412 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984), \textit{aff'd in part, rev'd in part, remanded, and vacated}, 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985), illustrates this point: the appellate court opinion, which had denied a public policy claim, was issued on June 21, 1984, but not published until after the Arizona Supreme Court opinion, which allowed the claim, was issued on June 17, 1985.

\textsuperscript{102} If A prevailed before determination on the merits, the case may return for trial, although in unusual cases the Supreme Court might be able to render a judgment based upon agreed facts. If B prevailed, the case may return for additional proceedings on damages, attorneys' fees, and the like, or for a new trial for other reasons.
diversity jurisdiction existed or if the wrongful discharge claim was attached to other claims under federal law. B vs. A might begin in federal district court. Despite its location in a federal court, the wrongful discharge claim would still be interpreted under State Z's law and the federal court would have two options in deciding the case. First, the court could make an "Erie guess" as to the law of State Z. In doing so, the federal court would perform much the same analysis as a state trial or intermediate appellate court and examine the decisions of state courts in State Z. Although the role of the federal court would be to anticipate the developments in State Z's law, not to innovate independently, federal judges are not to be merely "ventriloquists' dummies." Instead the federal court is to function as a proxy for the entire state court system, and therefore must apply the law that it conscientiously believes would have been applied in the state court system, which includes the state appellate tribunals. In other words, the federal court must determine issues of state law as it believes the highest court of the state would determine them, not neces-

103. 28 U.S. § 1332 (1988); see also infra, part II.B.2.
105. Alternatively, B vs. A could begin in state court and be removed to federal court under the removal statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1990). Removal use has varied over time. A study of selected federal district courts between 1928 and 1930 found that 10% of all actions on the law docket had been removed from state courts (990 of 9852 cases). Business, supra note 96, tbl. 103, at 211. Of these removed cases, 4.6% were remanded back to the state courts. Id. tbl. 105, at 215. Remands did not all occur immediately: 50.8% were remanded after one year; only 19.1% were remanded in less than six months; and 27.8% were remanded over two years after removal. Id. tbl. 106, at 217. Removal use varied greatly across districts: from 48.9% in the Western District of North Carolina to 1.1% in the Eastern District of Louisiana. In more recent times removals have grown from 10,177 (6% of total filings) in 1980 to 25,924 (11.8% of total filings) in 1990. 1990 Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts Annual Report tbl. S-4, at 79 (1990).
106. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), is the case which established the modern guidelines for federal courts applying state law.
107. The court would, of course, also consider opinions from other federal courts deciding similar issues and applying State X's law.
108. Richardson v. Commissioner, 126 F.2d 562, 567 (2d Cir. 1942) (under the then-prevailing interpretation of Erie, federal judges were "to play the rule [sic] of ventriloquist's dummy to the courts of some particular state").
sarily (although usually this will be the case) as they have
been decided by other state courts in the past.\textsuperscript{109}

The second alternative, available in most but not all states, would
be for the federal court to certify a question of law to the State Z
Supreme Court.\textsuperscript{110} The State Z Supreme Court could then choose
to accept the certification, and after additional delay, answer the
question with an opinion. The opinion might be published, and
might require additional analysis applying the law to the facts by
the federal court.\textsuperscript{111}

After deciding the case, the federal district court could issue an
opinion, which the Federal Supplement or a specialized employ-
ment law reporter might publish.\textsuperscript{112} The dissatisfied party might

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{109} 17A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4507, at
89 (1982). A wrongful discharge opinion exemplifying this analysis is a 1981 case exam-
ining both Georgia and Texas law. See Phillips v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 651 F.2d
1051 (5th Cir. 1981). The Fifth Circuit was faced with a claim by an employee that
he had been discharged for refusing to commit perjury (similar to the first public policy
exception case, Peterman v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffers, Warehousemen &
After finding "no reported case in either jurisdiction which stands on fours with this one,"
the court turned to predicting the holdings of the Georgia and Texas Supreme Courts. \textit{Id.}
at 1055. The court predicted that neither would adopt the exception, stating:

The courts of Georgia and Texas have consistently held to the at-will doctrine.
We are unable to perceive the slightest indication of a shift toward recognition
of any exception to the at-will rule. Indeed, the intermediate appellate courts of
each state have expressly refused to recognize exceptions to the at-will rule
when faced with challenges that are analogous, although not identical, to that
urged by [plaintiff].

\textit{Id.} at 1056.

\textsuperscript{110} Certification is a relatively recent innovation. Although the Uniform Law Commiss-
oiners proposed a Uniform Act in 1967, only a few states adopted the act and Wright
and Miller conclude that "certification did not play an important role in the federal courts
until 1974." 17A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 109, § 4248, at 162-63. Most states provide
for certification to the state supreme court from the U.S. Supreme Court and court of
appeals and many also allow district courts to certify questions. \textit{Id.} § 4248, at 167-68.
Delaware allows certification only from the federal district courts. \textit{Id.} at 168 n.31. Burk v.
K-Mart Corp., 770 P.2d 24 (Okla. 1989), is an example of adoption of an exception to
the at-will rule in a certified question context.

\textsuperscript{111} Some states allow certification only where the answer is determinative of the case.
See 17A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 109, § 4248, at 170-71. Wyoming, for example,
allows certification only where "there is nothing left for the federal court to do but apply
the state's answer to the question and enter judgment consistent with the answer. This is
a severe restriction since often a great deal remains to be done in the federal proceeding
after the state court's answer is received." \textit{Id.} at 169.

\textsuperscript{112} Even an opinion adopting an exception might not be published. There are no com-
prehensive statistics on federal district court publication rates. One analysis of employment
discrimination cases in one federal district found 80% of the 4310 cases filed between
then appeal\textsuperscript{113} to the appropriate federal circuit court of appeals,\textsuperscript{114} which would also have the option in some states of certifying the question if the district court had not done so.\textsuperscript{115} From there, the case could go to the full circuit court sitting \textit{en banc}, and, in very unlikely circumstances, to the U.S. Supreme Court.\textsuperscript{116}

July 1, 1972 and March 31, 1987 did not result in a published district court opinion. Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue III, \textit{Studying the Iceberg from Its Tip: A Comparison of Published and Unpublished Employment Discrimination Cases}, 24 \textit{Law \& Soc'y Rev.} 1133, 1137 (1990). The percentage of cases with published opinions in this area has increased over time, however. \textit{See id.} fig. 1, at 1141. Publication rates also vary considerably across districts. \textit{Id.} at 1144. For example, Volume 812 of the \textit{Federal Supplement}, published in 1993, contains 238 opinions by district courts. Of these, 63 (the largest number) are from district courts in the Second Circuit and ten (the smallest number) are from the Fifth Circuit. Among Second Circuit district courts, over a third of the opinions come from the Southern District of New York while only two opinions are from the Northern District of New York.

Again these statistics suggest an area for concern for researchers, but not a solution. The decision to file in (or remove to) federal court, where possible, rather than state court is likely to be influenced significantly by the time to decision in each of the courts. Plaintiffs may prefer federal court where it is significantly faster, for example. (The decision will also depend on many other factors as well.) This selection effect may cause changes in adoption rates if only state court opinions are counted. \textit{See infra} part II.B.2.

113. A study of selected federal district courts found that 322 of 9852 civil cases pending in 1928-30 were appealed (3.4\%) and that 82 of 1816 diversity cases (4.5\%) were appealed. \textit{Business, supra} note 96, at 93. Only 14 of these cases were appealed to the Supreme Court, only one of which was a diversity action. \textit{Id.} tbl. 97, at 205. Although no comparable survey exists for modern times, a rough equivalent can be obtained by comparing district and circuit courts within the same year. In the twelve month period ending June 30, 1989, for example, there were 34,995 total cases begun in the courts of appeals and 233,293 cases begun in the district courts. Of these, 4287 appellate cases and 67,211 district court cases were diversity cases. Roughly equivalent percentages would therefore be fifteen and six percent, respectively. 1989 \textit{Director Of The Administrative Office of the United States Courts Annual Report}, app. I, tbl. B-7, at 17 & tbl. C-2, at 22 (1989).

114. Appeals in the federal system tend to be resolved relatively quickly. On September 30, 1984, for example, there were 713 cases under submission to federal courts of appeals for more than three months, 424 had been under submission for three to six months, 157 for six to nine months, 70 for nine to twelve months, and 62 for more than one year. \textit{Business, supra} note 96, tbl. 4, at 6. In the same period, 31,018 cases were terminated and 32,342 filed. \textit{Id.} tbl. 2, at 3. Cases with unpublished opinions are resolved much faster than those which produce a published opinion. \textit{See William L. Reynolds \& William M. Richman, An Evaluation of Limited Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals: The Price of Reform}, 48 \textit{U. Chi. L. Rev.} 573, tbl. 6, at 594 (1981) [hereinafter, Reynolds \& Richman, \textit{An Evaluation}].

115. The question of certification may cloud resolution of the legal issue of primary interest. In Phillips v. Goodyear Tire \& Rubber Co., 651 F.2d at 1051, 1057-58 (5th cir. 1981) (Brown, J., dissenting), for example, one judge dissented from the \textit{Erie} guess on the ground that the court should have certified the issue to the state court.

116. In the 1991 Term, for example, five percent of appeals and petitions for review were granted on the appellate docket and one-half percent of appeals and petitions for
Courts may resolve appeals on either procedural or substantive grounds. \(^{117}\)

Identifying when the law changes is not a simple task. Courts are not only not under an enforceable obligation to reveal when they have made an innovation, but the common law reasoning process encourages active concealment of innovation as the decision is portrayed as simply the culmination of a long series of decisions. \(^{118}\) I have identified eleven general areas in which re-

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Consolidation</th>
<th>Procedural</th>
<th>On Merits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All cases</td>
<td>3,845 (9.1%)</td>
<td>14,989 (35.8%)</td>
<td>23,071 (55.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private civil cases</td>
<td>1,426 (11%)</td>
<td>5,193 (39.9%)</td>
<td>6,385 (49.1%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Of the terminations on the merits, these took the following form:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Affirmed/ Enforced</th>
<th>Dismissed</th>
<th>Reversed</th>
<th>Remanded</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All cases</td>
<td>18,280 (79.2%)</td>
<td>1,302 (5.6%)</td>
<td>2,668 (11.6%)</td>
<td>530 (2.3%)</td>
<td>291 (1.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private civil cases</td>
<td>4,975 (77.9%)</td>
<td>269 (4.2%)</td>
<td>987 (15.5%)</td>
<td>116 (1.8%)</td>
<td>38 (0.6%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 1991 AO REPORT, supra, Table B-5, at 23.

\(^{118}\) In the case of employment-at-will, most courts, perhaps recognizing the futility of concealing such a dramatic change, have been relatively open about admitting innovation. See, e.g., Parner v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625, 631 (Haw. 1982) (adopting public policy exception and stating that "[b]ecause courts are a proper forum for modifica-
searchers must make decisions: (1) opinions of intermediate courts of appeal and trial courts; (2) federal courts applying state law; (3) dicta;\(^{119}\) (4) unpublished opinions; (5) statutory interpretation cases; (6) sources of cases; (7) definition of the period; (8) flip-flops; (9) dismissals and summary judgments; (10) denials; and (11) ex post verification. I now turn to the factors to consider in making these decisions.

1. Intermediate Appellate Courts and Trial Courts

States can have several levels of courts: trial, intermediate appellate, and final.\(^{120}\) The state supreme court has the final word on a state’s law, so that a new rule can be considered finally adopted only when the state supreme court has spoken.\(^{121}\) States may operate for years, however, with only intermediate appellate opinions on a subject.\(^{122}\) Until then, one intermediate appellate opinion of the judicially created at-will doctrine, it is appropriate that we correct inequities resulting from harsh application of the doctrine by recognizing its inapplicability in a narrow class of cases.

Such directness is not, however, universal. See, e.g., Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffers, Warehousemen & Helpers of America, Local 396, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (creating the first public policy exception without citing authority or acknowledging it was changing a statutory rule). Similarly, when it radically changed its interpretation of New Hampshire’s implied covenant exception, the New Hampshire Supreme Court insisted that it had not changed the law. See Howard v. Dorr Woolen Co., 414 A.2d 1273, 1274 (N.H. 1980). See also supra notes 6 and 81.

Opinions which recognize the existence of a cause of action but find it inapplicable to the facts of the case at hand.

For details on court structure, see National Center for State Courts, State Court Caseload Statistics: Annual Report 1989, pt. 4, at 167 (1991) (including flow charts of court structure for each state). Some states have more than one final court, dividing jurisdiction by subject matter: Texas, for example, has both a civil (the Texas Supreme Court) and criminal court of last resort (the Court of Criminal Appeals). Some states have specialized courts of limited jurisdiction which potentially adds a fourth layer from which appeals can go to the general jurisdiction trial courts. Continuing with the Texas example, besides the 384 district courts (10 of which handle only criminal matters), in 1989 Texas had 254 constitutional county courts, 17 probate courts, 157 county courts, 928 justice of the peace courts, and 838 municipal courts. Id. at 216. Appeals from some of these courts are to the district courts. For example, county courts have appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases where the original jurisdiction lies with the justice courts and other inferior courts. 2 Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 26.046 (West 1988).

The Monge-Dorr problem remains, however. See supra notes 6 and 81.

In California, for example, the California Supreme Court did not address the public policy exception until Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980), over 20 years after Petermann, the first intermediate court opinion to adopt the exception. Similarly, in Ohio, Feazel offers the following account of a particular point of law:
court may ignore or disagree with the opinion of another.\footnote{123} Trial court opinions have even less precedential value.\footnote{124} Whether to count lower court opinions makes a great deal of difference dating the adoptions of exceptions to the at-will rule, as Table 2 shows.\footnote{125}

If one is concerned with the final adoption of a rule, one approach may be simply to wait until the state supreme court has spoken. There are a number of difficulties with this approach. First, not all states have intermediate courts of appeal, while some have more than one.\footnote{126} This obviously affects both the incentive struc-

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In 1904 a common pleas judge had before him the question of whether or not the owner of real estate could be enjoined from erecting an apartment house upon his lot when the deed by which he acquired the same contained a restriction to the effect that the lot should be used for "residence purposes only." The court decided that the erection of an apartment house would be a violation of the restriction and allowed the injunction in a well written opinion which is reported in the case of Burton vs. Stapley, 17 Ohio Decisions 1. This was the first reported decision in Ohio upon this subject, and the case was carried to the circuit court where the decision below was affirmed without report, and from the circuit to the Supreme Court where it was again affirmed without report. 74 Ohio State 461. It thus happened that though both the Circuit Court and Supreme Court had passed upon this important question for a number of years the only reported opinion was that of the trial judge.


\footnote{123} In Michigan, for example, one intermediate appellate court panel issued a decision on November 8, 1977, rejecting an implied contract theory, while another issued an opinion on November 9, 1977, accepting the theory. Illinois had a similar experience. See Appendix B for more detailed descriptions of these cases.

\footnote{124} Sometimes trial court opinions are important. Delaware, for example, adopted the at-will rule through a trial court opinion. \textit{See supra} note 94. In more recent times, some exceptions have been adopted by federal district courts before any state appellate court. \textit{See infra} part II.B.2. See Appendix B for a more detailed discussion of specific lower court opinions.

\footnote{125} Table 2, \textit{infra}, contains the dates of the opinions adopting exceptions to the at-will rule which meet the following criteria: all are lower state court opinions cited by Krueger, Dertouzos and Karoly, or myself in support of the adoption of an exception, except those which come after a state supreme court opinion which I identified as adopting an exception. For the purposes of this table, I accepted the characterization of the opinions cited by Krueger or Dertouzos and Karoly as they gave them. Some additional research was done to identify cases adopting the rule after intermediate court opinions cited by one or more of the three papers when no other paper cited a later state supreme court opinion.

\footnote{126} In 1989, for example, 13 jurisdictions had no intermediate appellate court: Delaware, the District of Columbia, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, \textit{supra} note 120, at 70. Seven states—Alabama, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Texas—had multiple appellate courts at least at one level, which allows for conflicting precedents at that level. \textit{Id.} at 72. The remaining jurisdictions had one intermediate appellate court and one court of last resort.
ture of the courts and the speed with which the court of last resort will speak to an issue. The structure of the intermediate court also makes a difference. Texas, for example, has fourteen courts of appeal, with eighty judges sitting in panels.127 Utah, on the other hand, has only one court of appeal with seven judges sitting in panels.128 The potential for conflicting rulings among Utah intermediate appellate panels is obviously much lower than the potential for conflict among Texas appellate courts and panels, even after taking into account the differences in caseload which result from differences in population.129

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127. Id. at 62-69.
128. Id. at 216.
129. The filing rates per 100,000 population are not that different: 56,939 trial court cases in Texas in 1989 versus 41,180 in Utah in 1989. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 120, at 106-07. The outputs, however, are quite different: the Utah Court of Appeals reported only 326 signed opinions in 1987, while the Texas Courts of Appeals produced 5,324 (46.67 opinions per Utah judge vs. 66.55 per Texas judge). See id. at 96, 98.
Table 2  Intermediate and State Supreme Court Datings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Exception</th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Lower Court</th>
<th>Court of Last Resort</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>IC</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>6/14/83</td>
<td>4/25/84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>PP</td>
<td>M,R</td>
<td>9/30/59</td>
<td>6/2/80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>IC</td>
<td>M,K</td>
<td>2/6/76</td>
<td>12/29/88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>IC</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>3/31/72</td>
<td>12/29/88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>PP</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>7/1/88</td>
<td>1/13/92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>IC</td>
<td>R,K</td>
<td>6/14/84</td>
<td>1/20/87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>PP</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>10/1/85</td>
<td>1/27/87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>GF</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>6/10/80</td>
<td>7/3/84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>GF</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>1/16/85</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>IC</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>12/20/74</td>
<td>1/30/87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>IC</td>
<td>K</td>
<td>7/26/86</td>
<td>1/30/87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansas</td>
<td>PP</td>
<td>M,R,K</td>
<td>6/19/81</td>
<td>3/25/88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansas</td>
<td>IC</td>
<td>M,R,K</td>
<td>8/2/84</td>
<td>6/12/87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>PP</td>
<td>M,R,K</td>
<td>11/18/86</td>
<td>6/26/87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>PP</td>
<td>M,R</td>
<td>11/5/85</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>PP</td>
<td>K</td>
<td>12/26/79</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>IC</td>
<td>M,R</td>
<td>1/18/83</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>PP</td>
<td>M,R</td>
<td>7/5/83</td>
<td>9/21/84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>PP</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>7/17/78</td>
<td>Rejected-3/29/83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Carolina</td>
<td>PP</td>
<td>M,R,K</td>
<td>5/7/85</td>
<td>7/26/89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>PP</td>
<td>M,R</td>
<td>2/11/85</td>
<td>3/14/90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>IC</td>
<td>M,R</td>
<td>3/21/82</td>
<td>8/9/85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>IC</td>
<td>K</td>
<td>3/30/84</td>
<td>8/9/85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oklahoma</td>
<td>IC</td>
<td>M,K</td>
<td>12/28/76</td>
<td>6/9/87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>IC</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>11/5/81</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>PP</td>
<td>M,R</td>
<td>6/7/84</td>
<td>4/3/85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>IC</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>4/11/85</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>PP</td>
<td>M,K</td>
<td>1/28/80</td>
<td>7/1/83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Method:  K: Krueger; M: Morriss; R: Dertouzos & Karoly (RAND)
Key: IC: Implied Contract; GF: Good Faith; PP: Public Policy
There is scattered research on the effects of creation of an intermediate appellate court on a state's legal system. Researchers have hypothesized two primary effects: (1) a reduction in the workload of the court of last resort, and (2) increased policymaking by the court of last resort. These effects will result in several important differences in the appearance of legal innovations. First, to the extent that intermediate courts concentrate on routine decisions, cases which could result in a policy innovation will take longer to reach courts of last resort, potentially delaying the innovation. Second, the intermediate court may increase the chance of the court of last resort adopting an innovation by allowing the final court more time to consider the cases it does decide.

PRINCIPLE 4: Researchers should base their choice of whether to include intermediate or trial court decisions on the theoretical model. They should include lower court opinions when modeling changes in the law but exclude those opinions when modeling the behavior of courts of last resort.

2. Federal Courts

Even when only state common law is concerned, federal courts play an important role since a federal court may consider a state's common law on a subject before the state's own courts have spoken. Table 3 shows the dates of the federal opinions in the

130. The most comprehensive surveys of this research are NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURTS: IMPROVING CASE PROCESSING (1990), and John A. Stookey, Creating an Intermediate Court of Appeals: Work Load and Policymaking Consequences, in THE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL REFORM 153 (Philip L. Dubois ed., 1982).

131. See Stookey, supra note 130, at 153. Stookey argues that the crucial step is the granting of discretionary review authority to the court of last resort. See id. at 165-66. Since that review is impossible without the creation of an intermediate court, the distinction does not seem to be critical.

wrongful discharge area relied on by the three papers discussed here as well as the subsequent state court rulings and shows that counting federal opinions makes a significant difference.133

Table 3 Federal vs. State Court Opinions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Exception</th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Erie Guess</th>
<th>State Court</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>Implied Contract</td>
<td>Krueger</td>
<td>8/14/84</td>
<td>7/10/87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>Public Policy</td>
<td>Morriss</td>
<td>9/18/85</td>
<td>7/11/88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>Implied Contract</td>
<td>Morriss</td>
<td>10/18/83</td>
<td>6/14/84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.C.</td>
<td>Public Policy</td>
<td>Morriss</td>
<td>1/26/86</td>
<td>9/17/91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>Good Faith</td>
<td>Krueger</td>
<td>3/16/84</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>Public Policy</td>
<td>Morriss</td>
<td>5/28/80</td>
<td>2/18/82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>Public Policy</td>
<td>Morriss</td>
<td>7/17/87</td>
<td>8/19/93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>Implied Contract</td>
<td>Morriss</td>
<td>9/9/83</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

How should one treat opinions by these courts? One approach is a categorical exclusion.134 Some circumstances may justify this approach. For example, if one is modeling the behavior of judges, state court judges will obviously have different incentives to adopt a change than federal judges because state court judges often are elected or appointed for relatively short terms while federal judges are appointed for life.135 If the concern is the effect of the law on the behavior of others, a categorical exclusion is difficult to sup-

133. Table 3, infra, includes all federal opinions cited by any of the three papers except opinions which are dated after a state court opinion which I identified as adopting the exception. For the purposes of this table, I accepted the characterization of the opinions cited by Krueger or Dertouzos and Karoly as they gave them.

134. That is, for example, the strategy Dertouzos and Karoly chose. See DERTOUZOS & KAROLY, supra note 2, at 10 n.3.

135. This is especially true of territorial judges who were appointed for limited terms but whose incentives were very different from those of state court judges after statehood. See Morriss, Exploding Myths, supra note 132, at 720-22. In these cases, the existence of a federal court decision might be handled more properly as an independent variable or the adoption by either court treated as competing risks.

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port. Federal judges' role under the *Erie* doctrine is to anticipate the development of the law in the state.\(^\text{136}\) Their judgment is a strong indicator that the law has in fact changed, although their record is not perfect.\(^\text{137}\) Thus, where the model is of a change in the law, there is little justification for a categorical ban.

In general, a case-by-case analysis of the federal court opinions seems to be the best approach. Factors to consider should include the familiarity of the court rendering the opinion with the law of the state in question,\(^\text{138}\) the importance of the doctrine to the result,\(^\text{139}\) and the strength of the court's opinion.\(^\text{140}\)

PRINCIPLE 5: Researchers should count federal court diversity opinions when the model concerns the behavior of the

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\(^{136}\) See *supra* notes 103-109 and accompanying text.

\(^{137}\) See, e.g., *Samples* v. Hall of Mississippi, Inc., 673 F. Supp. 1413 (D. Miss. 1987). The federal court initially made an *Erie* guess that Mississippi would allow an implied contract claim based on supervisory guidelines governing terminations and allegations of promises to employees. *Id.* at 1417. Shortly before this opinion was issued, the Mississippi Supreme Court rejected the doctrine in *Perry v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.*, 508 So. 2d 1086 (Miss. 1987). When the federal court became aware of that opinion, it modified its holding to find that the implied contract theory was not available. *Samples*, 673 F. Supp. at 1418-19.

\(^{138}\) For example, more weight should be given to a federal court sitting in Texas interpreting Texas law than a federal court in Illinois interpreting Texas law. See *infra* notes 257-58. The classic reference on this point is *Bishop* v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 345 (1976). See also Dan T. Coenen, *To Defer or Not to Defer: A Study of Federal Circuit Court Deference to District Court Rulings on State Law*, 73 MINN. L. REV. 899 (1989) (summarizing and analyzing circuit court deference to district court rulings on state law).

\(^{139}\) For example, the conclusion of the court in *High v. Sperry Corp.*, 581 F. Supp. 1246 (S.D. Iowa 1984), that there was sufficient evidence to survive a motion to dismiss is worthy of less attention than a direct *Erie* guess that a cause of action exists in a state as in *McKinney v. National Dairy Council*, 491 F. Supp. 1108 (D. Mass. 1980). Weaker still is *Hass v. Picker Int'l Inc.*, 122 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2367 (D. Mass. 1986). The BNA Individual Employment Rights Manual summarizes the three-paragraph opinion as allowing a claim based on "statements in an employee handbook and representations by the employer's agent that [the employee] would be employed for a term in excess of one year." *Bureau of National Affairs, Individual Employment Rights Manual* 505:434 (1991). That opinion merely rejected a summary judgment motion, saying "although plaintiff's evidence appears to be gossamer thin it cannot be ruled with certainty that there is no question of material fact lurking in this case." *Hass*, 122 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2368. Given the procedural posture, this is less than "gossamer thin" authority for the existence of such a cause of action in Massachusetts. See also discussion *infra* part II.B.3.

\(^{140}\) *Brooks v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.*, 574 F. Supp. 805 (D. Colo. 1983), embodies both a strong and weak finding in one opinion. With respect to the implied contract exception, *Brooks* made a careful argument as to why Colorado would recognize the exception. *Id.* at 808-10. With respect to the public policy exception, however, *Brooks* misstated previous precedent. *Id.* at 809. See also Appendix B.
public or change in the law but not when modeling state courts' behavior.

3. Dicta

Cases III, IV, and V in Table 1 present an additional problem area. In these types of opinions, courts hint that they are sympathetic to claims that the law really is Rule X, but some other rule prevents them from reaching that issue. Their comments about Rule X are therefore dicta and not binding on future courts deciding the issue. The strength of dicta varies enormously. The weakest version might simply mention that a party has made a claim that Rule X applies but never go beyond the simple mention of the claim. At the other extreme, a court could undertake an extensive analysis of a rule but ultimately decide not to reach the issue on the merits. How should one handle these cases? The answer will again depend upon the model under consideration.

The common law exceptions to the at-will rule provide an

141. See, e.g., Hass, 122 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2368. “Given the fact that a complaint is to be read favorably to the party resisting a motion for summary judgment, I rule that although plaintiff's evidence appears to be gossamer thin it cannot be noted with certainty that there is no question of material fact lurking in this case.” This passage is the entire substantive discussion of this issue in this opinion.

142. See, e.g., M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 596 S.W.2d 681 (Ark. 1980). In between these two extremes is Chin v. AT&T, 410 N.Y.S.2d 737 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978) (subsequent history omitted). In the trial court opinion in Chin, the court discussed a public policy claim, which it termed a claim under “the doctrine of abusive discharge”:

Although it does not appear that this doctrine has been recognized in this state, it is appropriate, on a motion of this nature, to examine the elements of the cause of action to determine whether the complaint alleges sufficient facts upon which relief might be granted at trial. Since plaintiff is proceeding on a cause of action not presently recognized in this state, he bears a heavy burden of demonstrating that this new cause of action should be adopted. . . .

At the threshold, the doctrine of abusive discharge places upon the plaintiff the burden of persuading this court that (1) there is a public policy of this state that (2) was violated by the defendant. Plaintiff herein has not sufficiently demonstrated that public policy, derived from or bottomed on New York constitutional, statutory or decisional law, exists that would restrict the right of a private employer to discharge an employee at will due to the employee's political beliefs, activities and associations.

This is not to say that such public policy does not exist; it merely is to say that plaintiff herein has not sustained his burden of persuasion. While this court is not averse to recognizing new causes of action or defenses where clearly warranted, such recognition should only be given upon a substantial showing which has not been made here.

Id. at 740-41 (citation omitted).
excellent example of this issue. Particularly in the 1970s and early 1980s, courts often indicated sympathy for a particular exception in dicta but then concluded that, even if the exception were to be adopted, that this particular plaintiff would not qualify for it. Whether such an opinion should count depends on how strongly the opinion endorsed the theory. For example, in Abrisz v. Pulley Freight Lines, Inc., the Iowa Supreme Court stated:

This appeal is before us on a narrow and clearly defined issue. Plaintiff asks us to carve out an exception to the employment at-will rule and to provide a remedy when such employment is terminated for reasons contrary to public policy. This doctrine has recently gained considerable favor with courts. . . . We do not decide if an employee under an at-will contract is without a remedy under any circumstances, as the dissent in Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co. and authorities there cited insist. We hold only that under the facts of this case there is no showing that plaintiff’s discharge was violative of public policy. Since the court avoided the issue entirely, I did not consider Abrisz as adopting the public policy exception, even though a plaintiff later argued the opinion established the exception. On the other hand, I did use Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation District. In dicta, the Idaho Supreme Court stated, “[a]s a general exception to the [at-will] rule . . . an employee may claim damages for wrongful discharge when the motivation for the firing contravenes public policy.” This unambiguous statement, later relied on by the same court as the source of the rule, is sufficient to create the perception that the rule has changed.

Dicta must be handled carefully. Reliance on it can cause major changes in datings. In the case of Idaho’s public policy exception, for example, the dicta upon which Dertouzos and Karoly and I relied predates the more conclusive opinion counted by Krueger by eight years. Scholars can avoid over-counting or under-counting only by careful legal analysis of the opinions.

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143. 270 N.W.2d 454 (Iowa 1978).
144. Id. at 455-57 (citations omitted).
146. 563 P.2d 54 (Idaho 1977).
147. Id. at 57.
149. See Appendix B.
150. Dertouzos and Karoly cite dicta in Jones v. Keogh, 409 A.2d 581 (Vt. 1979) for a
PRINCIPLE 6: Careful legal analysis of dicta is necessary to determine whether it is a basis for counting a case.

4. Unpublished, Depublished, and Limited Authority Opinions

Courts do not publish all their opinions\(^{151}\) and not all published opinions are officially published.\(^{152}\) This creates a dilemma narrow public policy exception and Payne v. Rozendaal, 520 A.2d 586 (Vt. 1986) for a broad one. Krueger and I counted only Payne. In rejecting a public policy claim, the Jones' court noted:

The basic common law rule which still is widely accepted is that which was pronounced by this Court in Mullaney v. C.H. Goss Co. Ever present in those opinions recognizing the common law rule is the concern that acceptance of a rule extending enforceable contract rights to an at-will employee would destroy the mutuality of obligation extant in such employment relationships. Accordingly, courts generally have been unwilling to uphold suits by discharged employees at-will unless there is a clear and compelling public policy against the reason advanced for the discharge.

While full employment and employer-employee harmony are noble goals to which society aspires, they alone do not present the clear and compelling public policies upon which courts have been willing to rely in upholding an action for discharge of an employee at-will. Nor is the fact that bad faith, malice and retaliation are motives upon which we look askance sufficient to impel us to find a clear and compelling public policy where, as here, there is none.

Jones, 409 A.2d at 582 (citations omitted). Payne later cites a fragment of this language: "In Vermont, under an "at-will" employment contract, an employee may be discharged at any time with or without cause, 'unless there is a clear and compelling public policy against the reason advanced for the discharge.'" Payne, 520 A.2d at 588 (emphasis in original) (quoting Jones, 409 A.2d at 582). Thus Payne's discussion of what "courts generally" have been unwilling to do was transformed into the definition of Vermont's public policy exception. Justice Peck's dissent notes that Jones is actually a unanimous endorsement of the at-will rule. Id. at 591-92 (Peck, J., dissenting). Despite the Payne court's reference to Jones, it would be difficult to construe its passing reference to "courts generally" as forecasting a change in a Vermont rule it had just endorsed.

151. "Opinion" is an imprecise term. Courts issue a variety of products: orders, memorandum, per curiam opinions, signed opinions, judgments, and so forth.

152. Federal district court opinions are not officially published but are widely available in West's Federal Supplement, online in WESTLAW and LEXIS, and in a variety of subject matter and other services which publish opinions (including those of other courts) unofficially. Some of these, such as the CCH and BNA services, have wide circulation. Others do not. One example is Coffey's Probate Decisions, which consist of the decisions of Judge James V. Coffey, a 19th century judge of the probate court in San Francisco. A commentator describe these reports as follows:

Although not buoyed up, nor made prominent through the prestige of a high court, yet by virtue of his learning and great ability as a judge, his decisions have attained renown and permanency on their merits, having been published in six volumes at $5.00 each, and being of exceptional value to a practitioner.

Fred H. Peterson, Court Opinions and Reports, 86 CENT. L.J. 428, 430 (1918).
for researchers: should they count unpublished opinions? If so, how can scholars find these opinions? One appellate judge termed such opinions “a personal letter from the panel to the trial court judge and the parties informing them of the decision and the rationale behind it.” It is tempting to resolve these questions with a simple bright line rule: only opinions which appear in official reporters count. Such a rule certainly eases the burden for the researcher. It also has the ring of common sense: if a court chooses not to publish an opinion, it cannot be important and should not count because the law’s addressees will not be aware of the change. In many circumstances, however, adopting such a rule would be a serious mistake. For example, when unpublished decisions are

Ohio’s publication history is well-documented and presents an excellent example of the multiplicity of unofficial reports. Official reporting of Ohio Supreme Court decisions began in 1823, although the Court was organized in 1803. In addition to the official reports, a volume of “Ohio Supreme Court Decisions (Unreported)” was issued. Appellate courts called “district courts” sat from 1851 to 1883 and a commentator notes that “[their] opinions carried great weight.” Feszler, supra note 122, at 10. Their decisions were not officially reported, but many appeared in legal periodicals and many were later reprinted in Ohio Decisions, Reprint which was published between 1869 and 1899. Id. at 11. This reporter not only included decisions published earlier but also approximately 100 opinions previously “overlooked.” Id. at 12. The opinions of the Ohio Circuit Courts, courts which existed from 1885 to 1912, were reported in three sets of reporters. George C. Trautwein, Ohio Courts and The Reports of Their Decisions, 7 U. Cin. L. Rev. 60, 64-65 (1933). The Courts of Appeals, which replaced the Circuit Courts in 1912, had opinions reported among six different reporters, some officially and some not. Id. at 65-66. In addition, a number of trial courts also had opinions published in a variety of reporters. See generally William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, The Supreme Court Rules for the Reporting of Opinions: A Critique, 46 Ohio St. L.J. 313, 315-18 (1985); Robert L. Black, Jr., Unveiling Ohio’s Hidden Court, 16 Akron L. Rev. 107 (1982); Trautwein, supra. Despite repeated attempts to suppress the unpublished opinions, market demand continued to be met by private publishers.

In 1915, Ohio appellate judges were given the power to choose which opinions were to be published. The judges published a small fraction of all cases handed down, successfully reducing the weight of the official reports, but unpublished cases refuse to lie dormant. Private periodical services began to appear. Unreported cases from certain courts are kept in complete files in the courts and collected by local firms by subscriptions. . . . Many cases turn upon the adequacy of the unofficial reports and follow cases cited in the better unofficial reports.


154. This is particularly true of research into cases’ attributes, a subject not treated in this paper. See Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 112, at 1150-56, for a review of the differences between published and unpublished cases in this regard. For example, Siegelman and Donohue found important differences between published and unpublished
widely circulated, failing to count them may result in overestimating the time until adoption of a particular legal change.

Courts’ creation and use of unpublished decisions poses a far more complex problem than the “personal letter” characterization suggests. Attorneys seek out and regularly make use of unpublished opinions, and any study which attempts to measure the impact of decisions on the bar and/or clients must consider unpublished opinions generally available among the population of interest.155

employment discriminations opinions with respect to the types of claims pursued, the statute relied on, the type of discrimination alleged, the occupation of plaintiffs, the industry of the defendants, the remedy sought, and the outcomes. Id.


One commentator describes how the First District Court of Appeals in Ohio has an index available to the bar, beginning with 1972 and containing 2500 cases; other districts also have indices. Black, supra note 152, at 109. Black also notes that Ohio Appellate Decisions on microfiche covers all opinions beginning in 1981 and that Banks-Baldwin Law Publishing Company publishes an Ohio Appellate Decisions Index. Id. at 112. The Ohio Revised Code Annotated published by Banks-Baldwin also digests these unpublished opinions.

In Arkansas, where “unpublished” opinions are in fact published in the Arkansas Legislative Digest, an unofficial supplement to the official Arkansas Reports, over 65% of attorneys responding to a questionnaire answered the question “Do you usually read the ‘unpublished opinions’ [of the Arkansas Supreme Court]?” as either “Definitely yes” or “To some extent yes.” Newbem & Wilson, supra, at 40-42. See also J. Myron Jacobstein, Some Reflections on the Control of the Publication of Appellate Court Opinions, 27 STAN. L. REV. 791, 792 n.4. (1975) (noting the formation of a subscription service by the Federal Bar Association for federal district court opinions in New Jersey); Gideon Kanner, The Unpublished Appellate Opinion: Friend or Foe?, 48 CAL. ST. B.J. 387, 436 n.12 (1973) (“My own practice is largely appellate in nature, and it generally falls into the substantive field of eminent domain. I have, therefore, assiduously collected all unpublished opinions relating to eminent domain...”).

Kanner mentions the “Unpublished Cases Department” of the California State Bar Journal. Id. at 447 n.77. See also Jacobstein, supra, at 798 n.36 (noting California subscription service for search and seizure cases and quoting editor as saying “subscribers from all over the state report winning case after case in trial courts by citing unpublished opinions”). In earlier times in California when the Supreme Court was the only court of appeal, it did not publish all its opinions, which led to the privately published California Unreported Cases Reporter. Eugene M. Prince, Law Books, Unlimited, 32 A.B.A. J. 134, 136 (1962). See also Wood, supra note 152, at 612 n.14. Similar circumstances existed in Texas, where Posey’s Unreported Cases filled the gap for Texas practitioners. See also
Despite formal rules prohibiting citation of unpublished opinions, these opinions often still reach and influence decisionmakers.\footnote{156} Even among published opinions, subsequent court action limits some opinions' authority in ways more subtle than a simple reversal. Higher courts may indicate a degree of approval in denying a request for discretionary review or, less subtly, an opinion may be "depublished."\footnote{157}

Although complaints about the volume of reported decisions\footnote{158}
date back almost to the first common law reports,\textsuperscript{159} the time period under consideration is an important factor in whether to count a particular opinion, because publication and citation practices have varied significantly across time as well as among courts.\textsuperscript{160} While the variation is too great to permit a summary here,\textsuperscript{161} the key lesson is that the period under study will affect the decision of

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161. \textit{Publication in the United States generally is a decision made by the court. West Publishing, for example, never refuses to publish an opinion.} Robert A. Leflar, \textit{Some Observations Concerning Judicial Opinions}, 61 \textit{Colum. L. Rev.} 810, 815 (1961). The individual states and federal circuits have used various methods to determine which opinions to publish. See Francis P. Whitehair, \textit{Some Suggestions for the Elimination or Reduction of Publication of Unnecessary Opinions}, 21 \textit{Fla. L. Rev.} 225, 228-29 (1947). Among the methods used are commissions, discretion of the court, and mandatory publication. Some courts publish all their opinions. The United States Supreme Court, for example, publishes all its opinions, although a few early 18th century opinions were not published. Most courts do not publish all their opinions. Some courts, such as the Fifth Circuit, have rules allowing them to decide cases without written opinion. \textit{See, e.g., 5th Cir. R. 47.6.} There is thus no ‘opinion’ left unpublished in those cases; in others there is a written but unpublished opinion. Some of the courts which selectively publish their opinions have formal policies describing, with varying degrees of specificity, the criteria used to select opinions for publication. There is a surprisingly large amount of legal literature on the merits of these policies which provides some guidance, but there is no comprehensive guide to publication policies across courts and across time. The most comprehensive source on this issue is Leah Chanin, \textit{A Survey of the Writing and Publication of Opinions in Federal and State Appellate Courts}, 67 \textit{Law Libr. J.} 362 (1974). This article covers the then-current policies in all states and federal circuits. The publication policies which are the best documented are those of the federal appellate courts and these can be used as examples here. \textit{See generally Reynolds & Richman, An Evaluation, supra note 114, at 575-77 and Reynolds & Richman, Limited Publication, supra note 155, at 810-14.}
how to handle unpublished and limited authority cases. From the limited research in existence, there is evidence of considerable variation both between and within courts in the content and nature of these opinions. Researchers deciding how to use unpublished and limited authority materials need to consider several issues with respect to particular courts: (i) publication policies; (ii) distribution policies; (iii) citation policies; and (iv) limitations on authority. Because the policies have changed over time and across courts, the answer may also differ from court to court and across time.

Court opinions fill many needs other than providing precedent. Both published and unpublished opinions resolve particular disputes. Although not providing general precedent, unpublished opinions establish the law of the case for the case in which they arose and are sometimes used for preclusion purposes. Under some circumstances, they provide precedent. Where courts have adopted formal publication policies which establish criteria for publication, these policies provide valuable guidance to the researcher. Even when such policies exist, and they are all too rare at the state level, the researcher must still be alert to an opin-

162. The Ninth Circuit, for example, wrote lengthy unpublished opinions in social security disability appeals. Robel, supra note 156, at 943 n.17. In Kentucky before 1976, unpublished decisions of the Kentucky Supreme Court consisted of a simple statement that the decision below was correct. One such opinion is quoted in full in Render, supra note 153, at 147: "This case has been reviewed by a panel of three circuit judges and by this court. All are of the opinion that the judgment is correct and should be affirmed." Decoursey v. Ashland Oil & Refining Co., No. F-20-72 (Ky. Sept. 27, 1974). Where unpublished decisions are of such character, the interest lies primarily in whether they strengthen or weaken the lower court opinion.

163. Most obviously, opinions resolve a legal issue between parties. In doing so, the opinion demonstrates that the appellate court has considered the issues raised by the appellant, and so encourages confidence in the judicial system. In the case of reversals, opinions inform the lower court of the rationale for overturning decisions. Opinions also provide a record for use in future assertions of collateral estoppel, law of the case, and res judicata.

164. For example, a federal district judge in the Northern District of Illinois held that a prior unpublished opinion from the same district holding a Chicago statute unconstitutionally overbroad and vague required the statute be held unconstitutional in a new suit five years later by different plaintiffs. See George M. Weaver, The Precedental Value of Unpublished Judicial Opinions, 39 MERCER L. REV. 477, 482-83 (1988).

165. Most states have no official standards for publication. See Chanin, supra note 161, at 362. The Federal Judicial Center has published Standards for Publication as a recommendation for federal courts of appeal, and these standards are useful in considering what may be published:

(1) the opinion lays down a new rule of law, or alters or modifies an existing rule; (2) the opinion involves a legal issue of continuing public interest; (3) the opinion criticizes existing law; or (4) the opinion resolves an apparent conflict
ion which gains widespread currency with the bar without publication. One cannot, therefore, regard such policies as conclusive.

When the research concerns the impact of decisions on the bar and/or public, the distribution of unpublished decisions is an important factor. Some courts limit distribution to the parties and lower court; others permit subscription to unpublished decisions. When the distribution of the opinion is limited, its impact on the public and bar is likely also to be limited.

In addition to limiting publication and distribution, some courts have formal rules governing citation of unpublished decisions. Some courts allow citation of unpublished opinions as precedential authority without limit, others limit the circumstances under which they may be cited, while still others forbid their cita-
Where the issue is when the law changed, the precedential value of unpublished opinions is critical to the determination of whether to count the opinion.

The inclusion of unpublished material on LEXIS and WESTLAW makes identification of recent unpublished opinions easier (and more important) for researchers. A study of legal changes in all states in the 1920s, for example, could not include as thorough an analysis of unpublished opinions (although it would have to address the use of unofficial reporters), while a study of changes in the 1980s could and should be much more complete. Studies of a particular state, and treatment of the identified decisions, should be based on consideration of factors such as citation, publication, and distribution policies and the existence of distribution mechanisms.

Even when courts have published opinions, subsequent events short of direct review may affect the opinions’ precedential value. Some states have or have had procedures for giving partial approval or partial disapproval to opinions of lower courts. Opinions also sometimes disappear between the advance sheets and the final reporter volumes. These are not simply unpublished opinions provide attorneys with unpublished opinions. See Black, supra note 152, at 107 n.2. Professional associations of attorneys provide both summaries and full reports of unpublished opinions in various areas. Id. at 108-09.

171. See 9TH Cir. R. 36-3 ("A disposition that is not for publication shall not be regarded as precedent . . . except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel."); Ark. S. Ct. R. 5.2(d). See generally Newbern & Wilson, supra note 155. For a useful comparison of citation policies, see Reynolds & Richman, Limited Publication, supra note 155, at 812-14.

172. In Texas, for example, the state Supreme Court can refuse to hear discretionary cases with one of several notations. "Writ refused" and "writ refused no reversible error," for example, denote cases with greater and lesser authority, respectively; cases in which no writ of error has been sought are reported with the notation "no writ." The writ history is rarely reported outside Texas and is not mentioned in the Bluebook.

During the first part of this century, the California Supreme Court commented on lower court opinions without writing new ones: it “withheld its approval” of some, “approved” part or all of others, and "expressed no opinion" as to the merits of others. See, e.g., Robert G. Berrey, Comment, 13 S. CAL. L. REV. 461 (1940); Comment, Courts: Significance of the Practice of the California Supreme Court of Commenting on the Opinion of the District Court of Appeal When Denying A Hearing After Judgment, 28 CAL. L. REV. 81 (1939). Clearly, researchers need to be aware of such procedures and their effects as to the validity of lower court opinions.

173. See Render, supra note 153, at 156-58 for a description of such a case in Kentucky. The parties settled after the Kentucky Court of Appeals had ruled and the opinion had appeared in the Kentucky Law Summary. After settlement, the parties made a joint motion to the Kentucky Supreme Court asking that the Court of Appeals opinion not be published; this motion was granted. Curiously, the order directing the case not be pub-
but opinions whose bases have been questioned. They should therefore not be counted, although their existence should be noted. Finally, since 1971, California has used a practice which allows the California Supreme Court to order decisions of the lower courts "depublished."

These decisions are omitted from the official reports and are unavailable as precedent. Depublished opinions were itself unpublished, meaning that someone reading the case in the *Kentucky Law Summary* would be unaware that the case should not be cited. Id. Beginning in 1964, the intermediate appellate courts gained the authority to refrain from publishing opinions. The presumption was in favor of publication. After 1972, the presumption was reversed. See Kanner, *supra* note 155, at 388.

Estimates of the number of depublished opinions are given below.

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176. Unpublished opinions of the court of appeals may not "be cited or relied on by a court or a party in any other action or proceeding." CAL. CT. R. 977(a) (Supp. 1994). One California Supreme Court Justice has written that depublication is generally ordered "because a majority of the justices consider the opinion to be wrong in some significant
ions may provide useful insights into the state of the law as well as being worthy of study in their own right. 177

PRINCIPLE 7: Scholars should consider unpublished and limited authority decisions on a case-by-case basis when they have been identified. In determining the treatment of such opinions, they should consider publication, citation, and distribution policies, together with local practice.

PRINCIPLE 8: Researchers should consider both limitation of authority and depublication when examining the impact of an opinion; the effect prior to the limitation or depublication may differ from the effect after the limitation or depublication.

5. Statutory Interpretation Cases

Statutes and statutory interpretation 178 exert influence on courts' decisions on common law rules; this influence may require some choices by researchers. For example, a court may interpret statutory language to provide a remedy similar to a common law remedy instead of adopting a common law rule. When the statutory language is clear, such an interpretation is not a common law way, such that it would mislead the bench and bar if it remained as citable precedent.”


177. Two recent empirical studies are, Dubois, supra note 175, and Uelmen, supra note 175.

178. Economic analysis of law has generally distinguished between analysis of common law and statutory law. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 523-36 (1992). Although this distinction has been criticized for failing to recognize the fundamental similarities between the processes which produce common law rules and those which produce statutes, see Paul H. Rubin; Common Law and Statute Law, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 205 (1982), the institutional differences are significant for the researcher conducting an empirical investigation into the common law. To take an obvious example, there is no reason to expect that the terms of judges will affect a legislature's deliberation on a statute in the same way that the same terms will affect a judge's decision. Legislatures might regard a judiciary made up of judges with short terms as easier to control than one which is made up of judges with life tenure. This could affect the optimal degree of specificity in language used by the legislature. Judges with short terms might be more concerned with reappointment or reelection, but there is no reason to believe the magnitude of the effect would be the same and hence an empirical investigation would need to examine the two routes to a rule separately. An exception might be a competing risks model of adoption of a rule. I am unaware of any such study. Curran, supra note 2, examined the adoption of comparative negligence through both legislative and judicial means by treating both as identical. He reported that his initial investigation into the method of adoption was inconclusive. Id. at 311 n.35.
innovation. When, on the other hand, a court interprets vague language or strains to base the result on statutory interpretation, the result properly may be counted as a common law innovation. 179

An example of this is the interpretation of workers' compensation statutes on the issue of the existence of a remedy for discharge in retaliation for seeking benefits under the compensation scheme. Some such cases simply applied relatively clear statutory language to provide a remedy. See Smith v. Piezo Technology and Professional Adm'rs, 427 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 1983), where the court concluded that Florida Statute § 440.205 created a cause of action for a retaliatory discharge. Id. at 183. That section stated: "No employer shall discharge, threaten to discharge, intimidate, or coerce any employee by reason of such employee's valid claim for compensation or attempt to claim compensation under the Workers' Compensation Law." Fla. Stat. § 440.205 (1979). The only reason one might question whether such a claim was possible was that the statute did not specify a forum for resolving such claims or describe the relief possible. Smith, 427 So. 2d at 184 n.1. Recognizing that the statute clearly imposed a duty, the Florida Supreme Court had no difficulty finding an implied right of action. Id. at 184. This recognition was eased by the fact that § 440.205 was a response to Segal v. Arrow Indus. Corp., 364 So. 2d 89, 90 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), which held that there was no such cause of action under the prior statute. See Hartley v. Ocean Reef Club, Inc., 476 So. 2d 1327, 1330 n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).

Similarly, in Henderson v. St. Louis Hous. Auth., 605 S.W.2d 800 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979), the statute explicitly permitted retaliatory discharge claims: "No employer or agent shall discharge or in any way discriminate against any employee for exercising any of his rights under this chapter. Any employee who has been discharged or discriminated against shall have a civil action for damages against his employer." [179] Id. at 802-03 (quoting Mo. Rev. Stat. § 287.780 (Supp. 1975)). The recognition of such a cause of action should not count as an innovation. (Missouri amended the earlier version of this statute to provide a civil remedy in 1973.) See Mo. Ann. Stat. § 287.780 (Vernon 1993).

In Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973), on the other hand, the Indiana Supreme Court held that discharging an employee for filing a workers' compensation claim was a "device" within the meaning of a workers' compensation statute provision, which read: "No contract or agreement, written or implied, no rule, regulation, or other device shall, in any manner, operate to relieve any employer in whole or in part of any obligation created by this act." Id. at 427-28 (emphasis added) (quoting Ind. Code § 40-1215 (1971)). The court held:

The Act creates a duty in the employer to compensate employees for work-related injuries (through insurance) and a right in the employee to receive such compensation. But in order for the goals of the Act to be realized and for public policy to be effectuated, the employee must be able to exercise his right in an unfettered fashion without being subject to reprisal. If employers are permitted to penalize employees for filing workmen's compensation claims, a most important public policy will be undermined. The fear of being discharged would have a deleterious effect on the exercise of a statutory right. Employees will not file claims for justly deserved compensation—opting, instead, to continue their employment without incident. The end result, of course, is that the employer is effectively relieved of his obligation. . . .

. . . We believe the threat of discharge to be a "device" within the framework of [the statute], and hence, in clear contravention of public policy. . . .

. . . Retaliatory discharge for filing a workmen's compensation claim is a wrongful, unconscionable act and should be actionable in a court of
Courts may also attempt to cloak the innovation in terms of filling the gaps in statutory schemes. In these cases the researcher will have to pierce the veil of the court’s language to determine whether the result in question is truly a matter of interpreting the statute or whether it is a common law innovation.

A second problem arises when a common law remedy is tied indirectly to a statutory provision. Courts may use language...
that implies that the rule being adopted is merely the fulfillment of an existing statutory policy. The researcher must therefore decide if there has been a common law innovation.\textsuperscript{182} This decision must rest on an interpretation of both the decision's language and the statutory provision. The legal change under study may be tied to the language of state statutes; these statutes may use different language to resolve the same issue.\textsuperscript{183} Whenever conducting the analysis requires some aggregation, the researcher will have to make qualitative judgments about the statutes' similarities and differences to avoid losing any impact in a welter of statute-specific variables.

Finally, different courts may have different degrees of deference toward their legislatures.\textsuperscript{184} Researchers should be especially

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\textsuperscript{182} An example here is Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffers, Warehousemen & Helpers of America, Local 396, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959). The court simply asserted that:

Generally, such a relationship [employment contract without fixed duration] is terminable at the will of either party (Labor Code, §2922) for any reason whatsoever. However, the right to discharge an employee under such a contract may be limited by statute or by considerations of public policy.

\textit{Id.} at 27 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The last part of this claim is unsupported by citation to any authority, and the remainder of the opinion discusses whether perjury is an action prohibited by public policy and whether plaintiff had a claim for expulsion from the union. \textit{Id.} at 27-29. What is remarkable about \textit{Petermann} is that no court had ever made such a holding before and yet the court did not attempt to justify its conclusion. The issue of whether a court has the ability to limit at-will contracts in the same fashion as the legislature continues to be a major issue in many courts. \textit{Compare} Vigil v. Arzoia, 699 P.2d 613, 619 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983) (allowing claim for discharge in retaliation for publicly opposing certain public expenditures, and rejecting claim that court should defer to legislature in modifying the at-will rule outside workers' compensation area), \textit{rev'd}, 687 P.2d 1038 (N.M. 1984) \textit{with} Bottijilo v. Hutchison Fruit Co., 635 P.2d 992, 997-98 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981) (deferring to the legislature with respect to retaliation claim in workers' compensation area), \textit{overruled by} Michaels v. Anglo Am. Auto Actions, Inc., 689 P.2d 279 (N.M. 1994).

\textsuperscript{183} One might examine the adoption of retaliatory discharge causes of action under workers' compensation schemes. See \textit{supra} note 179.

\textsuperscript{184} Compare the attitudes of the Montana and Georgia Supreme Courts toward their respective codified at-will rules. Montana has developed one of the most pro-plaintiff wrongful discharge doctrine with barely a mention of the code provisions, while Georgia has consistently deferred to the legislature. See \textit{infra} Appendix B.
cautious in interpreting decisions in those states which have civil
codes that purport to be substantive substitutes for the common
law. During the nineteenth century California, the Dakotas, Geor-
gia, Louisiana, and Montana all adopted substantive civil codes
which were intended to supplant, in varying degrees, the common
law.185

PRINCIPLE 9: Researchers should not categorically reject
statutory interpretation cases as sources of common law
innovation. They must examine the content of each case
carefully before counting or rejecting it.

6. Sources of Cases

There are two methods for locating cases. The first is to rely
on secondary sources.186 The second is to conduct independent
legal research. The first is relatively inexpensive, but the potential
for inaccuracy is high. When the secondary sources are primarily
aimed at practicing lawyers, such as publications by the Bureau of
National Affairs or the Practicing Law Institute, the criteria for
selection of a case are not the same as an empirical researcher
might use.187 Even when the secondary sources are historically
oriented, a researcher must carefully ensure that the criteria used
are similar to those she wishes to employ. In general, there is no
substitute for independent legal research. To facilitate independent
evaluation of empirical work, researchers should provide, and jour-

185. See generally Andrew P. Morriss, "This State Will Soon Have Plenty of Laws"--
Lessons from One Hundred Years of Codification in Montana, 56 MONT. L. REV.
forthcoming 1995 [hereinafter Morriss, Plenty of Laws]; Andrew P. Morriss, The Law
and Economics of Employment At Will, ch. 2 (1994) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology) [hereinafter Morriss, Law and Economics] for a discus-
sion of the employment at will provisions of these codes and a history of these codes,
and Robert G. Natelson, Running with the Land in Montana, 51 MONT. L. REV. 17
(1990) for a thorough discussion of the theories of displacement in the California, North
Dakota, South Dakota, and Montana codes.

186. This is the method used by Krueger. See Krueger, supra note 8, tbl. 1, at 649
(deriving figures from Bureau of National Affairs and Shepard, Heylman, and Duston).

187. The historical evolution of the doctrine is less important in these materials than the
current state of the law. Thus the careful research necessary to find the original case is
likely to be subordinated to the need to discuss the current contours of a course of ac-
tion. There are also mistakes in these types of materials. For example, Krueger refers to
Staggs v. Blue Cross of Maryland, 486 A.2d 798 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985) but lists the
date as 1987. Krueger, supra note 8, at 649. This appears to be a repeat of a typographi-
cal error in the BNA Individual Employment Rights Manual which incorrectly lists the
date as 1987 rather than 1985. 9A BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INDIVIDUAL EMPLOY-
nals should publish, complete citation lists.\textsuperscript{188}

\textbf{PRINCIPLE 10:} Researchers should perform independent legal research to discover the common law events.

\textbf{PRINCIPLE 11:} Researchers should publish complete citation lists and disclose all choices made.

7. Flip-Flops

Courts sometimes change their minds about doctrines. These changes may occur when a question finally reaches a higher court,\textsuperscript{189} opinions change on a question,\textsuperscript{190} or a court reinterprets its own precedents.\textsuperscript{191} Some projects will require that the models specified allow for the possibility of a doctrinal reversal.\textsuperscript{192} It is also important that reversals of doctrines be recognized as exactly that; researchers should not be deceived by a court's attempt to portray a rule change as simply a clarification.\textsuperscript{193} In general, empirical work should focus on the contemporaneous view of a decision, not the \textit{ex post} rationalization.\textsuperscript{194}

\textsuperscript{188} One might argue that providing a list of cases on request is adequate. It is not. Only a published list will enable a reader to determine whether to rely on the research. No one would consider publishing an empirical economics article without including both the source of the data and descriptive statistics. Including a citation list is a minimal cost in most instances. Krueger's paper, for example, relied on only 64 cases. Krueger, \textit{supra} note 8, unpublished appendix (on file with author). The citation list of only case names, as in that paper, creates additional confusion. Only by examining the actual data set and conducting independent research (since the list does not reveal whether there is more than one opinion in any particular case) can a reader determine which opinion was relied upon for Connecticut's implied covenant or Mississippi's public policy exceptions. See \textit{infra} notes 381-88, 475-76 and accompanying text. Where both intermediate and final opinions are published, as in those cases, the full citation is necessary to eliminate confusion. Ideally an appendix which briefly discloses choices made, possible in those journals such as law reviews which have relatively high page limits, would be desirable.

\textsuperscript{189} \textit{See, e.g.,} Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988).


\textsuperscript{192} Dertouzos and Karoly specifically address this. \textit{See DERTOUZOS & KAROLY, supra} note 2, at 16.

\textsuperscript{193} \textit{See, e.g.,} Dorr, 414 A.2d at 1274 and discussion \textit{supra} note 86.

\textsuperscript{194} Interpretations of a case by other courts, law review articles, and other legal literature provide valuable indications of the contemporaneous view of an opinion. \textit{See supra} note 81 on interpretation of \textit{Monge}. 
PRINCIPLE 12: When appropriate, researchers should focus on the contemporaneous view of an opinion rather than on a court’s *ex post* rationalization.

PRINCIPLE 13: Model specifications should allow for reversals.

8. Dismissals and Summary Judgments

When the plaintiff seeks recovery under a new cause of action, it is not uncommon for the trial court to dismiss the plaintiff’s case\(^\text{195}\) or to grant summary judgment against the plaintiff. An appellate court may then affirm the dismissal or summary judgment, sometimes on slightly different grounds. These opinions present a difficult choice for the researcher. The appellate court may address the claim as follows: “B does not have a claim because Rule X applies. Even if Rule X applied, however, this claimant does not have a claim under Rule X, since B has received all the benefit he might obtain under Rule X.”\(^\text{196}\) Scholars should

195. While there are no statistics on use of state procedures to accomplish dismissal, the analogous federal procedural device, Rule 12(b)(6) of the *Federal Rules of Civil Procedure*, has been studied. Three studies looked at samples of cases drawn from selected federal district courts and found between 6 and 12% of cases had motions to dismiss and 4 to 8% of cases had such motions granted. THOMAS E. WILLGING, *USE OF RULE 12(b)(6) IN TWO FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS* 6-8, Federal Judicial Center Staff Paper (1989). As these statistics indicate, relatively few federal cases are disposed of through motions to dismiss. The importance of these types of motions will vary with the subject matter. In the case of states which have not yet adopted a common law exception to the at-will rule, motions to dismiss, based on my reading of thousands of employment cases, appear to have been more important than the federal (12)(b)(6) motions are today. This is to be expected since a broad gatekeeper rule such as the at-will rule would preclude most discharge-related claims. A tort suit, on the other hand, based on a well-established course of action would be more likely to turn on the factual dispute rather than the legal validity of the claim. One consequence for empirical researchers is that challenges to rules like the at-will rule are more likely to rise through the legal system more rapidly since courts are more likely to dismiss them at the trial level. Although opinions concerning dismissal appear more quickly, final opinions resolving the existence of a claim may be delayed by the intermediate appellate trip. If the claim is not dismissed, a potentially more conclusive final appellate opinion will also be delayed while the case is tried below. The researcher’s decision concerning how to handle these types of opinions can therefore have a substantial impact on the timing of the common law event. This highlights the need for a consistent approach to the issues surrounding dating.

distinguish these cases from cases which potentially recognize a rule in other forms of dicta. In dismissal or summary judgment cases, the court is often simply being careful. If a plaintiff’s claim fails even under the most favorable interpretation of a rule and the facts, there is no need to address the issue of whether the rule actually applies and the court has avoided a potential legal mistake. Holding that a claim has failed on the facts is a cheap form of insurance against reversal on the merits. Particularly in the case of decisions by intermediate appellate courts these decisions should not be counted as innovations. By contrast, a court sends a different signal when it goes out of its way to acknowledge that different facts might lead to a new rule.

**PRINCIPLE 14:** Dicta in opinions dismissing causes of action or granting summary judgment against proponents of a new rule should be counted as establishing a rule only when the dicta directly indicates a willingness to adopt a new rule in a future case.

9. Denials

Courts sometimes reject a doctrinal change. The rejection may stand for a lengthy period or the court may overturn it soon thereafter. It may be a simple rejection of a claim or it may be a firm endorsement of deference to the legislature in a particular area. How should a researcher approach these opinions? One

197. It is cheap because factual determination by trial courts are reviewed with a much greater level of deference than legal determinations. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) ("clearly erroneous" standard of review applies to factual determinations).

198. See, e.g., Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174 (Pa. 1974). The dicta in Geary noted that:

It may be granted that there are areas of an employee's life in which his employer has no legitimate interest. An intrusion into one of these areas by virtue of the employer's power of discharge might plausibly give rise to a cause of action, particularly where some recognized facet of public policy is threatened. Id. at 180. The employer won in Geary based on the particular facts: the employer successfully argued that the employee was discharged for failing to follow company procedure when making his complaint about the safety of the product, not because he complained. Id. at 179-80. The clear message of Geary was that the at-will rule was no longer absolute.


possibility is to model the outcome as a choice between two alternatives, although this may not always be possible. These decisions have important information, the loss of which would be especially undesirable for models of the behavior of a court. A court which has just issued a ringing endorsement of Rule X, for example, is far less likely to adopt Rule X the following day. Moreover, attorneys and litigants are less likely to present cases raising an issue if the court has just rejected a rule change.201

PRINCIPLE 15: Models of doctrinal change should include the possibility of rejection of the change.

10. *Ex Post Verification*

How much attention should researchers pay to courts’ own assessments of their precedents? As demonstrated in the discussion of the habeas “new rule” cases202 and of the Monge-Dorr history,203 courts have difficulty agreeing amongst themselves about the meaning of their decisions, and their assessment of opinions should not be binding on researchers. At the same time, courts’ assessments of the meaning of precedent provide valuable information. If a case is never cited after it is issued, that is at least some indication that other courts did not regard it as breaking important new ground. If another case is simply cited more, however, it may be that the other case is from a higher court, is better written, contains facts more closely analogous to the current case, is written by a particularly well-regarded judge, or provides a more complete analysis of the cause of action. Lack of extensive citation is not necessarily fatal to a case’s claim on history, however.204

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Power Co., 251 S.E.2d 51, 52 (Ga. Ct. App. 1978) (declaring unanimously that “there is no room for this exception in Georgia as [the at-will rule is statutory and the statute, Code § 66-101, does not encompass the exception”).

201. *FED. R. Civ. P.* 11 and its state analogues require a good faith belief that there is a cause of action before filing suit, a standard which is difficult to meet if the state appellate courts have just decisively rejected a similar claim. Priest’s approach, described in note 6, *supra*, is one way to handle this problem.

202. See *supra* notes 13-62 and accompanying text.

203. See *supra* note 81.

204. See Landes & Posner, *supra* note 6, at 263-67 for a discussion of precedent as capital and an empirical examination of citation practice. In the at-will area, cases establishing the at-will rule in Alabama are a good example of the changing pattern of citation. Modern Alabama cases generally cite a recent opinion such as Meeks v. Opp Cotton Mills, Inc., 459 So. 2d 814 (Ala. 1984), for the rule. See, *e.g.*, Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Campbell, 512 So. 2d 725, 728 (Ala. 1987). Pre-Meeks Alabama cases cited earlier cases, and so on, back to the original opinion adopting the rule in 1891. See Howard v.
PRINCIPLE 16: Citation history is only one factor in deciding whether or not to count a case.

PRINCIPLE 17: Researchers must do more than trace the courts' own dating of legal changes. They must develop theoretically sound methods.

C. The Choice of Structure

Empirical researchers must choose a method of categorizing the cases in order to be able to fit the common law into a quantitative model. The three analyses discussed below used three different ways to categorize the common law: (1) by doctrinal base;205 (2) by quantity,206 and (3) by remedy.207 Which categorization is appropriate will depend on the question asked. It will also depend on the hypothesis concerning the method through which the common law is thought to influence the dependent variable (or, if the change is the dependent variable, be influenced by the independent variables.)

An example of a different resolution of this issue than that used in this Article was the classification Dertouzos and Karoly used in their examination of the growth of the modern common law exceptions.208 Using the dates of adoption, they estimated a

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205. Similar to the author's analysis, Krueger, supra note 8, at 655, categorizes data according to its doctrinal base in specifications 1, 2, and 3 as displayed in Krueger's tbl. 4.
206. Id. at 655, 656 (using quantity as part of specifications 4, 5, and 6).
207. Dertouzos and Karoly developed a two-way characterization of remedies based on either contract or tort law. DERTOUZOS & KAROLY, supra note 2, at 23-26.
208. They examined what they termed "the supply and demand for new legal doctrines." Id. at 18. Unfortunately, data unavailability meant that no sensitivity testing of this model was possible. They explained their approach as follows:

Demand for new legal doctrines is determined by those who would benefit from the legal change, for example nonunionized or unemployed workers. Supply is determined by those who would bear the costs of the legal changes, such as employers or the judiciary. Some supply and demand factors may be operating at the national level and may affect all states equally. Changes in these aggregate variables over time can explain the increased recognition of the wrongful-termination doctrines in the 1980s. Other supply or demand factors may vary substantially across states and over time. These factors may explain the variation across states in the pattern and timing of adoption of the new legal doctrines.

Id. at 18-19 (emphasis in original). Their empirical model included several types of variables: (i) declining unionization; (ii) business cycle (unemployment rate); (iii) increased litigiousness (percent change in lawyers per capita); (iv) increased awareness of workers'
model of the probability of adoption of the various doctrines and used it to examine the effect of various factors. In doing so, Dertouzos and Karoly used two slightly different methods of characterizing legal doctrines, both of which differ from those Krueger and I used. In the method most similar to the other analyses, they categorized cases as one of the following: (1) narrow public policy;

rights (year dummies); (v) ideological factors (existence of right to work law, percent unionization); and (vi) other costs (percent of geographic neighbors that have adopted doctrine). Id. at 19-21.

209. Formally, the probability of having doctrine \( d \) in state \( s \) at time \( t \) for years 1980-1987 is:

\[
\log \left[ \frac{P_{dst}}{1 - P_{dst}} \right] = X_{st} B + Y_s \gamma + Z_{st} \alpha + \mu_{dst}
\]

where \( P_{dst} \) is the probability, \( X_s \) is a vector of time-varying state-specific variables, \( Y_s \) is a vector of time-invariant, state-specific variables, \( Z_{st} \) is a vector of time-varying aggregate variables, and \( \mu_{dst} \) is a random disturbance term. Id. at 23. The problem of how to model courts' behavior is a difficult one for which there is currently no satisfactory answer. Dertouzos and Karoly's approach, however, has a number of implications which suggest it is incorrect. Although courts undoubtedly "supply" legal doctrines, these doctrines are not separate goods. They are joint products with the other output which the same courts simultaneously supply: decisions in particular cases. The consumers of legal doctrines also "demand" changes at times. Consumers' general demands are also bound up with their demands in particular cases. When people go to court they want two things: justice and victory. The private rank ordering of these two goals does not always favor the social good.

In Dertouzos and Karoly's model, courts respond to the "demand" for new doctrines by changing the common law. Id. at 18-19. Political events from judicial elections to presidential elections clearly influence the courts. How these events pressure judges in particular cases is difficult to model. There are certainly reasons why a state with right to work laws, for example, might have a judiciary more or less favorable to developing a common law of wrongful discharge, but the effects are complex and difficult to specify. Are right to work laws simply a proxy for an underlying political climate which is "pro-employer," or does the weakness of the union movement make judges more inclined to favor alternative legal doctrines which benefit nonunion employees? Or might a "pro-employee" judge see wrongful discharge remedies as a method of making unions less attractive? See Susan L. Catler, The Case Against Proposals to Eliminate the Employment At Will Rule, 5 INDUS. REL. L.J. 471, 494 (1983) (opposing common law exceptions to the at-will rule because they will lessen the demand for unionization). Without an underlying model of how judges decide cases, it is hard to predict how political variables will affect their decisions.

Further, Dertouzos and Karoly's model excludes court structure itself. State judges in the United States are both elected and appointed, serve limited and unlimited terms, are chosen in partisan elections and in nonpartisan elections, and so forth. Regardless of the political variable under consideration, one would expect that the method of judicial selection and system of tenure would lead to different types of influence. See Morriss, Exploding Myths, supra note 132, at 713-15 (describing interstate differences among courts as a factor in their decision-making processes).
(2) implied contract or good faith contract exception; and (3) broad public policy or good faith tort exception. They also used a two-way classification, based on whether the remedy was tort or contract based.

The time period used as a basis for the study is a problem which has a more generalizable answer. Krueger used a time unit of one year for his study of the influence of common law decisions on the introduction of bills providing statutory remedies. However, courts' decisions are issued during a year at a specific point in time in a year. By treating all decisions within a year as simultaneous, Krueger lost information on the time of adoption. This information was particularly important in his case since many state legislatures meet only for part of a year, and so the timing of the decision would be even more likely to affect whether a decision would influence those legislatures. Smaller time units, when possible, thus have significant advantages.

The fact that Louisiana's unusual legal system contains more elements of a civil law system than other states' suggests that it should be excluded from the analysis. Similarly, the fact that Georgia has codified the at-will rule, and that its courts give great deference to that legislative judgment, suggests, in my judgment, that its inclusion in Krueger's model was inappropriate. The failure to adopt an exception in Georgia would not indicate the same thing as the failure to adopt in, for example, Montana. Actually reading cases is the only way to discover these types of peculiarities, since both Montana and Georgia have codified at-will rules, but Montana's courts ignored their code provision while developing one of the most pro-employee set of remedies for wrongful discharge among the states.

Structural problems in analyzing legal institutions are not limit-
ed to the common law, of course. For example, although Krueger's paper noted that some state legislatures do not meet annually, his data included observations for years in which state legislatures did not meet.\textsuperscript{218} Since the probability of a bill's being introduced in these state legislatures in years in which the legislature is not in session is virtually zero,\textsuperscript{219} the thirty-six observations for those states in the appropriate years should be deleted. Close attention to such institutional details is necessary to make empirical work credible.

**PRINCIPLE 18:** Researchers should choose an analytical structure for categorizing the law which reflects the mechanism through which the law is hypothesized to influence or be influenced by the other variables as well as the institutional environment being studied.

### III. CASE STUDIES OF THE DECLINE OF EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL

Having established the foregoing principles theoretically, I now move to their application to the area of employment-at-will. The erosion of the employment-at-will rule presents an unusual natural experiment.\textsuperscript{220} Not only has the at-will rule been in place since

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\textsuperscript{218} Seven state legislatures meet only biannually: Arkansas, Kentucky, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon, and Texas. All of these legislatures but Kentucky meet only in odd numbered years. \textit{The Council of State Governments, The Book of the States} 137-38 (1992).

\textsuperscript{219} The state legislature could, of course, be called into special session to consider an agenda which included unjust dismissal legislation. \textit{Id.} None of the state-years affected, however, is listed by Krueger as a year in which such legislation was introduced. Krueger, supra note 8, tbl. 2, at 650.

\textsuperscript{220} These developments in the law are themselves interesting. An extensive legal literature critical of the at-will rule exists. This literature has influenced courts to alter the rule and adopt these exceptions. Almost every opinion adopting an exception cites the critical literature. Most also repeat arguments made by the critics, sometimes without attribution. See, e.g., Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 509 (N.J. 1980), where the court made, but failed to cite, essentially the argument made in \textit{Frank Tannenbaum, A Philosophy of Labor} 9 (1954) that

[w]e have become a nation of employees. We are dependent upon others for our means of livelihood, and most of our people have become completely dependent upon wages. If they lose their jobs they lose every resource, except for the relief supplied by the various forms of social security. Such dependence of the mass of people upon others for all of their income is something new in the world. \textit{For our generation, the substance of life is in another man's hands.}

Prof. Lawrence Blades quoted this argument in an important 1967 article critical of employment-at-will and from there it found its way into many judicial opinions and law review notes. See Blades, supra note 180, at 1404. Much of this success appears to be
the early part of this century in every jurisdiction in the United States, but the common law has evolved toward relatively uniform alternatives.\textsuperscript{221} I analyze the effects of those changes on the duration of employment using the methodology described in the previous section. Most importantly for methodological purposes, other researchers have conducted several analyses of the decline of employment-at-will in which they have approached the dating of common law changes differently.\textsuperscript{222} This presents a unique opportunity to examine the practical consequences of the assumptions about changes in the law necessary to empirical research on the common law.

Since the end of the nineteenth century, the default rule for the interpretation of indefinite employment contracts in the United States has been employment-at-will.\textsuperscript{223} The rule’s operation is quite simple: either party can end the contract at any time without liability.\textsuperscript{224} The most important legal consequence of this rule is that discharged at-will employees could not sue their employers for wrongful discharge.\textsuperscript{225}

The development of the modern common law exceptions to the rule began in 1959, when an intermediate appellate court in California allowed an employee of the Teamsters union to bring a claim against his employer for wrongful discharge despite his at-

due to the claims made in this literature that employers routinely discharge at-will employees for “bad reasons” and that most, if not all, of these discharges would be prevented by adopting legal modifications of employment-at-will. See, e.g., Cornelius J. Peck, Unjust Discharges from Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 48 (1979); see generally Jack Stieber & Michael Murray, Protection Against Unjust Discharge: The Need for a Federal Statute, 16 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 319 (1983). Given the variation across states and across time in adopting these exceptions, it would be interesting to discover whether the critics’ claims have been proven correct.\textsuperscript{221} See infra notes 226-34 (discussing the different types of exceptions).

\textsuperscript{222} See generally DERTOUZOS & KAROLY, supra note 2; Krueger, supra note 8.

\textsuperscript{223} See Morriss, Exploding Myths, supra note 132, at 683-89 (providing more details about the rule’s history).

\textsuperscript{224} Employers and employees are, of course, free to contract around the rule, to make definite term contracts or indefinite contracts which restrict either party’s ability to terminate the contract. Prominent examples of the former are professional athletes with definite term contracts, while two examples of the latter are teachers and university faculty with tenure and employees covered by collective bargaining agreements.

\textsuperscript{225} Some commentators have argued that employees systematically misunderstood their employers’ obligations under indefinite contracts. See, e.g., Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816, 1831 (1980). Given the clarity and brevity of the at-will rule, however, it is difficult to imagine that such a systematic misunderstanding could have persisted since the end of the 19th century.
will status. The court allowed the claim because the employee alleged that he was discharged for refusing to commit perjury. The court held that

in order to more fully effectuate the state's declared policy against perjury, the civil law, too, must deny the employer his generally unlimited right to discharge an employee whose employment is for an unspecified duration, when the reason for the dismissal is the employee's refusal to commit perjury. To hold otherwise would be without reason and contrary to the spirit of the law. The public policy of this state would be seriously impaired if it were to be held that one could be discharged by reason of his refusal to commit perjury.

The significance of Petermann was not that employers could not fire employees who refused to commit perjury, a relatively rare occurrence, but that for the first time at-will employees could frame a cause of action for their discharge. After Petermann, commentators began to call for changes in the at-will rule. In the 1970s state courts began in earnest to modify the at-will rule, and by the mid-1980s three theoretically distinct approaches had developed: public policy exceptions, implied contract exceptions, and actions based on the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

Most states have adopted public policy exceptions similar to Petermann. Many states adopted implied contract exceptions to the rule, allowing claims based on statements made by employers either orally or in writing which implied restrictions on the

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227. Id.
228. Id. at 27.
229. The most influential early criticism of the at-will rule has been by Lawrence E. Blades, see supra note 180.
230. See infra Appendix B (detailing the exceptions for various states).
231. The primary difference among them is how broadly the courts defined the public policy. Some states require the public policy to be defined by statute or constitutional provision, while others take a broader view. Nebraska, for example, requires that a specific statute or constitutional provision be the source of the public policy. See Schriner v. Meginnis Ford Co., 421 N.W.2d 755, 757 (Neb. 1988). Utah, on the other hand, allows a much looser definition of public policy. See Berube v. Fashion Ctr., Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1043 (Utah 1989) (allowing judicial decisions to be a source of substantial principles of public policy in areas which the legislature has not spoken).
employer's ability to discharge.232 Finally, some states allowed a cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.233 Unlike implied contract claims, these claims rest on a promise implied by law, and thus represent a much broader potential claim.234

The development of the modern exceptions has been dated for three empirical projects. Each employed somewhat different methodologies. My examination applied the principles developed in this paper; Dertouzos and Karoly made different choices; and Krueger relied entirely on secondary sources. Not surprisingly these methods produced significantly different datings. Tables 5 to 7 contain the datings and Tables 8 and 9 show the correlations both among and between methods for particular exceptions for the period 1976-89, treating each month as an observation. Figures 1 to 3 present the differences in dates graphically. As can be seen from these tables, the three approaches produced quite different results.

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232. Again, there are differences among states in the level of specificity required to make a statement enforceable. In Alabama, for example, the courts recognized the possibility that there might be an implied term to a contract before they recognized other implied limitations on the right to discharge. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Etowah Quality of Life Council, 484 So. 2d 1075 (Ala. 1986) . Other differences exist among states over whether employers can disclaim the statements. See, e.g., Schipani v. Ford Motor Co., 302 N.W.2d 307, 311 (Mich. App. 1981) (written disclaimer effective against claim based on employee handbook but not against oral statement by supervisor).

233. See infra Appendix B (detailing the exceptions in various states).

234. See, e.g., Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 728 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) ("The duty which arises from the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is unconditional and independent in nature; it is not controlled by events in the same manner as conditions precedent or subsequent."). Cleary's allowance of tort damages was later disapproved. See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 401 n.42 (Cal. 1988); see also infra notes 359-61 and accompanying text. Again there is significant variation among states, with some construing the claim in tort (which carries with it much greater damages) and some in contract. Between the Cleary decision on October 29, 1980, and the Foley decision on December 29, 1988, for example, tort damages for breach of the implied covenant were available in California. Since Foley, only contract damages are available. See infra notes 359-61 and accompanying text.
Table 4  Motions to Dismiss

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<td>Total granted</td>
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*Cases with motions filed.
Table 5  Public Policy

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Note: There is no applicable data for states not listed.
### Table 6  Implied Contract

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Note: There is no applicable data for states not listed.
FIGURE 1 Public Policy
FIGURE 2 Implied Contract
FIGURE 3 Implied Covenant
Table 7 Implied Covenant

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Note: There is no applicable data for states not listed.

Table 8 Correlations Within Methods and Between Exceptions

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Source: calculated from case assignments in Appendix B.

Table 9 Correlations Between Methods and Within Exceptions

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Source: calculated from case assignments in Appendix B.
A. The Probability of Job Termination and Wrongful Discharge

Turning to the specific case studies, I begin with an original investigation into the impact of the common law changes. Many of the legal arguments against employment-at-will have focused on the consequences for individuals of job loss for “bad reasons.” A natural avenue of investigation is the impact the law has had on the probability that jobs end. If the critics are correct that (a) there are a significant number of discharges for “bad reasons” and (b) changing the at-will rule will reduce or eliminate these discharges, then changes in the legal rules should significantly affect the probability of discharge.

Examining the impact of the law on the probability of job termination for individuals has several advantages over using aggregate measures such as state unemployment data. First, aggregate approaches generally rely on yearly data, while the legal changes occur at specific points during a given year. An approach focused on individuals thus allows for more precise control for the changes in the legal environment. Second, aggregate employment data is far more sensitive than the end of individual’s employment to other changes in a state’s legal environment outside of employment law. If those changes are both imperfectly controlled for and correlated with the adoption of exceptions to employment-at-will, then the aggregate approach may overestimate the influence of the changes in the at-will rule. Unfortunately, the individual approach also has a significant disadvantage, which is that there are no available data limited to firings. My approach uses the probability of a job’s ending from all causes as the dependent variable and explores through a logistic model whether changes in the legal environment affect that probability.

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236. A state’s decisions on tax levels, for example, would be likely to affect aggregate employment significantly. Similarly, state-mandated benefits are generally thought to decrease employment.
237. It is quite likely that there would be some correlation in types of changes. Many state courts have reputations as “pro-consumer” or “pro-plaintiff” and could be expected to adopt rules in many areas consistent with a general philosophy. See, e.g., Canon & Baum, supra note 2, at 982 (finding that certain traits of judges and methods of their selection influence the way they decide cases).
238. Even if such data existed, they would inevitably include significant measurement error to the extent that they relied on individuals to report discharges separately from voluntary quits or layoffs.
239. The model used is
Because the employment-at-will rule is simply a default con-

\[ B_{LP} = \left[ 1 + \left( \frac{1 - P}{P} \right) e^{-B_1} \right]^{-1} - P \]

where \( P \) is the probability of employee \( i \)'s job ending at time \( t \), \( X_i \) is a vector of characteristics of employee \( i \) and his current job (such as marital status, industry, and occupation), \( Z_i \) is a vector of dummy variables which are 1 if the state has adopted a particular exception to the at-will rule and 0 otherwise, and \( u_i \) is a random error term. \( P \) is the sum of the probabilities of a job ending from different causes: (i) discharge for cause; (ii) discharge not for cause; (iii) quits; and (iv) layoffs. Because I am concerned only with the effect of legal changes on (ii), there is the potential for bias if the legal changes are correlated with (i), (iii), or (iv). If the changes in the law are uncorrelated with changes in these other reasons for termination, the only effect will be the additional noise.

In the absence of uncertainty, legal rules prohibiting discharges for "bad reason" should have no impact on (i). In the presence of uncertainty concerning the courts' application of the rules, however, employers would be less likely to fire those employees who deserve it, and so one might expect the inclusion of (i) in \( P \) to bias the results in favor of finding an effect.

There is no theoretical reason to believe (iii) will be affected by changes in the employment-at-will rule, and hence no reason to suspect a systematic biasing of the results. Legal rule changes allowing wrongful discharge suits may increase (iv), since firms will have an incentive to cloak discharges that are prohibited under the rule as layoffs to escape liability. The courts which have directly considered whether "for cause" contracts restrict the employer's ability to discharge employees for economic reasons have all recognized economic necessity as a valid defense. See Gesina v. General Elec. Co., 780 P.2d 1376, 1378 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) ("A bona fide decision based on sound economic reasons can constitute cause for discharge. . . . If in the case of a reduction in force due to economic reasons, as between two persons of equal ability, the one who has a lifetime contract is to be preferred for retention" (citations omitted)); Crawford v. David Shapiro & Co., 490 So. 2d 993, 995 n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (noting that a recession can be "just cause" for termination); Telepshree Int'l, Inc. v. Scollin, 489 So. 2d 1152, 1153 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (allowing company to terminate employee after project in which employee was engaged was abandoned); Wilde v. Houlton Regional Hosp., 537 A.2d 1137, 1138 (Me. 1988) (permitting layoffs in light of financial difficulties); Heltborg v. Modern Mach., 795 P.2d 954, 961 (Mont. 1990) (reducing staff for economic reasons is not subject to a negligence analysis); Coombs v. Gamer Shoe Co., 778 P.2d 885, 887 (Mont. 1989) (emphasizing the importance of business viability); Velantzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 536 A.2d 237, 239 n.2 (N.J. 1988) (discharge justified if needed to achieve a reduction in the work force); Linn v. Beneficial Commercial Corp., 543 A.2d 954, 957 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988) (allowing employee removal to achieve a legitimate business objective); Caldwell v. Ford, Bacon & Davis Utah, Inc., 777 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1989) (finding an exception to a "for cause" agreement in an employee manual to allow for a reduction in force under the "involuntary terminations" clause); see also Tripp v. Hall, 395 So. 2d 33, 34 (Ala. 1981) (the lack of funds for a position was held to be a sufficient defense); Webster v. Schauble, 400 P.2d 292, 293 (Wash. 1965) (closing office sufficient defense); Rompf v. John Q. Hammons Hotels, Inc., 685 P.2d 25, 28-29 (Wyo. 1984) (stating that a manual does not act as a defense to employment-at-will in the face of economic adversity). Since such terminations are merely a relabeling of (ii) as (iv), they should be included to measure the extent of a real effect. Thus, although potentially noisy, the data should be adequate for this purpose.
tract rule, two groups are generally excluded from the rule: government employees\textsuperscript{240} and employees covered by collective bargaining agreements.\textsuperscript{241} These groups must be excluded from the sample because they are unlikely to be affected in the same way, if at all, by the changes in the common law.\textsuperscript{242} Union workers provide a convenient control group that should be unaffected by the changes in the common law.\textsuperscript{243}

An empirical examination of the effects of these changes re-

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\textsuperscript{240} Civil service laws and rules protect the former from arbitrary discharge, and constitutional guarantees of due process also limit government employers' ability to discharge employees. See, e.g., Mowery v. Adams, 641 N.E.2d 1186, 1188-89 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994). Whether indefinite contracts are contracts at-will affects the level of process which is due, of course, but most government employees have some degree of protection from arbitrary dismissal under civil service provisions. Courts have applied employee handbooks, for example, to provide additional protection to public employees through a due process analysis. See, e.g., Brandy v. City of Cedar Hill, 884 S.W.2d 913, 914-15 (Tex. Ct. App. - Texarkana 1994). Public employee law is sufficiently different from that governing private employees to warrant the exclusion of government workers from the sample. The changes in public employee law prevent their use as a reference group, however.

\textsuperscript{241} Union contracts almost always require cause for dismissal, and typically provide an arbitration mechanism as a method of review of employer decisions. FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ASPER ELKOURI, HOW ARBITRATION WORKS 6 (4th ed. 1985).

\textsuperscript{242} In addition to the substantial common law erosion of the rule, there has been a parallel erosion through federal, state, and local statutes, regulations, and ordinances. Many states, for example, prohibit by statute discharges of certain whistleblowers. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 5, para. 395/1(2) (Smith-Hurd 1993) (Illinois whistleblower statute protecting some state employees who disclose information which the employee reasonably believes shows mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety and employees who file worker's compensation claims). Federal statutes bar discharges in retaliation for filing health and safety complaints, or asserting rights under the Fair Labor Standards Act or many other statutes. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 623(d) (West 1985) (stating that it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees because such employees opposed a discriminatory practice or filed a charge alleging discriminatory practice). As these laws apply generally, however, it is not possible to exclude the populations affected by them.

\textsuperscript{243} Employees covered by collective bargaining agreements generally have been unable to make common law wrongful discharge claims because their contracts provide for mandatory arbitration. See David L. Durkin, Comment, Employment At-Will in the Unionized Setting, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 979, 1004 (1985) (noting that a union member wishing to sue for breach of a collective bargaining agreement must exhaust that procedure, and then judges will defer to the arbitrator, such that absent an exception the suit will not be allowed to proceed). There have been exceptions, however. See, e.g., Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, Inc., 726 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir.) (finding that a remedy in tort superseding the contractual arbitration remedy does not pose a threat to collective bargaining), cert. denied 471 U.S. 1099 (1984); see also Durkin, supra, at 1014-18 (discussing scenarios in which unionized workers can bring state tort claims). In the landmark New Hampshire Supreme Court decision in Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549, 553 (N.H. 1974), the plaintiff was a union member who ignored an established grievance procedure. The Monge court majority did not address this issue.
quires a theory about how legal changes affect people who are outside the legal events which produce the change. I assume that the most important effect is the creation of legal uncertainty over the outcome of a wrongful discharge claim. Prior to the development of the modern exceptions, an employer could be confident that a white male employee under forty would be unable to file a claim in almost all cases of discharge. After a court decision which suggested that such claims were possible in the employer's state, however, the employer could no longer be as confident and would be forced to prepare for a potential claim. These preparations would be the mechanism by which discharges for "bad reasons" would be avoided.

Before their behavior changes, employers must learn of the change in legal rules. There are a large number of channels through which news of an opinion might reach employers. The popular press may publicize a decision, which becomes more likely as the amount of money involved increases, the rank of the deciding court rises, and the facts become more interesting. Specialized employment law services publicize decisions to both employment lawyers and personnel departments. Lawyers often provide clients with notice of important decisions which might affect them through newsletters, phone calls, or meetings. Continuing legal education seminars disseminate news of changes in the

244. The authority to discharge might be taken from line managers and given to the personnel department, for example, or the amount of documentation of bad or unproductive conduct required for a discharge might be raised.

245. In Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem. Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985), for example, an employee alleged she was fired after she refused to participate in a parody of the song "Moon River" staged by other employees which involved "mooning" the audience. Id. at 1029. She claimed this discharge violated the Arizona public policy against indecent exposure. Id. at 1035. The Arizona Supreme Court determined that it was unnecessary to decide whether mooning was an actual violation of the indecent exposure statute but that since it might involve conduct prohibited by that statute, a public policy claim was stated. Id.

246. The Bureau of National Affairs, for example, has published a looseleaf service on Individual Employment Rights since 1986. See 9 INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS (BNA) (looseleaf compilation of applicable cases) and 9A INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS (BNA) (looseleaf manual). Before that, all at-will cases were published in a cumulative index. See generally LABOR REL. CUMULATIVE DIGEST & INDEX WITH TABLE OF CASES, (BNA). Both of these publications are continuously updated.
Law, as do management seminars. Computerized legal databases boast of instant retrieval of new opinions. Local services exist which disseminate opinions of courts almost immediately. I assume therefore that news of opinions adopting exceptions to employment-at-will is disseminated to employers rapidly and that most employers quickly become aware that a new remedy has been created.

1. Case Selection

Based on this model of the way in which legal decisions affect employer behavior, I examined the case law in each of the fifty common law jurisdictions. In general, I used the date of the earliest court opinion which met my other criteria. I included courts other than the court of last resort in a state, including some state trial and intermediate appellate courts and federal district and circuit courts interpreting state law, because the issuance of an


248. See supra part II.B.4 (describing the way in which even unpublished opinions have helped construct the common law via ad hoc distribution methods).

249. This is not the same as assuming that employers are aware of the precise legal contours of the new cause of action. The courts themselves take years to determine those. Both the New Hampshire experience with Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549, 553 (N.H. 1974), and the California experience with Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980), demonstrate how long this process may take (six and eight years respectively). See supra notes 6 and 234. (discussing Monge's and Cleary's history, respectively). Similarly, litigation in New Hampshire over the extent of the effect of the reinterpretation of Monge continued for several years. See supra note 6 (discussing Monge's history). All that matters for this paper is that the issuance of an opinion produces a rapid rise in employers' uncertainty concerning their potential liability for discharging an employee.

250. The District of Columbia and all states but Louisiana.

251. Federal courts often find themselves presented with wrongful discharge claims that have not yet been recognized by the courts of the state whose law governs. In Pennsylvania, for example, there was an extensive period during which federal court opinions were the primary source of law on employment-at-will. From 1959 to the early 1980s, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed the issue of at-will employment only once, in Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174 (Pa. 1974). Since Geary, federal courts in Pennsylvania have addressed the issue 37 times. See Kramer, supra note 132, at 253; see also Odell v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 201 F.2d 123, 128 (10th Cir.) (the first case to apply the at-will rule in New Mexico and cited as the source of the rule by the New Mexico courts), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 941 (1953); Laws v. Aetna Fin. Co., 667 F.
opinion by any of them would create a significant amount of uncertainty concerning the applicability of the at-will rule in that state. Further, lower courts are rarely far in front of supreme courts when modifying a longstanding rule like the employment-at-will rule, and are likely to defer to the supreme court on such a major change.\(^\text{252}\) When lower courts do adopt a change, therefore, it is a good indicator that the law has in fact changed. Even if the lower court were later reversed, during the period between its opinion and the reversal, employers in that state would have good reason to behave as if the legal rule had changed. Since my specification allows for the law to change back,\(^\text{253}\) I can capture such an intermediate period.

When the first opinion to adopt an exception in a state is from a federal court which has unambiguously predicted the state courts' acceptance of a common law exception,\(^\text{254}\) I have used the date of that opinion for the exception.\(^\text{255}\) When the federal court opin-

Supp. 342, 348 (N.D. Miss. 1987) (adopting public policy exception in advance of the Mississippi state courts); Morriss, Exploding Myths, supra note 152, at app. A (illustrating sources used by courts in formulating the at-will rule).


Thus we stand at the crossroads of two important public policies . . . . As neither the Texas Legislature nor the Texas Supreme Court has established the State's position in this sensitive area, this Court must exercise judicial restraint and refrain from creating this new right of recovery. To do otherwise would be to exceed our proper authority within the legal framework.

Id. at 676. Maus discusses the resolution of a similar question, whether to extend strict liability beyond the only area expressly approved at the time by the Texas Supreme Court, "food for human consumption." The Amarillo intermediate appellate court refrained from doing so, and when the Texas Supreme Court ultimately did extend the doctrine, it "commended the Amarillo Court's restraint." Id. (citing Sales Associates, Inc. v. McKisson, 408 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1966), rev'd 416 S.W.2d 787, 791 (Tex. 1967). See also Watson v. Zep Mfg. Co., 582 S.W.2d 178, 180 (Tex. Ct. App.—Dallas 1979) ("If the case were one of first impression, we would have the responsibility as well as the opportunity to consider the social implications of our decision. . . . When the law is admittedly settled, however, the obligatory course for an intermediate court is judicial self-restraint.") (writ ref'd n.r.e.).

253. In the case of New Hampshire, for example, I consider the implied covenant exception to have been in effect between February 28, 1974, the date of Monge, and May 5, 1980, the date of Howard v. Dorr Woolen Co., 414 A.2d 1273 (N.H. 1980). See supra note 6.


ion simply refused to dismiss a case for failure to state a claim. I have not used it. I also excluded opinions from federal district courts located in states other than the one whose law is being interpreted, as the presumptive expertise in local law would not exist. Many court decisions are unpublished. Although in all cases I relied on published opinions, I did not use a blanket presumption against unpublished opinions but examined each case I identified individually.

Some retaliatory discharge cases in which employers invoke the at-will rule are based on interpretation of statutes, particularly workers' compensation statutes. When the opinion simply interpreted relatively clear language to provide a remedy, I did not consider that such an opinion created a new common law exception. When the opinion indicated it was creating a common law cause of action to prevent subversion of the statutory scheme or when the language interpreted would appear to a reader armed with common sense to create such a cause of action, I considered the case to have created a public policy exception.

2. Case Categorization

Although there are three generally recognized categories of common law exceptions, these categories are not the only way to subdivide the cases. One could consider, as Dertouzos and

(explicitly guessing that Mississippi would recognize a public policy exception).


258. Such cases are also not necessarily available to lawyers in the home jurisdiction. Whitehead, for example, is digested in the Illinois digest and not the Texas digest, and was not available in the Texas library in LEXIS when I researched these cases.

259. An example of a close case was the Ohio public policy exception. The Sixth Circuit opinion in Merkel v. Scovill, Inc., 787 F.2d 174 (6th Cir.) cert. denied, 479 U.S. 990 (1986) notes that the district court in that case had made an Erie guess that Ohio would recognize a public policy exception. Id. at 180. Since Merkel was argued at the circuit on December 6, 1985, and since the district court's ruling is identified as having been made prior to the post-trial motion stage, it is possible that the federal district court ruling precedes the opinion in Goodspeed v. Airborne Express, Inc., 121 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3216 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985), issued February 12, 1985. I did not count the district court opinion in Merkel since it was unpublished, a federal court opinion, and a trial court opinion which was known to be on appeal. (Even if this choice was incorrect, the closeness in time of Goodspeed means the difference is unlikely to be significant.).

260. See supra notes 179-81 and accompanying text.

261. This problem arose most frequently in connection with workers' compensation statutes. See supra notes 179-83 and accompanying text.

262. See supra notes 226-34 and accompanying text.
Karoly did, the significant division to be whether tort or contract damages are available. Alternatively, one could subdivide the exceptions into smaller categories, such as broad or narrow public policy exceptions. I adopted the conventional legal view and separated the cases into the three doctrinal categories for several reasons. First, this division corresponds to a number of important legal distinctions. The public policy claims, even at their broadest, are relatively narrow, since to be liable, the employer must fire an employee for a reason contrary to some public policy, not simply because the employer dislikes the employee. This limits the types of behavior against which the employer must guard. Any discharge, by contrast, is a potential source of implied contract claims. These cannot be prevented simply by reviewing discharges at the time of discharge, as the claim rests on conduct occurring prior to discharge. Finally, the implied covenant claims are extremely broad, since they require the employer to engage in good faith behavior measured by an uncertain standard and are implied by law into all contracts.

3. Alternative Datings

To further guard against errors in dating, I also used the alternative dates developed independently by Dertouzos and Karoly and by Krueger for their analyses. They made different choices in some instances, providing a valuable check on the robustness of my results. To test whether the conclusions are sensitive to the dating methodology, I used all three sets of dates. In addition to these dating methods, I constructed two additional sets of dates. In the “narrow” method, I date an exception only when all three primary

263. DERTOZOS AND KAROLY, supra note 2, at 8-9.


methods have listed it as adopted. In the “broad” method, I use the earliest date of the three. Thus the implied contract date for Arkansas, for example, would be November 22, 1982 under the broad method and April 1, 1985 under the narrow method. Although there is no substantive content to the constructed categories, they will be useful to examine whether the “correct” dating method’s results are bracketed by “narrow” and “broad” methods.

Table 10 shows the correlation for each type of exception across the primary dating methodologies for the union and non-union samples. The implied covenant exception is the most highly correlated, which is to be expected as the fewest states have adopted it. Krueger’s and Dertouzos and Karoly’s methods yield more highly correlated assignments for the implied contract exception than do my method and either of the others, but are less highly correlated for the public policy exception than my method is with either.

The exceptions themselves are highly correlated, and Table 11 presents correlations within methods and between methods for each of the three types. Dertouzos and Karoly’s method and my method produce assignments significantly more highly correlated between the public policy and implied contract exceptions, while the Krueger dating results in a slightly higher degree of correlation between the public policy and implied covenant exceptions. All three methods find a much higher degree of correlation between the implied covenant and implied contract exceptions than either of the other two pairings, which is to be expected since both are based on contract theories.

266. See infra notes 339-49 and accompanying text (discussing Arkansas’ implied contract cases).
Table 10  Sample Correlations Between Methods and Within Exceptions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exception / Study</th>
<th>Union Observations</th>
<th>Nonunion Observations</th>
<th>All Observations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Knueger RAND</td>
<td>Knueger RAND</td>
<td>Knueger RAND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Policy</td>
<td>Morriss 88.49</td>
<td>87.91</td>
<td>90.34 90.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Krueger --</td>
<td>85.49</td>
<td>-- 87.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implied Contract</td>
<td>Morriss 87.12</td>
<td>88.31</td>
<td>85.07 85.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Krueger --</td>
<td>95.02</td>
<td>-- 93.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implied Covenant</td>
<td>Morriss 98.82</td>
<td>99.67</td>
<td>98.12 99.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Krueger --</td>
<td>99.05</td>
<td>-- 98.73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: calculated from the sample and case assignments in Appendix B.

4. Results

If the critics of the at-will rule are correct, (i) there are significant numbers of discharges for reasons unconnected with productivity and which are not justified by employers’ business needs and (ii) modification of the at-will rule will halt many, if not all, of these discharges. If both (i) and (ii) are true, then the adoption of exceptions to the at-will rule should reduce the probability of discharge. If either is false, then the effect of the common law changes will be indeterminate. For all three exceptions the results should be indeterminate for union sector data, since none of the exceptions is generally applicable, and stronger for white men under forty, who are unprotected by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and have historically not brought numerous Title VII suits over individual discharges.

A statistically significant negative probability coefficient for an
exception indicates that recognition of that exception decreases the probability that an employee's job will end in any given month. As can be seen from the probability coefficient results in Table 12, a significant negative effect on the probability of discharge under my dating method for all white men resulted only from the public policy exception. The implied covenant coefficient was generally negative although insignificant. Although generally insignificant, the sign of the implied contract exception coefficient depended on the specification. With differences in the magnitude of coefficients and the significance levels, this result was generally true for the Dertouzos and Karoly, Krueger, and narrow dating methods as well. Interestingly, the broad method resulted in different coefficients' attaining significance. Table 14 gives the results for the sample of nonunion white men under forty. The signs, magnitude, and significance are generally similar to the results for all nonunion white men.

270. With dichotomous independent variables the appropriate formula is:

\[ B_{LP} = \left[ 1 + \left( \frac{1 - P}{P} \right) e^{(-B_U)} \right]^{-1} - P \]


271. The details of the various specifications are discussed in Appendix C. The specifications used included both methods of identifying job changes described above, various variables describing personal characteristics of employees, and in some cases, variables for occupation and profession. See infra Appendix C.
Table 11  Sample Correlations Within Methods and Between Exceptions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exceptions</th>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Public Policy</th>
<th>Implied Contract</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Union</td>
<td>Nonunion</td>
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<tr>
<td>Implied Contract</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>64.08</td>
<td>70.01</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>K</td>
<td>64.18</td>
<td>65.22</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R</td>
<td>66.36</td>
<td>68.94</td>
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<tr>
<td>Implied Covenant</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>56.43</td>
<td>62.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>K</td>
<td>63.05</td>
<td>67.70</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R</td>
<td>54.29</td>
<td>60.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: calculated from the sample and case assignments in Appendix B.

Table 12  White men, nonunion members

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specification</th>
<th>Morriss</th>
<th>Krueger</th>
<th>RAND</th>
<th>Narrow</th>
<th>Broad</th>
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<tr>
<td>Public Policy</td>
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<td>-0.00037</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(2) -0.00412</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3) -0.00202</td>
<td>-0.00009</td>
<td>-0.00031</td>
<td>-0.00104</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4) -0.00411</td>
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<td>-0.00329</td>
<td>-0.00515</td>
<td>-0.000263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.002777</td>
<td>0.001124</td>
<td>0.001742</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>(4) -0.00103</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4) -0.00296</td>
<td>-0.00297</td>
<td>-0.00172</td>
<td>-0.00041</td>
<td>-0.01006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Bold indicates underlying logit coefficient significant at 5% level.
Table 13 White men, union members

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specification</th>
<th>Morris</th>
<th>Krueger</th>
<th>RAND</th>
<th>Narrow</th>
<th>Broad</th>
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<tr>
<td>Public Policy</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>(4)</td>
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<td>-0.00358</td>
<td>-0.00191</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.004895</td>
<td>0.002616</td>
<td>0.001869</td>
<td>-0.00494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2)</td>
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<td>0.000568</td>
<td>-0.00072</td>
<td>0.000382</td>
<td>-0.00121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3)</td>
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<td>0.005661</td>
<td>0.004038</td>
<td>0.001998</td>
<td>-0.0047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>-0.00195</td>
<td>0.00262</td>
<td>-0.00084</td>
<td>0.000193</td>
<td>0.001077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implied Covenant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>-0.00335</td>
<td>-0.00364</td>
<td>-0.00591</td>
<td>-0.0003</td>
<td>0.003235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>-0.00269</td>
<td>-0.0027</td>
<td>-0.00317</td>
<td>-0.00202</td>
<td>-0.00218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>-0.00225</td>
<td>-0.00289</td>
<td>-0.0051</td>
<td>-0.00253</td>
<td>0.003558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>-0.00195</td>
<td>-0.00239</td>
<td>-0.00291</td>
<td>-0.00161</td>
<td>-0.00218</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: **Bold** indicates underlying logit coefficient significant at 5% level.

Table 14 White men under 40, nonunion members

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specification</th>
<th>Morris</th>
<th>Krueger</th>
<th>RAND</th>
<th>Narrow</th>
<th>Broad</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public Policy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>-0.00291</td>
<td>-0.0013</td>
<td>-0.00088</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.0007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>-0.00288</td>
<td>-0.00417</td>
<td>-0.00298</td>
<td>-0.0051</td>
<td>-0.00107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>-0.0027</td>
<td>-0.00184</td>
<td>-0.00253</td>
<td>-0.00175</td>
<td>-0.00071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>-0.00405</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>-0.00507</td>
<td>-0.0008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implied Contract</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>0.002073</td>
<td>0.00296</td>
<td>0.000162</td>
<td>0.000764</td>
<td>0.002679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>0.00209</td>
<td>0.001778</td>
<td>0.000162</td>
<td>0.001038</td>
<td>-0.004990</td>
</tr>
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<td>(3)</td>
<td>0.001923</td>
<td>0.001224</td>
<td>-0.000003</td>
<td>0.00061</td>
<td>0.002815</td>
</tr>
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<td>(4)</td>
<td>-0.00195</td>
<td>0.001542</td>
<td>0.000268</td>
<td>0.000816</td>
<td>-0.005120</td>
</tr>
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<td>Implied Covenant</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>-0.00293</td>
<td>-0.00386</td>
<td>-0.00193</td>
<td>-0.00229</td>
<td>0.00705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>-0.00297</td>
<td>-0.00215</td>
<td>-0.00126</td>
<td>0.0000763</td>
<td>-0.00920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>-0.00288</td>
<td>-0.00368</td>
<td>-0.00126</td>
<td>-0.00201</td>
<td>-0.00732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>-0.00281</td>
<td>-0.00226</td>
<td>-0.00127</td>
<td>-0.00185</td>
<td>-0.00948</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: **Bold** indicates underlying logit coefficient significant at 5% level.

Table 13 shows that the results for the union sample were generally insignificant. This is consistent with the hypothesis that changes in the common law of wrongful discharge would not affect those working under collective bargaining agreements and so
would not change the probability of a job's ending. Table 15 shows the results for union employees under forty, which are resolutely and gratifyingly insignificant.

There is fairly strong evidence of a small negative effect\textsuperscript{272} on the probability of a nonunion job's ending from the appearance of a public policy exception. This may be because employers react more to those decisions than to the other types or because employers are likely to learn quickly about public policy exceptions. The facts of public policy cases generally make good press—employees who win decisions in cases in which they accuse their employer of violating public policy are likely to get wider coverage than are claims about contract violations. Public policy claims are also more likely to generate large awards since they generally sound in tort. Clearly this is a subject for further investigation.

The more interesting conclusion is the sensitivity of the results to the method of dating. The public policy coefficient, for example, varies between \(-0.00037\) and \(-0.00215\) for specification (1), an almost six-fold difference, depending on which method of dating was used. In some cases, there were changes in the sign of the coefficient.\textsuperscript{273} In addition, the broad method of dating produced results with quite different levels of significance from the other methods. This highlights the need for both legal accuracy in identifying changes in the common law and explicit discussion of the method used in empirical work. Perhaps most interestingly, the differences in the results are not bounded by the constructed methods of dating.\textsuperscript{274} Dating changes in the law is thus not something one can address simply by making "narrow" or "broad" assumptions.

\textsuperscript{272} Even where significant, however, the effects are very small. Part of the explanation is the time scale of the data. It would be surprising indeed if a change in wrongful discharge law had a large impact on the probability of discharge during a given month. There is also a potential bias because of the lack of available data on state level economic conditions.

\textsuperscript{273} Several of the implied contract specifications had this characteristic. See infra tbls. 12 & 14.

\textsuperscript{274} In other words, neither the broad nor the narrow method produces consistently high or low estimates compared to the others. Id.
B. Changes in the Law

Alan Krueger examined the impact of changes in the common law on state legislatures’ consideration of statutory remedies for wrongful discharge.275 He used data on the introduction of just-cause dismissal laws in state legislatures between 1981 and 1988.276 Because both employer and employee groups sometimes jointly support statutes which create a cause of action for wrongful discharge, he argued that a general explanation of just-cause dismissal laws as employee-initiated reform of employment-at-will is inadequate.277 Instead, Krueger suggested a tradeoff by employers similar to the compromise which produced workers’ compensation laws in the early twentieth century, noting that “many employers are willing to support unjust-dismissal legislation and accept a ‘just cause’ firing requirement in exchange for the implementation of a strict standard for employees to recover punitive damages and a consistent, well-defined legal definition of unjust dismissals.”278 He then concluded that the testable implication279 of the theory is “that unjust-dismissal legislation is more likely to be proposed and ultimately enacted into law in states where the courts have recognized exceptions to the traditional employment-at-will doctrine than

275. See Krueger, supra note 8, at 648-50.
276. Id. at 655.
277. Id. at 653.
278. Id. at 653.
279. The statistical framework used is straightforward: employer resistance to legislation is determined by a latent variable, \( y^* \), which depends on the costs of claims under legislation, the cost in the absence of legislation, and a random disturbance. Id. at 654. The hypothesis is that a proposed statute will receive employer support if the difference between the costs under legislation and the costs in the absence of legislation is greater than the disturbance term. Id. Krueger assumes, correctly I believe, that employee groups always support such legislation. Id. at n.18; see also Jack Stieber, Recent Developments in Employment-At-Will, 36 LAB. L.J. 557, 562 (1985) (citing union support for proposals in Connecticut, California, and Michigan). The proposal of a bill, \( y_\ell \), is an indicator of \( y^* \), and is 1 if a bill is introduced and 0 if no bill is introduced. Dummy variables are used to control for the common law exceptions’ existence, represented by \( E_i \) for exception \( i \) in year \( t \). The basic equation estimated is then:

\[
Y_\ell = F(E_{1,\ell-1}, E_{2,\ell-1}, E_{3,\ell-3}, X_\ell)
\]

where \( X_\ell \) is a vector of state-level explanatory variables and \( F \) is the logistic cumulative distribution function. Krueger, supra note 8, at 654. Covariates included union membership, proportion of Democratic members of legislature, unemployment rate, and proportion of employment in manufacturing. Id. at 655-56. Krueger uses the same doctrinal division as my analysis: (i) public policy, (ii) implied contract, and (iii) implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Id. at 655.
in states where they have not. Krueger found that the existence of the good faith and public policy exceptions had a positive and significant effect on the likelihood of legislation being enacted, while the existence of the implied contract exception had a positive, but not significant, effect.

Jack Stieber and Richard Block criticized Krueger's analysis. Their primary criticism was that employers generally oppose just-cause legislation. Most interesting for the purposes of this paper is what Stieber and Block do not criticize. They do not quarrel with Krueger's analysis of the common law, with his tripartite division of exceptions, or with his model of how court decisions influence legislative action. In all of these areas it is at least possible to differ with Krueger's model; given Stieber's position as a leading critic of the at-will rule, it is at least surprising that a generally hostile piece would fail to mention any of these areas. Perhaps this is due to the lack of any foundation principles on which to base such criticism and the lack of information in empirical articles which makes discovering problem areas without extensive research possible.

To test the sensitivity of Krueger's results, I reestimated Krueger's equations using the alternative methods of dating described in detail above. As Table 16, Table 17, and Table 18

280. Id. at 653.
281. Id. tbl. 4, at 655.
283. Stieber and Block also question whether Krueger accurately determined which states introduced bills and criticize the interpretation of the econometric results. These criticisms are generally inaccurate or incorrect. See Alan B. Krueger, Reply, 45 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 795, 797-99 (1992) (refuting the criticisms of Stieber and Block). However, there are a number of other problems with Krueger's analysis. See infra note 285 and accompanying text.
284. Stieber & Block, supra note 282, at 794-95.
285. Krueger's case citations are available, for example, only as an unpublished appendix which includes case names but not citations. See Krueger, supra note 8, unpublished app. (on file with author).
286. These were: (i) my own dating, see supra part III.A.; (ii) the tripartite dating used by Dertouzos and Karoly, see DERTOZOS & KAROLY, supra note 2, at 21; (iii) the "narrow" definition of changes in the law, which recorded a change only when all studies' dating concurred; and (iv) the "broad" definition which recorded a change as occurring on the earliest date listed by any of the three methods. Krueger graciously provided
demonstrate, Krueger's data and results\textsuperscript{287} are sensitive to the method of dating.\textsuperscript{288}

**Table 15** White men under 40, union members

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specification</th>
<th>Morriss</th>
<th>Krueger</th>
<th>RAND</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public Policy</td>
<td>(1) 0.000612</td>
<td>-0.00178</td>
<td>-0.00053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) -0.00148</td>
<td>-0.0024</td>
<td>-0.00031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3) -0.00187</td>
<td>-0.00286</td>
<td>0.000438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4) -0.00192</td>
<td>-0.00269</td>
<td>-0.00079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implied Contract</td>
<td>(1) -0.00144</td>
<td>0.005241</td>
<td>0.00057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) -0.00127</td>
<td>-0.0024</td>
<td>-0.00043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3) -0.00059</td>
<td>0.004164</td>
<td>0.002627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4) -0.00118</td>
<td>-0.00269</td>
<td>-0.00017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implied Covenant</td>
<td>(1) -0.0015</td>
<td>-0.0039</td>
<td>-0.00632</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) -0.0012</td>
<td>-0.00153</td>
<td>-0.00248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3) -0.00094</td>
<td>-0.00333</td>
<td>-0.00619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4) -0.00092</td>
<td>-0.00132</td>
<td>-0.0021</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specification</th>
<th>Narrow</th>
<th>Broad</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public Policy</td>
<td>(1) 0.000606</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) -0.00229</td>
<td>0.002886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3) -0.00111</td>
<td>-0.00206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4) -0.00257</td>
<td>0.003004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implied Contract</td>
<td>(1) 0.000318</td>
<td>-0.00537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(2) 0.00031</td>
<td>-0.00169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3) 0.001003</td>
<td>-0.00506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4) 0.000246</td>
<td>-0.00164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implied Covenant</td>
<td>(1) -0.00593</td>
<td>0.011738</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) -0.00097</td>
<td>-0.00142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3) -0.00568</td>
<td>0.010144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4) -0.00063</td>
<td>0.000938</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Bold indicates underlying logit coefficient significant at 5% level.

me with his data set, enabling these comparisons.

\[287\] The issue in this Article is the sensitivity of results to the dating method. To compare results, therefore, I simply reestimated Krueger's results with the different dates produced by each dating method.

\[288\] See infra notes 289-91 and accompanying text.
### Table 16 Means and Standard Deviations of Selected Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>States With Laws Proposed</th>
<th>States Without Laws Proposed</th>
<th>All States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Morriss</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Policy</td>
<td>0.929 (0.267)</td>
<td>0.482 (0.500)</td>
<td>0.498 (0.501)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implied Contract</td>
<td>0.571 (0.514)</td>
<td>0.448 (0.498)</td>
<td>0.453 (0.498)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implied Covenant</td>
<td>0.429 (0.514)</td>
<td>0.083 (0.276)</td>
<td>0.095 (0.294)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Krueger</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Policy</td>
<td>0.929 (0.267)</td>
<td>0.430 (0.496)</td>
<td>0.448 (0.498)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implied Contract</td>
<td>0.643 (0.497)</td>
<td>0.319 (0.467)</td>
<td>0.33 (0.471)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implied Covenant</td>
<td>0.429 (0.514)</td>
<td>0.080 (0.272)</td>
<td>0.925 (0.290)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rand</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Policy</td>
<td>0.857 (0.363)</td>
<td>0.526 (0.500)</td>
<td>0.538 (0.499)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implied Contract</td>
<td>0.571 (0.514)</td>
<td>0.347 (0.477)</td>
<td>0.355 (0.479)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implied Covenant</td>
<td>0.429 (0.514)</td>
<td>0.073 (0.260)</td>
<td>0.085 (0.279)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The results are sensitive in several ways. First, the assignments of states to the two categories of the dependent variable are different. Table 16 shows the assignments across the dating methods used by Krueger, Dertouzos and Karoly, and me. Table 17 shows the assignments across the methods constructed through combinations of those three (the "narrow" and the "broad" method). Second, the linear estimates of the probability of the enactment of the unjust discharge statutes differ significantly. The estimates vary,

---

**Table 17** Means and Standard Deviations for Constructed Dating Methods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>States With Laws Proposed</th>
<th>States Without Laws Proposed</th>
<th>All States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Broad Policy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Policy</td>
<td>0.560 (0.497)</td>
<td>0.929 (0.267)</td>
<td>0.573 (0.495)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implied Contract</td>
<td>0.477 (0.500)</td>
<td>0.643 (0.497)</td>
<td>0.483 (0.500)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implied Covenant</td>
<td>0.098 (0.298)</td>
<td>0.429 (0.514)</td>
<td>0.11 (0.313)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narrow Policy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Policy</td>
<td>0.412 (0.493)</td>
<td>0.857 (0.363)</td>
<td>0.428 (0.495)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implied Contract</td>
<td>0.262 (0.440)</td>
<td>0.571 (0.514)</td>
<td>0.273 (0.446)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implied Covenant</td>
<td>0.648 (0.246)</td>
<td>0.429 (0.514)</td>
<td>0.078 (0.268)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

*289. Krueger calculated the linear probability estimates using the formula*

\[
B_{LP} = \frac{\partial P}{\partial X} = P (1 - P) B_L
\]

*See Krueger, supra note 8, at 656 n.21. This formula is valid only for marginal changes in independent variables and is therefore inappropriate for use with dummy variables such as the ones used to control for legal environment changes. With dichotomous independent variables the appropriate formula is the one given in note 239.*
for example, from an increase of 7.6% under Dertouzos and Karoly's method, to an increase of 28.5% under Krueger's method.

Table 19 and Table 20 examine the correlations among the dating methods for the observations in Krueger's data set. As expected, the correlations between methods are highest for the implied covenant exception, which has rarely been adopted, and for the public policy exception, where the differences are smaller. The implied contract exception, which is most affected by the different treatment of dicta and dismissed cases, has the lowest correlations across methodologies.

Table 18 Comparison of Linear Probability Coefficients

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specification</th>
<th>Krueger</th>
<th>Morriss</th>
<th>Rand</th>
<th>Broad</th>
<th>Narrow</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public Policy</td>
<td>(1) 0.285</td>
<td>0.232†</td>
<td>0.076†</td>
<td>0.190†</td>
<td>0.133†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) 0.279</td>
<td>0.203†</td>
<td>0.058†</td>
<td>0.053</td>
<td>0.127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3) 0.273</td>
<td>0.190</td>
<td>0.050†</td>
<td>0.147</td>
<td>0.120†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implied Contract</td>
<td>(1) 0.044</td>
<td>0.004†</td>
<td>0.010†</td>
<td>0.143†</td>
<td>0.042†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) 0.030</td>
<td>-0.005†</td>
<td>0.017†</td>
<td>-0.001†</td>
<td>0.025*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3) 0.027</td>
<td>-0.001*</td>
<td>0.002†</td>
<td>0.006†</td>
<td>0.023†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implied Covenant</td>
<td>(1) 0.199</td>
<td>0.124†</td>
<td>0.158†</td>
<td>0.124†</td>
<td>0.142†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) 0.149</td>
<td>0.159†</td>
<td>0.197†</td>
<td>0.402†</td>
<td>0.169**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3) 0.175</td>
<td>0.180</td>
<td>0.242†</td>
<td>0.190†</td>
<td>0.200†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Exceptions</td>
<td>(4) 0.105</td>
<td>0.075†</td>
<td>0.063†</td>
<td>0.067†</td>
<td>0.065†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5) 0.102</td>
<td>0.073†</td>
<td>0.058†</td>
<td>0.065†</td>
<td>0.068†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6) 0.109</td>
<td>0.075†</td>
<td>0.061†</td>
<td>0.071†</td>
<td>0.076†</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Differs at 5% level from Krueger point estimate.
**Differs at 1% level from Krueger point estimate.
†Differs at 1% level from Krueger point estimate.
Note: Bold indicates underlying logit coefficient is significant at 5% level.

290. DERTOUZOS & KAROLY, supra note 2, at 32-33.
291. Krueger, supra note 8, at 655-56.
292. The correlations are generally smaller than in my data set, which is to be expected since Krueger's data set contains only one observation per state per year instead of an observation per individual per month.
Table 19 Correlations within Dating Materials

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Public Policy</th>
<th>Implied Contract</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public Policy</td>
<td>Morriss</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Krueger</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RAND</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implied Covenant</td>
<td>Morriss</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Krueger</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RAND</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C. Aggregate Impacts

Dertouzos and Karoly examined the impact of changes in wrongful discharge law on state aggregate employment levels.293 The basic premise of the model294 is similar to the familiar economic analysis of laws which add to the cost of employing a worker, such as worker’s compensation laws:293 employment levels will be reduced, perhaps after a period of adjustment, when states adopt a new exception to employment-at-will.296 Dertouzos and Karoly use three slightly different specifications of the legal environment:

293. DERTOUZOS & KAROLY, supra note 2, at 46. They also examined the effects on different industries and firm types and on the speed of employment adjustment. Id. at 53. In a different section they examined the development of exceptions to the at-will rule; no data was available to conduct a reevaluation with alternative dating. Id. at 5-7.
294. The model estimated is a straightforward test of this hypothesis:

$$\ln (E_{i,t}) = B_0 + B_1 \ln (GSP_{i,t})$$
$$+ B_2 [\ln (GSP_{i,t} - \ln (GSP_{i,t-1})$$
$$+ \sum_{k=2}^{50} \lambda_k S_{k,i} + \sum_{j=1}^{6} \alpha_j Y_{j,t} + \delta X_{i,t}$$
$$+ \gamma W_{i,t} + \mu_{i,t}$$

here GSP<sub>i</sub> is the gross state product in constant dollars for state <i>i</i> in year <i>t</i>; S<sub>k</sub> is a set of state dummy variables; Y<sub>j</sub> is a set of year dummy variables; X<sub>i</sub> is a vector of other control variables; W<sub>i</sub> is a set of variables indicating the presence of common law changes; and u<sub>i</sub> is a random disturbance. Id. at 47.
296. DERTOUZOS & KAROLY, supra note 2, at 44.
Model I: a tort/contract damages distinction, dividing exceptions into cases of whether a tort or contract remedy is allowed;

Model II: a tripartite division of exceptions into (i) good faith tort or broad public policy; (ii) implied contract or good faith contract; and (iii) narrow public policy;

Model III: a tripartite division of exceptions into (i) tort damages; (ii) contract damages; and (iii) broad public policy or good faith tort claim.297

When the effect of liability on total employment was estimated, they found that both the tort and contract doctrines had a significant negative effect on employment under Model I, the broad public policy and good faith doctrine had a significant negative effect under Model II, and the tort doctrine had a significant negative effect under Model III.298 Dertouzos and Karoly also estimated the model for separate industrial sectors299 and separately for large and small employers. In general, they found that adoption of common law exceptions to employment-at-will had a significant, negative impact on gross state product, suggesting that the social cost of wrongful discharge suits is large.300

297. Id. at 8-9.
298. Id., tbl. 5.2, at 50.
299. Id., tbl. 5.3, at 34 (including estimates for the nonmanufacturing, manufacturing, service, retail, wholesale, and finance sectors).
300. Id. at 62-63. Specifically, they concluded that after states adopt the most liberal tort versions of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and the broad public policy exceptions to employment-at-will, the following labor-market changes occur:

* Aggregate employment drops by 2 to 5%. This result is insensitive to the use of alternative models, statistical assumptions, and econometric methodologies.

* Employment reductions are even higher in some nonmanufacturing industries, particularly the service sector, the retail trade, and the financial, insurance, and real estate group. This difference could stem from a variety of factors. Possible explanations include less frequent union protection, higher expected damage claims by dismissed employees due to greater levels of skills that are not transferable to other firms, systematic differences in management organization, and differences in the availability of objective criteria for evaluating job performance . . .

* The decline in employment appears to be greater for larger businesses, i.e., those having more than 250 workers. This suggests that most costs associated with wrongful termination are not fixed (that is, the
As noted earlier, Dertouzos and Karoly used a different method of characterizing common law doctrines and different dates. Of particular interest is their choice of a model which examines the influence of particular common law changes on such aggregate variables as state-level employment and which uses years as the period of observation. The choice of an aggregate analysis is a natural one, suggested by the state-by-state nature of change in the common law. As discussed below, this choice requires some trade-offs and assumptions about the impact of the common law, which each researcher must evaluate in the context of her particular project. Similarly, the choice of an annual basis for observations loses some information known about court decisions, since the date on which an opinion is issued is known. While this loss may be justified in the context of a particular project, it must inevitably result in some loss of precision in estimating the impact of a decision, since a decision adopted December 31st is treated the same as one issued the preceding January 1st.

Only limited testing of the sensitivity of Dertouzos and Karoly's results to alternative dating methods is possible. Table 20 shows that using my dating methods changes the results somewhat. The impact of the contract cause of action on employment in Model I goes from being negative and marginally significant to being positive and insignificant, while impact of the Model II broad public policy exception becomes larger and more significant, and the impact of the Model II implied contract/good faith exception goes from positive to negative, although it is insignificant under both methods.

Table 20 Correlations Across Different Methods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Public Policy</th>
<th>Implied Contract</th>
<th>Implied Covenant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Morriss</td>
<td>Krueger</td>
<td>Morriss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morriss</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAND</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

same regardless of the number of employees), but, rather, vary on a per-employee basis.

Id. at 62-63.
301. See supra note 208-11 and accompanying text.
302. This is different from positing a lag in the effect of a legal change, since one can lag the indicator variables regardless of the period chosen.
303. Lynn Karoly kindly reestimated this model using my alternate dates and provided me with the results.
IV. CONCLUSIONS

Empirical research on the development of the common law and the impact of common law changes on the economy promises significant rewards. Not only will it lead to greater understanding of how and why the common law changes, but it can contribute to the assessment of the costs and benefits of those changes. Without such empirical evaluation, economics' contribution to understanding the law remains incomplete. Conducting such research requires the development of an analytical framework for dating changes in the common law.

The discussion of the empirical analyses of the development of wrongful discharge law demonstrates three important things. First, the method of dating common law changes does matter when those changes are included in empirical work. Researchers must therefore take care in dating those changes. Second, although dating matters, it does not matter too much. If the conclusions in these case studies dramatically changed, it would suggest that the results were so sensitive as to be driven by the dating methodology. The closeness of results reassures us that empirical work is possible. It is encouraging that three quite different research methods, ranging from Krueger's complete reliance on secondary sources to the different counting methods Dertouzos and Karoly and I used, produced results which were not incompatible. Finally, the existence of differences suggests the need for a framework for making these choices. Such a framework would both ensure consistency and allow readers to evaluate the validity of the research design.

The results presented in Part I of this Article are sufficiently likely to be generalizable that empirical researchers should, as a minimum, make explicit the methodology they use to select cases and the case citations they rely upon. Good practice should include additional elaboration of the choices made in dating; the reader should not be required to perform original research to evaluate the reasonableness of these choices. Where space does not permit the publication of such explanatory material with the original report of the results, in, for example, an article published in an economics journal, it should be stated in the article that such material is available on request. The peer review of such papers should include

304. This consistency, however, may simply be an artifact of these particular papers, so it is important not to allow overconfidence to encourage sloppy research methods.
305. See generally Richard S. Markovits, Second Best Theory and the Standard Analysis
legally trained reviewers, who are more likely to detect errors in dating methodology.

The eighteen principles suggested above provide a framework for making clear the research choices inevitable in empirical work which includes information on the common law. Those choices have a clear impact on the results, and it is therefore important that they be made visibly, carefully, and consistently with the theory which underlies the analysis. These principles are only a first step, however. Much research is needed before empirical work which includes common law events as either independent or dependent variables will be capable of being judged reliably by readers. Future work in this area should also include the collation of data on court structure and caseloads and distribution of such information through vehicles such as the Interuniversity Consortium on Political and Social Research.

The costs of such steps would not be trivial. Conducting the legal research for this paper, for example, consumed considerable effort, as I investigated the law in each U.S. jurisdiction. Without such an investment, however, the results are both unstable and untrustworthy. Economics has often been accused of imperialistic designs on other disciplines, including the law. It is time for economics to acknowledge that its conquest cannot be complete and that “law and economics” must truly be law and economics, not just economic analysis of law.

## Appendix A: Votes in *Teague* Supreme Court Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Rule</th>
<th>New</th>
<th>Old</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Teague</em></td>
<td>Sixth Amendment fair cross section requirement applies to petit juries</td>
<td>Blackmun*, Kennedy, O'Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia White*</td>
<td>Brennan, Marshall, Stevens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Penry</em></td>
<td>Jury instructions required on consideration of mitigating evidence</td>
<td>Kennedy, Rehnquist, Scalia, White</td>
<td>Brennan, Blackmun, Marshall, O'Connor, Stevens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Penry</em></td>
<td>Eighth Amendment bars execution of retarded defendants</td>
<td>Blackmun, Kennedy, O'Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia, Stevens, White</td>
<td>Brennan, Marshall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Sawyer</em></td>
<td>Prosecutor comments during jury argument concerning juror's responsibilities barred by Eighth Amendment</td>
<td>Kennedy, O'Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia, White</td>
<td>Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, Stevens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Butler</em></td>
<td>Fifth Amendment bars police initiated interrogation following a suspect's request for counsel in the context of a separate investigation</td>
<td>Kennedy, O'Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia, White</td>
<td>Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, Stevens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Saffle</em></td>
<td>Eighth Amendment requires jury be allowed to base sentencing decision upon sympathy they feel for defendant after hearing his mitigating evidence</td>
<td>Kennedy, O'Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia, White</td>
<td>Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, Stevens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Stringer</em></td>
<td>Use of aggravating factor in sentencing of &quot;heinous, atrocious, or cruel&quot; conduct was so vague as to violate Eighth Amendment</td>
<td>Blackmun, Kennedy, O'Connor, Rehnquist, Stevens, White</td>
<td>Scalia, Souter, Thomas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Graham</em></td>
<td>Constitutionality of Texas jury instructions on mitigating evidence</td>
<td>Kennedy, Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas, White</td>
<td>Blackmun, O'Connor, Souter, Stevens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Gilmore</em></td>
<td>Constitutionality of Illinois jury instruction on mitigating mental state</td>
<td>Kennedy, O'Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas, White</td>
<td>Blackmun &amp; Stevens dissent on other grounds</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Attribution based on concurrence in result with respect to *Swain* claim.
** Attribution based on concurring opinion where White agrees test is properly applied but disputes whether test itself is proper.
Appendix B: Case Selection Notes

This appendix describes the specific cases I selected for the three exceptions to the at-will rule for each state. Where the state did not adopt the exception within the relevant time period, the text so indicates. Where my choices differ from those made by Krueger and Dertouzos and Karoly, I list their choices and explain briefly why I made the choice I did. The appendix covers the time period up to 1989, when my data ended. Both Dertouzos and Karoly's and Krueger's data ended in 1987, while mine continued through 1988. As a result, there are some states where I identified an opinion after their ending dates. Each citation includes the date of the opinion.

Alabama

1. Public Policy

This exception was not adopted in the period under study.

2. Implied Contract

I date the implied contract exception from Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Campbell (7/10/87), as do Dertouzos and Karoly.

Krueger dates the implied contract exception from Knox v. American Sterilizer Co. (8/14/84). There the employee claimed that the employer breached the employment contract as defined by a handbook. The federal district court found that "it is apparent from the handbook that no such mutual contractual obligation was ever intended by the parties." It then found that the employee had failed to provide any factual support for his claim that he did not receive everything he alleged the handbook promised. Sig-

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306. DERTOUZOS & KAROLY, supra note 2, at 72; Krueger, supra note 8, at 654-55. Although Krueger's analysis covered through 1988, he lagged the adoption variables by one year, so the last adoption which counts for him is 1987. Id. at 657.
307. 512 So. 2d 725, 728-29 (Ala. 1987).
309. Id. at 2342.
310. Id. (emphasis in original).
311. Id.
nificantly, none of the benefits alleged to have been promised by the handbook (and mentioned by the district court) included protection from discharge. Moreover, the Alabama Supreme Court had made a similar determination twenty months earlier in *White v. Chelsea Industries* (1/21/83). *White* is cited for this point (that review of the handbook indicates it is possible for the handbook to create a contract) by the Alabama Supreme Court in *Hoffman-La Roche*. (Interestingly, *Hoffman-La Roche* does not cite *Knox* although it reviews Alabama cases as far back as the 1920s to support its analysis.)

The belief that *Knox* and *White* constitute the adoption of the implied contract exception to the at-will rule rests on the assumption that a court engaging in a review of the facts alleged would find some facts which could create a contract. This is too tenuous to support a public perception that the rule had changed in light of longstanding Alabama law allowing permanent contracts where additional consideration was supplied by the employee and Alabama’s steadfast refusal to adopt a public policy exception.

3. *Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing*

I date this exception from *Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Campbell* (7/10/87). Dertouzos and Karoly and Krueger cite no case.

*Alaska*

1. *Public Policy*

I use *Knight v. American Guard & Alert, Inc.* (2/21/86). Dertouzos and Karoly also rely on this case. Krueger lists no case for a public policy exception.

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312. Id.
313. 425 So. 2d 1090 (Ala. 1983).
315. See id. (citing cases).
316. Id.
317. Id. at 725.
2. Implied Contract

I cite Eales v. Tanana Valley Medical-Surgical Group (5/27/83).319 Krueger and Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this case.

3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

I use Mitford v. de Lasala (5/20/83),320 which explicitly adopts the implied covenant theory.321 The Alaska Supreme Court cited Mitford as the primary case on the implied covenant theory in Knight.322 Dertouzos and Kar also cite Mitford.

Krueger cites Conway, Inc. v. Ross (5/1/81)323 as support for the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Although Conway discusses an implied covenant, it is the implied covenant that “the employee will do nothing which could tend to injure the employer’s business interests.”324 There is no mention of an implied covenant which would protect the employee. The specific claim was that a topless dancer engaged in an act of prostitution.325 Although the opinion discusses the need for good cause to fire the dancer, it does so because there was an explicit written term contract for the employee’s services.326

Arizona

1. Public Policy

I cite Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hospital (6/17/85).327 Krueger and Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this case.

321. Id. at 1006-07.
322. Knight, 714 P.2d at 792.
324. Id. at 1030.
325. Id.
326. Id.
2. Implied Contract

I date the exception from *Leikvold v. Valley View Community Hospital* (6/14/83), vacated (4/25/84). Krueger and Dertouzos and Karoly use the subsequent supreme court opinion; the exception was first recognized by the appellate court. The supreme court opinion substituted its own analysis of the case, but reached the same result as the appellate court.

3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

I cite *Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hospital* (6/17/85). Krueger does not cite a case for this exception; Dertouzos and Karoly cite this case.

Arkansas

1. Public Policy

In *M.B.M. Co. v. Counce* (3/24/80), the Arkansas Supreme Court, although finding no claim on the facts before it, suggested that on different facts it might recognize an exception. This was acknowledged by the Arkansas Supreme Court in *Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford* (1/19/88), where the court said “In *Counce*, supra, we acknowledged that we might recognize an exception [based on public policy] to the at-will doctrine” for some circumstances. Dertouzos and Karoly cite *Counce* for a narrow public policy exception and *Sterling Drug* for a broad exception.

Krueger cites *Scholtes v. Signal Delivery Service, Inc.* (9/21/82), which made an *Erie* guess that Arkansas would recognize an exception to the at-will rule for four classes of public policy violations. A similar *Erie* guess was made by the Eighth

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331. 596 S.W.2d 681 (Ark. 1980).
332. *Id.* at 683.
333. 743 S.W.2d 380 (Ark. 1988).
334. *Id.* at 383.
336. *Id.* at 494. The four classes of public policy violations are:
Circuit in *Lucas v. Brown & Root, Inc.*\(^3^3^7\) Scholtes’ *Erie* guess was based on a citation to *Counce* and references to other jurisdictions.\(^3^3^8\) *Counce* is thus the more appropriate basis for the doctrine.

2. Implied Contract

I cite *Jackson v. Kinark Corp.* (6/4/84).\(^3^3^9\) Dertouzos and Karoly cite *Griffin v. Erickson* (11/22/82).\(^3^4^0\) Krueger cites *French v. Dillard Department Stores* (4/1/85).\(^3^4^1\)

In *French*, the Arkansas Supreme Court found that a particular profit-sharing plan did not create the conditions under which an exception might be made to the at-will rule. In that case, the employee had signed a written employment application which included the statement “I understand and agree that Dillard’s may terminate my employment at any time, without prior notice or liability of any kind, except for wages earned and unpaid at the time of such termination.”\(^3^4^2\) Similar positions had been taken by the court in both *Griffin* and *Jackson*, which predated *French*.\(^3^4^3\)

In *Griffin*, however, the court avoided the question of whether a handbook claim could be made by finding that the employee had received all the process he was due under the public employer’s rules and that cause to discharge him existed.\(^3^4^4\) In addition, *Griffin* involved a claim by a public employee, making the issue of procedural fairness particularly important.\(^3^4^5\) It is interesting to

\(^{337}\) 736 F.2d 1202, 1204-05 (8th Cir. 1984).
\(^{338}\) *Scholtes*, 548 F. Supp. at 493.
\(^{339}\) 669 S.W.2d 898 (Ark. 1984).
\(^{340}\) 642 S.W.2d 308 (Ark. 1982).
\(^{341}\) 686 S.W.2d 435 (Ark. 1985).
\(^{342}\) *Id.* at 436.
\(^{343}\) *Jackson*, 669 S.W.2d at 899 (stating the common law rule that a contract of employment for an indefinite term is subject to at-will termination even if it contains a “for cause” provision, but recognizing a trend towards a less harsh rule); *Griffin*, 642 S.W.2d at 311 (finding that an employee not claiming to have been employed for a definite term is subject to termination without cause).
\(^{344}\) *Griffin*, 642 S.W.2d at 311.
\(^{345}\) *Id.* at 309. The Court held that the at-will rule did apply to public as well as
note that the BNA Labor Relations Reference Manual reporter digests the case under the headnote “Wrongful Discharge—Public Employee,” while the West reporter headnotes concerning the manual are listed under Municipal Corporations key numbers, and the West Master and Servant headnotes all simply affirm the at-will rule.

In Jackson, the Court reversed a summary judgment in favor of the employer to allow development of a factual record on which to base the decision. French later referred to “the Jackson exceptions” to the at-will rule. Jackson is thus the more appropriate source of the handbook exception.

3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

This exception was not adopted in the period under study.

California

1. Public Policy

California adopted the first public policy exception in the United States in Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America, Local 396 (9/30/59). Dertouzos and Karoly cite this as establishing a narrow public policy exception. Krueger cites Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (6/2/80), which Dertouzos and Karoly cite as a broad public policy exception. Tameny explicitly relies on private employees. Id. at 310. However, the fact that the case involved a public employer would tend to favor an employee’s claim based on an official document since an employee may acquire a constitutionally protected property interest in public employment if the public employer has restricted its ability to discharge employees. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1972) (recounting Supreme Court holdings in which a property interest in public employment has been recognized where a legitimate expectation of private employment exists); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601-02 (1972) (stating that a property interest in employment protected by the Fourteenth Amendment may exist absent an explicit contractual provision regarding continued employment).

347. Griffin, 642 S.W.2d at 308-09.
351. 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980).
Petermann, and notes that the major question is whether the public policy-based claim sounds in tort or contract, not whether the exception exists.\textsuperscript{352}

2. \textit{Implied Contract}

I use \textit{Rabago-Alvarez v. Dart Industries} (2/6/76)\textsuperscript{353} to date the implied contract exception. Krueger also cites this case. Dertouzos and Karoly cite \textit{Drzewiecki v. H. & R. Block, Inc.} (3/31/72).\textsuperscript{354}

\textit{Rabago-Alvarez} cites \textit{Drzewiecki} for its statement that "a contract for permanent employment, whether or not it is based on some consideration other than the employee's services, cannot be terminated at the will of the employer if it contains an express or implied condition to the contrary."\textsuperscript{355} The cited passage comes from \textit{Drzewiecki}'s analysis of an employer's claim that a contract which purported to be "permanent" must therefore be at-will.\textsuperscript{356} The court rejected that claim, instead finding that the written contract which specified that termination could occur only if the employee were "improperly conducting the business" limited the employer's ability to discharge the employee.\textsuperscript{357} No state had adopted the implied contract theory in 1972. \textit{Drzewiecki} involved an explicit written employment contract, rather than an employee manual or oral promises.\textsuperscript{358} Under those circumstances, relying on a general statement like the one quoted from a case is an inappropriate basis for the creation of the exception.

3. \textit{Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing}

I cite \textit{Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc.} (10/29/80).\textsuperscript{359} Krueger and Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this case. Dertouzos and Karoly also cite \textit{Foley v. Interactive Data Corp.} (12/29/88).\textsuperscript{360}

\textsuperscript{352} \textit{Id.} at 1334-35.
\textsuperscript{353} 127 Cal. Rptr. 222 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
\textsuperscript{355} \textit{Rabago-Alvarez}, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 225 (quoting \textit{Drzewiecki}, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 174, 24 Cal. App. 3d at 704).
\textsuperscript{356} \textit{Drzewiecki}, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 173.
\textsuperscript{357} \textit{Id.} at 171, 174-75.
\textsuperscript{358} \textit{Id.} at 170-71.
\textsuperscript{359} 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
\textsuperscript{360} 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988).
which restricted the damages available for breach of the covenant to contract damages, while Cleary had allowed tort damages.\textsuperscript{361} Since all observations in the sample are from before December 1988, the change is unimportant for my purposes.

\textbf{Colorado}

1. \textit{Public Policy}

I use \textit{Winther v. DEC International, Inc.} (9/18/85).\textsuperscript{362} \textit{Winther} contains the type of careful and thorough analysis which would have created the expectation among employers that the public policy exception was now available in Colorado courts.\textsuperscript{363} \textit{Brooks v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.} (10/18/83), an earlier federal opinion, also found a public policy exception to exist in dicta.\textsuperscript{364} \textit{Brooks} cited \textit{Lampe v. Presbyterian Medical Center} as the source of a public policy exception based on discharges for exercising a "specifically enacted right or duty."\textsuperscript{365} This is a misstatement of the \textit{Lampe} court's discussion of cases from other jurisdictions, which it then distinguished from the facts before it.\textsuperscript{366} The exception should therefore date from \textit{Winther} rather than \textit{Lampe} or \textit{Brooks}.

Krueger does not count Colorado as having adopted the public policy exception. Dertouzos and Karoly, who do not rely on federal court opinions, cite \textit{Cronk v. Intermountain Rural Electric Ass'n} (7/1/88).\textsuperscript{367}

2. \textit{Implied Contract}

I cite \textit{Brooks v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.} (10/18/83).\textsuperscript{368} Krueger and Dertouzos and Karoly cite \textit{Salimi v. Farmers Insur-
ance Group (6/14/84). Although Brooks' analysis of Lampe was mistaken, the remainder of its argument that an implied contract exception would be found by the Colorado courts is well reasoned.

3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

This exception was not adopted in the period under study.

Connecticut

1. Public Policy

I date the exception from Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc. (1/22/80). Dertouzos and Karoly and Krueger also cite this opinion.

2. Implied Contract


As both the supreme court and the appellate court in D'Ulisse-Cupo note, Finley had already applied a similar theory to an employee handbook. The D'Ulisse-Cupo appeals court summarized the appellate court opinion in Finley by saying "Finley thus

370. See supra notes 366-67 and accompanying text.
371. 427 A.2d 385 (Conn. 1980).
374. 520 A.2d 217 (Conn. 1987).
375. 479 A.2d 781 (Conn. 1984).
376. See D'Ulisse-Cupo, 520 A.2d at 221 n.3; D'Ulisse-Cupo v. Board of Directors of Notre Dame High Sch., 503 A.2d 1192, 1196 (Conn. App. Ct. 1986), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 520 A.2d 217 (Conn. 1987).
establishes that an employer may be bound by an implied promise to fire an employee [only] for cause if the employee reasonably relies on that promise. Finley is thus clearly the more appropriate basis for the exception.

While discussing the general erosion of the at-will rule in the United States in Magnan the Connecticut Supreme Court states, in dicta:

For those employees not protected by collective bargaining agreements, civil service statutes or other laws, the courts have occasionally found an implied promise to discharge only for cause in the circumstances of particular employment relationships. Sometimes the promise has been found in the representations contained in an employee relations manual or handbook. In appropriate circumstances, such an agreement may arise when an employee, in reliance on an implied representation that the position will not arbitrarily be terminated, leaves his current employment, or otherwise acts in reasonable and significant reliance on the representation.

Although the appellate court in Finley relies on this dicta in the same manner as Dertouzos and Karoly, the dicta is so vague and limited by the condition that the employee act in reliance on the representation that I date the exception from Finley rather than from the Magnan dicta.

3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

I use Magnan v. Anaconda Industries (6/10/80), reversed and remanded on other grounds (7/3/84). The trial court rejected an employer’s request for summary judgment, noting that an implied

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377. D’Ulisse-Cupo, 503 A.2d at 1196.
378. The Dertouzos and Karoly appendix identifies some opinions as containing the rule in dicta. See DERTOZOS & KAROLY, supra note 2, at 67-71. The appendix does not indicate that they considered Magnan to have adopted the rule in dicta. Id. at 68.
379. Magnan, 479 A.2d at 785 (footnote omitted).
covenant of good faith and fair dealing existed in employment contracts under Connecticut law.\textsuperscript{382} The court did not delineate the boundaries of the covenant.\textsuperscript{383} When the case reached the state supreme court several years later, after trial, the supreme court restricted the covenant to public policy violations in the case of at-will contracts.\textsuperscript{384} It did not disavow the existence of the covenant as a separate basis for recovery where a contract provision existed to give it content, suggesting (in dicta) approval for the manner in which the Massachusetts courts had applied the covenant.\textsuperscript{385}

Dertouzos and Karoly cite \textit{Cook v. Alexander & Alexander of Connecticut, Inc.} (1/16/85).\textsuperscript{386} That case in turn cites the above mentioned dicta from the state supreme court opinion in \textit{Magnan}.\textsuperscript{387} Krueger also cites the Connecticut Supreme Court opinion in \textit{Magnan}.\textsuperscript{388}

\textbf{Delaware}

Delaware did not recognize any common law exceptions to the at-will rule in the period under study.

\textbf{District of Columbia}

Krueger and Dertouzos and Karoly do not include the District in their analyses.

1. \textit{Public Policy}

I use \textit{Newman v. Legal Services Corp.} (1/26/86).\textsuperscript{389} In this case the federal court is making an \textit{Erie} guess about District law,
rather than a District of Columbia court deciding the issue directly.

2. Implied Contract

I cite Washington Welfare Ass'n v. Wheeler (8/12/85).\(^{390}\) There are two earlier District cases which BNA cites as implied contract cases.\(^{391}\) Both involved university faculty and interpretation of faculty rules in relatively specific ways. In Bason v. American University,\(^{392}\) the court noted that both parties agreed that the faculty handbook in question was part of the contract, and the dispute was over the interpretation of the manual's language. In Howard University v. Best,\(^{393}\) the parties differed over what tenure category a faculty member fell into, not whether the handbook was part of the contract. Washington Welfare, which addressed the substantive issue of implying a contract directly, did not cite either case.\(^{394}\) Because of the special circumstances of Bason and Best and the lack of general language in either, I date the exception from Washington Welfare.

3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

This exception was not adopted in the period under study.

\textit{Florida}

Florida did not recognize any common law exceptions to the at-will rule in the period under study.

\textit{Georgia}

Georgia did not recognize any common law exceptions to the at-will rule in the period under study.

\(^{390}\) 496 A.2d 613 (D.C. 1985).
\(^{391}\) See infra notes 392-93 and accompanying text.
\(^{392}\) 414 A.2d 522, 523, 525 (D.C. 1980).
\(^{393}\) 484 A.2d 958, 966 (D.C. 1984).
\(^{394}\) See Washington Welfare, 496 A.2d 613.
Hawaii

1. Public Policy

I date this exception from *Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc.* (10/28/82). Dertouzos and Karoly and Krueger also cite this case.

2. Implied Contract

I use *Kinoshita v. Canadian Pacific Airlines* (8/26/86). Krueger does not cite a case for this exception. Dertouzos and Karoly cite this case.

3. *Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing*

This exception was not adopted in the period under study.

Idaho

1. Public Policy


In dicta in *Jackson*, the Idaho Supreme Court stated "[a]s a general exception to the [at-will] rule . . . an employee may claim damages for wrongful discharge when the motivation for the firing contravenes public policy." On the particular facts of the case, however, the court found there was no violation of public policy. *MacNeil* relies on *Jackson* as the source of the rule.

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395. 652 P.2d 625 (Haw. 1982).
400. *Id.* at 58.
2. Implied Contract

I use Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation District (4/21/77). Dertouzos and Karoly and Krueger also cite this case.

3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

I cite Metcalf v. Intermountain Gas Co. (8/8/89). Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this opinion. It is after Krueger’s time period; he cites no case for this exception.

Illinois

1. Public Policy

I date this exception from Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc. (12/4/78) Dertouzos and Karoly cite this case for a narrow public policy exception. Krueger cites Palmateer v. International Harvester Co. (original opinion 4/17/81, modified 6/8/81). Dertouzos and Karoly cite this case for a broad public policy exception.

In Kelsay, the court reversed a lower court ruling that an employee discharged in retaliation for filing a worker’s compensation claim had no claim. The Illinois Supreme Court found a common law remedy independent of the statutory scheme (which at that time did not provide a retaliatory discharge cause of action). The Illinois Supreme Court later accepted the appeal in Palmateer “to determine the contours of the tort of retaliatory discharge approved in Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc.” Prior to the Illinois Supreme Court opinion in Kelsay, an appellate panel had recognized a public policy exception in a workers’ compensation retaliation case in Leach v. Lauhoff Grain Co. ((8/31/77). This

403. 778 P.2d 744 (Idaho 1989).
404. 384 N.E.2d 333 (Ill. 1978).
406. Kelsay, 384 N.E.2d at 361.
407. Id. at 358-59.
408. Palmateer, 421 N.E.2d at 877.
case was decided the same day as the appellate court opinion in Kelsay, in which the court had ruled for the employer. Given the simultaneous and conflicting decisions and the workers' compensation context, I date the exception from the Illinois Supreme Court opinion in Kelsay.

2. Implied Contract


Illinois' intermediate appellate courts issued a number of decisions on whether a contract could be implied from an employee handbook or other material before the matter was settled in favor of the implied contract exception by the Illinois Supreme Court in Duldulao.

Duldulao cites Carter as the first case to create the exception and most post-Carter cases cite it, distinguishing it if they find no contract and applying it if they find a contract. Pundt is a post-Duldulao case and therefore clearly inappropriate. Given the goal of identifying the decisions which introduced the uncertainty into the employer's decision process, Carter is the appropriate source.

3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

This exception was not adopted in the period under study.

412. 505 N.E.2d 314 (Ill. 1987).
414. See Duldulao, 505 N.E.2d at 317.
415. Id.
Indiana

1. Public Policy

I date this exception from *Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co.* (5/1/73). Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this case for a narrow public policy exception. Krueger cites *Campbell v. Eli Lilly and Co.* (12/30/80).

*Frampton* concerned the interpretation of the Indiana workers' compensation statute. It held that a retaliatory discharge was a "device" within the meaning of the word in the statute and therefore prohibited by the language "[n]o contract or agreement, written or implied, no rule, regulation or other device shall, in any manner, operate to relieve any employer in whole or in part of any obligation created by this act."

The court, however, used very broad language to define the cause of action, stating that "when an employee is discharged solely for exercising a statutorily conferred right an exception to the general [at-will] rule must be recognized." The case is frequently cited as an example of a public policy claim. In addition, the *Campbell* court based its analysis of the facts on *Frampton*. *Frampton* is thus the appropriate basis for dating the exception.

2. Implied Contract

I use *Romack v. Public Service Co. of Indiana* (8/20/87). Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this case. Krueger does not list this exception as adopted.

419. *Frampton*, 297 N.E.2d at 427-28 (quoting IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-1215 (emphasis by the court)).
420. *Id.* at 428.
421. See, e.g., *Campbell*, 413 N.E.2d at 1060-62.
422. *Id.*
423. 511 N.E.2d 1024 (Ind. 1987).
3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

This exception was not adopted in the period under study.

Iowa

1. Public Policy

_Northrup v. Farmland Industries, Inc._ (7/31/85).424 Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this case. Krueger does not count this exception as adopted.

In _Northrup_, the Iowa Supreme Court says that it had previously “hinted” that it would recognize a public policy exception under the right circumstances.425 As in _Abrisz_, however, the _Northrup_ court found that facts did not support a public policy claim.426 The exception was finally adopted in _Springer v. Weeks & Leo Co._ (9/21/88).427 _Abrisz_ is discussed as an example in the text and is not used for the reasons given there.428

2. Implied Contract

I cite _Young v. Cedar County Work Activity Ctr., Inc._ (11/25/87).429 Krueger does not consider this exception to have been adopted. Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this case.

3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

Both Dertouzos and Karoly and I do not consider this exception to have been adopted in Iowa. Krueger cites the federal district court opinion in _High v. Sperry Corp._ (3/16/84).430

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424. 372 N.W.2d 193 (Iowa 1985).
425. Id. at 196 (citing _Abrisz v. Pulley Freight Lines, Inc._, 270 N.W.2d 454 (Iowa 1978)).
426. Id. at 196-97 (noting that the public policy claim of discrimination against disabilities was preempted by a statutory remedy for such discrimination).
427. 429 N.W.2d 558, 560 (Iowa 1988).
428. See _supra_ notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
429. 418 N.W.2d 844 (Iowa 1987).
High refused to dismiss for failure to state a claim a cause of action which sought recovery under the implied covenant theory, noting that "[t]he terms of the employment relationship between plaintiff and defendant are not before the court. Perhaps plaintiff can prove an employment relationship and other facts giving rise to a cause of action for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing." Given the extremely low standard for preventing dismissal on these grounds, this can hardly be said to have created an expectation that such a cause of action exists in Iowa.

Kansas

1. Public Policy

I cite Murphy v. City of Topeka-Shawnee County Department of Labor Services (6/19/81). Krueger cites this opinion; Dertouzos and Karoly list it as the source of a narrow public policy exception. Dertouzos and Karoly cite Palmer v. Brown (3/25/88) as the source of a broad public policy exception.

2. Implied Contract

I use Allegri v. Providence-St. Margaret Health Center (8/2/84). Dertouzos and Karoly and Krueger both cite this case.

3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

This exception was not adopted in the period under study.

Kentucky

431. Id. at 1248.
432. Dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) is granted only if "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
433. See Fogel v. Trustees of Iowa College, 446 N.W.2d 451, 457 (Iowa 1989) (noting that the question of the acceptance of the exception was still undecided and declining to decide it).
1. Public Policy

I cite Firestone Textile Co. v. Meadows (11/23/83).\textsuperscript{437} Krueger and Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this case.

*Firestone* cites two appellate opinions as support:\textsuperscript{438} *Pari-Mutuel Clerks’ Union of Kentucky, Local 541 v. Kentucky Jockey Club*\textsuperscript{439} and *Scroghan v. Kraftco Corp.*\textsuperscript{440} The former finds a remedy based on a Kentucky statute prohibiting the discharge of an employee for supporting a union.\textsuperscript{441} Although there was no explicit remedy provided by the statute, the court found an implied remedy existed.\textsuperscript{442} The *Firestone* court stated that “[w]e have already recognized a cause of action for wrongful discharge based on public policy implicit in an act of the legislature.”\textsuperscript{443} This analysis of *Pari-Mutuel* is difficult to sustain from the language of the case itself, and it would not be appropriate to date the exception from *Pari-Mutuel*.

*Scroghan* held that firing an employee who announced his intention to attend night law school did not involve a public policy question.\textsuperscript{444} Therefore, neither case suggested that a general public policy exception to the at-will rule existed.

2. Implied Contract

I use *Shah v. American Synthetic Rubber Corp.* (8/31/83).\textsuperscript{445} Krueger and Dertouzos and Karoly cite no case.

3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

This exception was not adopted in the period under study.

\textsuperscript{437} 666 S.W.2d 730 (Ky. 1983).
\textsuperscript{438} *Firestone*, 666 S.W.2d at 732.
\textsuperscript{439} 551 S.W.2d 801 (Ky. 1977).
\textsuperscript{440} 551 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
\textsuperscript{441} *Pari-Mutuel Clerks*, 551 S.W.2d at 802.
\textsuperscript{442} *Id.*
\textsuperscript{443} *Firestone*, 666 S.W.2d at 732 (citing *Pari-Mutuel*, 551 S.W.2d at 803).
\textsuperscript{444} *Scroghan*, 551 S.W.2d at 812.
\textsuperscript{445} 655 S.W.2d 489 (Ky. 1983).
Louisiana

Louisiana did not recognize any common law exceptions to the employment at-will rule in the period under study.

Maine

1. Public Policy

This exception was not adopted in the period under study.

2. Implied Contract

I cite Terrio v. Millinocket Community Hospital (11/2/77). Krueger also cites this case. Dertouzos and Karoly cite Larrabee v. Penobscot Frozen Foods, Inc. (12/31/84).

Terrio upheld a jury verdict for an employee who claimed an implied contract for a definite term based on a retirement plan, an employee handbook, and oral statements by supervisors. Although Larrabee did not mention Terrio, its main innovation was a relaxation of the evidentiary standard by which contracts can be taken out of the at-will rule. Terrio clearly adopted a somewhat more limited implied contract exception, but given the early date of its adoption its impact must have been relatively large.

3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

This exception was not adopted in the period under study.

Maryland

1. Public Policy

I cite Adler v. American Standard Corp. (7/16/81). Krueger
and Dertouzos and Karoly both cite this case.

2. Implied Contract

I use *Staggs v. Blue Cross of Maryland, Inc.* (1/14/85).\(^{451}\) Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this case. Krueger cites *Staggs* but lists the date as 1987.\(^{452}\)

3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

This exception was not adopted in the period under study.

*Massachusetts*

1. Public Policy


*McKinney* carefully surveyed Massachusetts law and brought the public policy exception into the implied covenant context.\(^{455}\) Massachusetts courts quickly began to cite *McKinney.*\(^{456}\) *Cort* cites *Gram,*\(^{457}\) which cites *McKinney* in support of the exception.\(^{458}\) Therefore, *McKinney* is a better source of the exception than *Cort.*

\(^{452}\) Krueger, *supra* note 8, unpublished appendix (on file with author). This appears to be a repeat of a typographical error in the BNA IER manual which correctly cites *Staggs* as 486 A.2d 798, but incorrectly lists the date as 1987 rather than 1985. *BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS MANUAL* 505:414 (June, 1993).
\(^{454}\) 431 N.E.2d 908 (Mass. 1982).
\(^{457}\) *Cort,* 431 N.E.2d at 910 (citing *Gram*, 429 N.E.2d at 21).
\(^{458}\) *See supra* note 456 and accompanying text.
2. Implied Contract

I cite Hobson v. McLean Hospital Corp. (5/16/88). Dertouzos and Karoly cite Jackson v. Action for Boston Community Development, Inc. (7/14/88). Krueger does not cite a case for this exception; these cases are outside the time period of his study.

Hobson cites no authority, but simply asserts the exception exists in Massachusetts. Jackson cites Hobson as the source of the exception. One earlier case deserves mention. The BNA Individual Employment Rights Handbook summarizes the three paragraph opinion in Hass v. Picker International, Inc. as allowing a claim based on “statements in an employee handbook and representations by the employer’s agent that he [the employee] would be employed for a term in excess of a year.” In fact, that opinion merely rejected a summary judgment motion, saying “although Plaintiff’s evidence appears to be gossamer thin, it cannot be ruled with certainty that there is no question of material fact lurking in this case.” Given the procedural posture, this is less than “gossamer thin” authority for the existence of such a cause of action in Massachusetts.

3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

I cite Fortune v. National Cash Register Co. (7/20/77). Krueger and Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this case.
Michigan

1. Public Policy

I use Sventko v. Kroger Co. (6/24/76). Krueger and Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this case.

2. Implied Contract

I cite Toussaint v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Michigan (6/10/80). Krueger and Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this case. The Michigan Supreme Court opinion in Toussaint actually decided two cases, one involving Toussaint and the other a plaintiff named Ebling. In the appellate court Ebling won and Toussaint lost. The appellate opinion in Toussaint was published. The appellate opinion in Ebling was not. It was issued on 11/9/77. I date the exception from the Supreme Court opinion for the reasons discussed above concerning the Illinois cases of Leach and Kelsay.

3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

This exception was not adopted in the period under study.

Minnesota

1. Public Policy

I use Phipps v. Clark Oil & Refining Co. (11/18/86). Dertouzos and Karoly and Krueger also cite this case.

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467. 245 N.W.2d 151 (Mich. 1976).
469. Id. at 883.
471. See supra notes 404-10 and accompanying text.
473. Although Krueger did not identify which of the two opinions he counted in his list, his data showed that it was the intermediate appellate opinion. See Krueger, supra note 8, tbl. 1, at 649 (illustrating the years that Krueger uses as the starting point of the recognition of the at-will doctrine in each state; thus, implying which cases Krueger relies
2. Implied Contract

I use *Pine River State Bank v. Mettille* (4/29/83).\(^{474}\) Krueger and Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this opinion.

3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

This exception was not adopted in the period under study.

**Mississippi**

1. Public Policy

I cite *Laws v. Aetna Finance Co.* (7/17/87).\(^{475}\) The *Laws* court gives an exhaustive analysis of state court dicta and makes a convincing argument that Mississippi would adopt a public policy exception for employees discharged for refusal to commit an illegal act.\(^{476}\) Krueger and Dertouzos and Karoly do not consider this exception to have been adopted in Mississippi.

2. Implied Contract

This exception was not adopted in the period under study.

3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

This exception was not adopted in the period under study.

**Missouri**

1. Public Policy

I date this exception from *Boyle v. Vista Eyewear, Inc.* (11/5/85).\(^{477}\) Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this case. Krueger

\(^{474}\) 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983).
\(^{476}\) Id. at 345-46.
\(^{477}\) 700 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
cites *Henderson v. St. Louis Housing Authority* (12/26/79).\(^{478}\)

In *Boyle*, the Missouri appellate court adopted a public policy exception after an exhaustive survey of both Missouri and other states’ law.\(^{479}\) *Henderson* had allowed a claim under the workers’ compensation statute where employees alleged they had been discharged for filing claims.\(^{480}\) Because the Missouri workers’ compensation statute explicitly allows such claims,\(^{481}\) and because no mention is made in *Henderson* of the at-will rule (as the defendant’s claim is that the plaintiff failed to prove his case),\(^{482}\) *Boyle* is the appropriate case from which to date the exception.

2. **Implied Contract**

I cite *Arie v. Intertherm, Inc.* (1/18/83).\(^{483}\) Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this case. Krueger does not cite a case.

3. **Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing**

This exception was not adopted in the period under study.

**Montana**\(^{484}\)

1. **Public Policy**

I cite *Keneally v. Orgain* (1/30/80).\(^{485}\) Krueger\(^{486}\) and Dertouzos and Karoly both cite this case.

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\(^{478}\) 605 S.W.2d 800 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
\(^{479}\) *Boyle*, 700 S.W.2d at 871-78.
\(^{480}\) *Henderson*, 605 S.W.2d at 800. The same issue was present in *Hansome v. Northwestern Cooperage Co.*, 679 S.W.2d 273 (Mo. 1984) (en banc).
\(^{482}\) *Henderson*, 605 S.W.2d at 802.
\(^{483}\) 648 S.W.2d 142 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
\(^{484}\) For a comprehensive analysis of the interplay between Montana’s code provisions and court decisions in this area see Morriss, *Plenty of Laws*, *supra* note 185.
\(^{485}\) 606 P.2d 127 (Mont. 1980).
\(^{486}\) Krueger cites the case as “Kenealy”. Krueger, *supra* note 8, unpublished appendix (on file with author).
2. Implied Contract

I use the *Montana Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act* (effective July 1, 1987).487 Dertouzos and Karoly also cite the statute. Krueger cites *Gates v. Life of Montana Insurance Co.* (1/5/82).488 *Gates* rejected a claim under an employment manual, citing the fact that it had been distributed after employment began and relying on the Kansas Supreme Court's decision in *Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co.*489 As there were no dicta indicating sympathy toward the exception and as *Johnson* is a particularly firm rejection of the theory, *Gates* is an inappropriate basis for the exception. It is not surprising that no implied contract exception developed in Montana, despite its status as one of the most pro-employee jurisdictions, given the wide reach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which is based on *Gates.*490

3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

I cite *Gates v. Life of Montana Insurance Co.* (1/5/82).491 Krueger and Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this case.

**Nebraska**

1. Public Policy

I use *Ambroz v. Cornhusker Square Ltd.* (11/25/87).492 Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this case. Krueger does not cite a case for this exception in Nebraska.

2. Implied Contract

I cite *Morris v. Lutheran Medical Center* (11/18/83).493

488. 638 P.2d 1063 (Mont. 1982).
489. *Id.* at 1066 (citing *Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co.*, 551 P.2d 779 (Kan. 1976)).
490. *See infra* note 491 and accompanying text.
491. 638 P.2d 1063 (Mont. 1982).
492. 416 N.W.2d 510 (Neb. 1987).
Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this case. Krueger does not cite a case for this exception in Nebraska.

3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

This exception was not adopted in the period under study. In one case, the Nebraska Supreme Court stated: “Except in cases where an employee is deprived of constitutional or statutory rights or where contractual agreements guarantee that employees may not be fired without just cause, the law in this state continues to deny any implied covenant of good faith or fair dealing in employment termination.” *Jeffers v. Bishop Clarkson Memorial Hospital* (5/30/86). Although this implies that the covenant does exist in the three types of cases mentioned, those cases either fall within the public policy exception or protect employees with contracts which take them out of the at-will rule’s coverage. For this reason I did not rely on *Jeffers*. 

Nevada

1. Public Policy

I cite *Hansen v. Harrah’s* (1/25/84). Krueger and Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this case.

2. Implied Contract

I use *Southwest Gas Corp. v. Ahmad* (8/31/83). Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this case. Krueger cites *Mannikko v. Harrah’s Reno, Inc.* (2/27/86). That case explicitly cites *Ahmad* as the basis for the implied contract exception. 

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494. Dertouzos and Karoly incorrectly list the case as “Morriss.”
495. 387 N.W.2d 692, 695 (Neb. 1986).
496. 675 P.2d 394 (Nev. 1984).
499. *Id.* at 196 (citing *Ahmad*, 668 P.2d at 261-62).
3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

I cite *K-Mart Corp. v. Ponsock* (2/24/87). Krueger and Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this opinion.

New Hampshire

1. Public Policy

I use *Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co.* (2/28/74). Krueger and Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this case.

2. Implied Contract

I date this exception from *Panto v. Moore Business Forms, Inc.* (8/5/88). Krueger and Dertouzos and Karoly do not cite any cases for this exception. In *Panto*, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that a “unilateral promulgation to present at-will employees” of a statement of intent to provide benefits can modify the contract of employment. The difference will not affect any of the comparisons in this Article, since *Panto* was issued in August 1988 and the comparisons with the data do not rely on any decisions after their time periods.

3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

I cite *Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co.* (2/28/74). Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this opinion. Krueger does not cite an opinion for this exception.

*Monge* was universally thought to have adopted a particularly broad version of the implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-

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501. 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974).
502. Howard v. Dorr Woolen Co., 414 A.2d 1273, 1274 (N.H. 1980), reinterpreted *Monge* to be a public policy exception to the at-will rule. However, even prior to *Dorr*, public policy claims were clearly within *Monge*. See supra note 6 (providing a more extended discussion of *Monge* and *Dorr*).
504. Id. at 261.
505. 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974).
ing until the New Hampshire Supreme Court announced in 1980 that Monge was actually a public policy exception. Thus the implied covenant should not be considered to have continued after 1980.

New Jersey

1. Public Policy

I cite Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. (7/28/80). Krueger and Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this opinion.

2. Implied Contract

I use Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche Inc. (5/9/85). Krueger and Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this opinion.

3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

This exception was not adopted in the period under study.

New Mexico

1. Public Policy

I date this exception from Vigil v. Arzola (7/5/83). Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this opinion. Krueger does not cite an opinion for this exception. New Mexico had previously rejected a public policy argument in a case involving the worker’s compensation law, holding that it was a matter for the legislature in Bottijliso v. Hutchinson Fruit Co. (9/22/81). In Vigil, however, the court held that as the at-will rule had been judicially created, it could be modified outside of comprehensive statutory schemes like

506. Dorr, 414 A.2d at 1274. See supra note 6 (providing an extended discussion of Monge and Dorr).
507. 417 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1980). 
workers' compensation.\textsuperscript{511}

2. **Implied Contract**

I cite \textit{Forrester v. Parker} (2/1/80).\textsuperscript{512} Krueger and Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this case.

3. **Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing**

This exception was not adopted in the period under study.

**New York**

1. **Public Policy**

I do not view New York as having adopted this exception. Krueger does not cite a case for this exception. Dertouzos and Karoly cite \textit{Chin v. AT&T Co.} (7/17/78).\textsuperscript{513} Dertouzos and Karoly also cite \textit{Murphy v. American Home Products Corp.},\textsuperscript{514} in which New York's highest court rejected the public policy exception.

In \textit{Chin}, a trial court rejected a claim of "abusive discharge" by holding that the plaintiff had failed to persuade the court that New York public policy barred discharge of at-will employees due to the employees' political beliefs and associations.\textsuperscript{515} The \textit{Chin} court, after noting that the public policy exception had not yet been recognized in New York, stated

\begin{quote}
\indent it is appropriate, on a motion of this nature [motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim], to examine the elements of the cause of action to determine whether the complaint alleges sufficient facts upon which relief can be granted at trial. Since plaintiff is proceeding on a cause of action not presently recognized in this state, he bears a heavy burden of demonstrating that this new cause of ac-
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{511} Vigil, 699 P.2d at 620.  
\textsuperscript{512} 606 P.2d 191 (N.M. 1980).  
\textsuperscript{513} 410 N.Y.S.2d 737 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978).  
\textsuperscript{514} 448 N.E.2d 86 (N.Y. 1983).  
\textsuperscript{515} \textit{Chin}, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 741.
tion should be adopted.\textsuperscript{516}

Given this language, it is difficult to argue that \textit{Chin} represented anything more than a careful analysis of a motion to dismiss. There is no dicta indicating a favorable view of the doctrine in question.

Finally, it is worth noting that \textit{Murphy}, which rejects the public policy exception, does not mention \textit{Chin}, an indication that \textit{Chin} was not thought to have suggested the exception might exist.\textsuperscript{517} The lack of any other published opinions in the almost five years between \textit{Chin} and \textit{Weiner} reinforce the view that \textit{Chin} was not seen as a signal that the door had opened to such claims.

2. \textit{Implied Contract}

I use \textit{Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc.} (11/18/82).\textsuperscript{518} Krueger and Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this case.

3. \textit{Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing}

This exception was not adopted in the period under study.

\textit{North Carolina}

1. \textit{Public Policy}

I date this exception from \textit{Sides v. Duke Hospital} (5/7/85).\textsuperscript{519} Krueger and Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this case.

2. \textit{Implied Contract}

This exception was not adopted in the period under study.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[516] \textit{Id.} at 740.
\item[517] \textit{See Murphy}, 448 N.E.2d 86.
\item[518] 443 N.E.2d 441 (N.Y. 1982).
\end{footnotes}
3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

This exception was not adopted in the period under study.

North Dakota

1. Public Policy

I date this exception from *Krein v. Marian Manor Nursing Home* (11/19/87). Krueger and Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this case.

2. Implied Contract


In *Hammond*, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that a state agency which had promulgated a *Personnel Policies Manual* "must be held accountable under those provisions in its employment relationship with" the employee. Although *Hammond* involved a public employer, the holding does not rely on the public character of the employer. *Bailey* discussed *Hammond* in the context of a private employer. Further, in *Bailey* the plaintiffs cited *Hammond* as the source of the rule, indicating that the bar viewed *Hammond* as creating the exception. Further, *Bailey* concerned the effect of a disclaimer in the employment manual, not whether the manual itself was part of the contract. As the effectiveness of the disclaimer is an issue only if the manual is otherwise potentially effective, this further supports the rule predating *Bailey*.

520. 415 N.W.2d 793 (N.D. 1987).
521. 345 N.W.2d 359 (N.D. 1984).
522. 398 N.W.2d 120, 122-23 (N.D. 1986).
523. *Hammond*, 345 N.W.2d at 361.
524. See id.
525. *Bailey*, 398 N.W.2d at 122-23.
526. See id.
527. Id.
3. **Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing**

This exception was not adopted in the period under study.

**Ohio**

1. **Public Policy**

   I cite *Goodspeed v. Airborne Express, Inc.* (2/11/85).\(^{528}\) Krueger does not cite a case for Ohio for this exception. Dertouzos and Karoly cite this case.

   *Goodspeed* is the earliest case adopting the exception. The Ohio Supreme Court subsequently recognized the exception in *Greely v. Miami Valley Maintenance Contractors, Inc.*\(^{529}\) and noted that this case not only found a cause of action but is cited by the BNA *Individual Employer Rights Manual* for the proposition that Ohio recognized the exception.\(^{530}\) Between *Goodspeed* and *Greely*, however, the Ohio Supreme Court decided *Phung v. Waste Management, Inc.* (4/16/86).\(^{531}\) There the Court rejected a public policy claim and stated that Ohio had not yet recognized any public policy exceptions.\(^{532}\) Dertouzos and Karoly and I consider this case to reverse the exception.

2. **Implied Contract**

   I use *West v. Roadway Express* (3/21/82).\(^ {533}\) Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this case. Krueger cites *Helle v. Landmark, Inc.* (3/30/84).\(^ {534}\) Although *West* rejected the specific claim at issue, it carefully examined the evidence offered by the plaintiff and concluded that a contract not to fire except for just cause had not been created.\(^ {535}\)

\(^{529}\) 551 N.E.2d 981 (Ohio 1990).
\(^{530}\) Id. at 986 n.3.
\(^{531}\) 491 N.E.2d 1114 (Ohio 1986).
\(^{532}\) Id. at 1196.
\(^{535}\) *West*, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 4555-56.
3. **Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing**

This exception was not adopted in the period under study.

**Oklahoma**

1. **Public Policy**

I cite *Burke v. K-Mart Corp.* (2/7/89).\(^{536}\) Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this case. Krueger does not cite a case for this exception in Oklahoma.

2. **Implied Contract**

I date this exception from *Langdon v. Saga Corp.* (12/28/76).\(^{537}\) Krueger also cites this case. Dertouzos and Karoly cite *Hinson v. Cameron* (6/9/87).\(^{538}\) While *Hinson* is the first state supreme court case on the subject, it cites the court of appeals opinion in *Langdon*, and finds it “compatible” with a later public employee case.\(^{539}\) Because *Langdon* predates *Hinson* it is the appropriate benchmark.

3. **Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing**

This exception was rejected by *Hinson v. Cameron* (6/9/87)\(^{540}\) and *Burke v. K-Mart Corp.* (2/7/89).\(^{541}\) Many courts, however, interpreted the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s decision in *Hall v. Farmers Insurance Exchange* (5/21/85),\(^{542}\) which found an implied covenant in an insurance agent’s contract with the insurance company, to apply to the employer-employee relationship as well.\(^{543}\) Thus from May 1985 to June 1987, it appeared that Oklahoma had adopted this exception, and I consider it to have been adopted

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538. 742 P.2d 549 (Okla. 1987).
539. Id. at 555.
540. Id. at 554.
during that period.

Krueger and Dertouzos and Karoly do not consider Oklahoma to have adopted this exception.

Oregon

1. Public Policy

I cite Nees v. Hocks (6/12/75). Krueger and Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this case.

2. Implied Contract


Oregon courts cite Yartzoff as authority for implied contract claims. Two such cases are: Simpson v. Western Graphics Corp. and Fleming v. Kids and Kin Head Start. Speciale is a particularly inappropriate source of the rule: it concerned an appeal of a denied motion to replead a complaint after dismissal on demurrer and the standard applied was thus very low.

3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

This exception was not adopted in the period under study.

544. 536 P.2d 512 (Or. 1975).
545. 576 P.2d 356 (Or. 1978).
547. 643 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Or. 1982).
549. Speciale, 590 P.2d at 737.
Pennsylvania

1. Public Policy


In 1974, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted in dicta in *Geary* that

[j]t may be granted that there are areas in an employee’s life in which his employer has no legitimate interest. An intrusion into one of these areas by virtue of the employer’s power of discharge might plausibly give rise to a cause of action, particularly where some recognized facet of public policy is threatened.

The employer won in *Geary* because of its particular facts. The clear message of *Geary* was that the at-will rule was no longer absolute. *Reuther* based a public policy exception on this dicta from *Geary*. Federal courts in Pennsylvania have also relied on *Geary* in upholding public policy claims. *Geary* is thus a more appropriate basis for dating the public policy exception.

2. Implied Contract

This exception was not adopted in the period under study.

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553. The employer successfully argued the employee was discharged for failing to follow company procedure in making his complaint about the safety of a product, not because he complained. *Id.* at 176.
554. *See id.* at 180.
3. *Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing*

This exception was not adopted in the period under study.

**Rhode Island**

I do not consider Rhode Island to have adopted any exceptions to the at-will rule in the period under study. Krueger also does not count Rhode Island as adopting any exceptions to the at-will rule.

Dertouzos and Karoly cite to dicta in *Volino v. General Dynamics* (4/7/88)\(^{557}\) as supporting a public policy exception. Although the plaintiff in *Volino* did allege that he was discharged for reporting violations of government construction standards to the Navy, the only mention of that claim is when the court notes it was not presented at the state administrative hearing at which the employee lost his bid for unemployment compensation.\(^{558}\) After reaffirming the at-will rule, the court also notes that the plaintiff failed to present any evidence supporting his claim and thus failed to meet his burden in creating a fact question under Rhode Island's summary judgment standard.\(^{559}\) Although the court could have simply stopped after stating the at-will rule, the fact that the court also mentioned that the plaintiff failed to produce any evidence supporting his theory is difficult to construe as support for the existence of a public policy exception given the strong endorsement of the at-will rule in the preceding paragraph.\(^{560}\) Whether *Volino* counts as an adoption of the exception will not materially affect the results of this paper since there are no observations after April 1988.

**South Carolina**

1. *Public Policy*

I cite *Ludwick v. This Minute of Carolina, Inc.* (11/18/85).\(^{561}\)

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558. *Id.* at 532.
559. *Id.*
560. *Id.*
Both Krueger and Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this case.

2. **Implied Contract**

I date this exception from *Small v. Springs Industries, Inc.* (6/8/87). Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this case. Krueger does not cite a case for this exception.

3. **Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing**

This exception was not adopted in the period under study.

**South Dakota**

1. **Public Policy**

I cite *Johnson v. Kreiser's, Inc.* (12/7/88). Krueger does not cite any cases for this exception. Dertouzos and Karoly cite *Tombollo v. Dunn* (1/4/84).

In *Tombollo*, an employee alleged that she was discharged by a supervisor who was sexually harassing her. The Court held that any wrongful discharge claim based on those facts was barred because the plaintiff had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies under South Dakota law. There is nothing in this opinion which suggests that a public policy exception exists in South Dakota.

2. **Implied Contract**

I cite *Osterkamp v. Alkota Manufacturing, Inc.* (4/13/83). Krueger and Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this opinion.

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564. 342 N.W.2d 23 (S.D. 1984).
565. *Id.* at 25.
566. *Id.* She had failed to appeal the dismissal of her administrative action based on a finding of the South Dakota Division of Human Rights that she had been fired for cause. *Id.* (her claims before the agency were based on the South Dakota anti-discrimination statute).
567. 332 N.W.2d 275 (S.D. 1983).
3. \textit{Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing}

This exception was not adopted in the period under study.

\textit{Tennessee}

1. \textit{Public Policy}

I use \textit{Clanton v. Cain-Sloan Co.} (8/20/84).\textsuperscript{568} Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this case. Krueger cites \textit{Watson v. Cleveland Chair Co.} (7/26/85).\textsuperscript{569}

In \textit{Clanton}, the Tennessee Supreme Court created a claim for retaliatory discharges for exercising rights under the workers’ compensation law.\textsuperscript{570} The Court followed the Indiana Supreme Court’s opinion in \textit{Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co.},\textsuperscript{571} noting that the Tennessee and Indiana statutes were similar.\textsuperscript{572} \textit{Watson}, which Krueger cites, refers to \textit{Clanton} as the source of the exception, saying “Tennessee recently recognized one exception to this rule in \textit{Clanton}.”\textsuperscript{573}

2. \textit{Implied Contract}

I cite \textit{Hamby v. Genesco, Inc.} (11/5/81).\textsuperscript{574} Krueger and Dertouzos and Karoly do not cite a case for this exception. In \textit{Hamby}, the court of appeals found that an employee handbook was part of an employee’s contract of employment without any discussion of legal authority.\textsuperscript{575} Although the specific claims made in the case concerned benefits rather than the standard for discharge, court did not limit its analysis to such claims but used general language.\textsuperscript{576}

\textsuperscript{568} 677 S.W.2d 441 (Tenn. 1984).
\textsuperscript{570} \textit{Clanton}, 677 S.W.2d at 445.
\textsuperscript{571} 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973).
\textsuperscript{572} \textit{Clanton}, 677 S.W.2d at 443.
\textsuperscript{573} \textit{Watson}, 122 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2077.
\textsuperscript{574} 627 S.W.2d 373 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981).
\textsuperscript{575} \textit{Id.} at 376.
\textsuperscript{576} \textit{Id.} at 375.
3. **Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing**

This exception was not adopted in the period under study.

**Texas**

1. **Public Policy**

I use *Hauck v. Sabine Pilots, Inc.* (6/7/84), affirmed (4/3/85). Dertouzos and Karoly and I cite the court of appeals decision; Krueger cites the supreme court decision.

2. **Implied Contract**

I cite *Johnson v. Ford Motor Co.* (4/11/85). Krueger and Dertouzos and Karoly do not cite a case for this exception.

*Johnson* simply ignores the earlier decision of the Corpus Christi appellate court in *Reynolds Manufacturing Co. v. Mendoza*, which had rejected the exception. Shortly after *Johnson*, the Texarkana Court of Appeals followed suit on 7/9/85. When faced with this split, the Fifth Circuit followed *Johnson* and *United*.

3. **Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing**

This exception was not adopted in the period under study.

**Utah**

1. **Public Policy**

I cite *Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd.* (3/20/89). Dertouzos

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578. 690 S.W.2d 90 (Tex. Civ. App.–Eastland 1985, *writ ref'd n.r.e.*).
582. 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989).
and Karoly also cite this case. Krueger does not cite a case for Utah for this exception (this case is beyond his time period).

2. Implied Contract

I cite *Rose v. Allied Development Co.* (5/13/86).\textsuperscript{583} Krueger and Dertouzos and Karoly do not cite a case for this exception.

*Rose* analyzed an implied contract claim based on statements alleged to have been made by the employer.\textsuperscript{584} Although the court found for the employer on the facts of the case, clearly an exception to the at-will rule existed.\textsuperscript{585} *Rose* cited *Bihlmaier v. Carson*\textsuperscript{586} as creating the implied contract exception.\textsuperscript{587} The cited language from *Bihlmaier* is, in full:

The general rule concerning personal employment contracts is, in the absence of some further express or implied stipulation as to the duration of the employment or of a good consideration in addition to the services to be rendered, the contract is no more than an indefinite general hiring which is terminable at the will of either party.\textsuperscript{588}

As this language from *Bihlmaier* is far from a clear endorsement of an exception to the at-will rule, it seems more appropriate to date the exception from *Rose*.

3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

This exception was not adopted in the period under study.

\textsuperscript{583} 719 P.2d 83 (Utah 1986).

\textsuperscript{584} Id. at 85.

\textsuperscript{585} Id. at 85-86.

\textsuperscript{586} 603 P.2d 790 (Utah 1979).

\textsuperscript{587} *Rose*, 719 P.2d at 85-86 (citing *Bihlmaier v. Carson*, 603 P.2d 790, 792 (Utah 1979)).

\textsuperscript{588} *Bihlmaier*, 603 P.2d at 792 (footnote omitted).
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Vermont

1. Public Policy

I cite Payne v. Rozendaal (9/26/86). Krueger also cites this case. Dertouzos and Karoly cite dicta in Jones v. Keogh (11/5/79) for a narrow public policy exception and Payne for a broad one. In rejecting a public policy claim, the Jones court noted:

The basic common law rule which still is widely accepted is that which was pronounced by this Court in Mullaney v. C.H. Goss Co., supra [122 A. 430, 432 (Vt. 1923)]. Ever present in those opinions recognizing the common law rule is the concern that acceptance of a rule extending enforceable contract rights to an at will employee would destroy the mutuality of obligation extant in such employment relationships. Accordingly, courts generally have been unwilling to uphold suits by discharged employees at-will unless there is a clear and compelling public policy against the reason advanced for the discharge.

While full employment and employer-employee harmony are noble goals to which society aspires, they alone do not present the clear and compelling public policies upon which courts have been willing to rely in upholding an action for discharge of an employee at will. Nor is the fact that bad faith, malice and retaliation are motives upon which we look askance sufficient to impel us to find a clear and compelling public policy where, as here, there is none.

Payne later cites a fragment of this language:

In Vermont, under an "at will" employment contract, an employee may be discharged at any time with or without cause, "unless there is a clear and compelling public policy

589. 520 A.2d 586 (Vt. 1986).
591. Id. at 582 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
against the reason advanced for the discharge."\textsuperscript{592}

Thus \textit{Payne}'s discussion of what "courts generally" have been unwilling to do was transformed into the definition of Vermont's public policy exception. Justice Peck's dissent in \textit{Payne} notes that \textit{Jones} is actually a unanimous endorsement of the at-will rule.\textsuperscript{593} Despite the \textit{Payne} court's reference to \textit{Jones}, it would be difficult to construe its passing reference to "courts generally" as forecasting a change in a Vermont rule it had just endorsed.

\textbf{2. Implied Contract}

I cite \textit{Sherman v. Rutland Hospital, Inc.} (8/9/85).\textsuperscript{594} Krueger also cites this case. Dertouzos and Karoly cite \textit{Benoir v. Ethan Allen, Inc.} (7/18/86).\textsuperscript{595} \textit{Benoir} is simply later than \textit{Sherman} and therefore the wrong benchmark.

\textbf{3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing}

This exception was not adopted in the period under study.

\textit{Virginia}

\textbf{1. Public Policy}

I use \textit{Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville} (6/14/85).\textsuperscript{596} Both Krueger and Dertouzos and Karoly cite this case.

\textbf{2. Implied Contract}

I date this exception from \textit{Frazier v. Colonial Williamsburg Foundation} (9/9/83).\textsuperscript{597} Krueger and Dertouzos and Karoly do not cite a case.

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{592} Payne, 520 A.2d at 588 (citing Jones v. Keogh, 137 Vt. 562, 564, 409 A.2d 581, 582 (1979) (emphasis in original)).
\bibitem{593} Id. at 591.
\bibitem{594} 500 A.2d 230 (Vt. 1985).
\bibitem{595} 514 A.2d 716 (Vt. 1986).
\bibitem{596} 331 S.E.2d 797 (Va. 1985).
\bibitem{597} 574 F. Supp. 318 (E.D. Va. 1983).
\end{thebibliography}
3. **Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing**

This exception was not adopted in the period under study.

**Washington**

1. **Public Policy**

   I cite *Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co.* (7/5/84).\(^{598}\) Krueger also cites this case. Dertouzos and Karoly cite dicta in *Roberts v. Atlantic Richfield Co.* (8/18/77).\(^{599}\)

   Although the court does discuss several public policy cases from other states in *Roberts*, it concludes:

   > On the record before us we can neither reach the question of whether we should totally abrogate the common law terminable-at-will doctrine nor the question of whether we should follow the *Monge* court and make an exception thereto based on bad faith and malice. While the future of this doctrine is a compelling issue, it is one which must be left for another day and different facts.\(^{600}\)

   This is not the sort of suggestion as to the future course of the law that implies a change is coming soon (and the change took almost seven years to arrive).

2. **Implied Contract**

   I cite *Roberts v. Atlantic Richfield Co.* (8/18/77).\(^{601}\) Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this case. Krueger cites *Saruf v. Miller* (11/9/78).\(^{602}\)

   Although the employee lost in *Roberts*, the court clearly recog-

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598. 685 P.2d 1081 (Wash. 1984).
599. 568 P.2d 764 (Wash. 1977).
600. Id. at 770.
nized the existence of an implied contract exception. In Saruff the court acknowledged Roberts' creation of the exception, saying that in Roberts "we recognized that allegations similar to those made by Saruff may give rise to an implied contract of employment."

3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

This exception was not adopted in the period under study.

West Virginia

1. Public Policy

I use Harless v. First National Bank (7/14/78). Krueger also cites this case; Dertouzos and Karoly cite it for a narrow public policy exception and cite Cordle v. General Hugh Mercer Corp. (7/13/84) for a broad exception.

2. Implied Contract

I cite Cook v. Heck's Inc. (4/4/86). Krueger and Dertouzos and Karoly both cite this case.

3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

This exception was not adopted in the period under study.

Wisconsin

1. Public Policy

Bradstreet (7/1/83).  

Brockmeyer is the first state supreme court ruling, but Ward is widely recognized as the first appellate opinion in Wisconsin to create a public policy exception.  

2. Implied Contract

I cite Ferraro v. Koelsch (6/5/85).  Both Krueger and Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this case.

3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

This exception was not adopted in the period under study.

Wyoming

1. Public Policy


Griess involved a claim of retaliation for filing a workers’ compensation case.  Allen rejected several public policy claims made by two discharged employees.  The rationale for doing so was that statutory remedies existed to protect the public policies which the court found to have been valid.  In doing so, it defined the requirements for a “tort action premised on public policy” in general terms.  Presumably, that is the dicta on which the Dertouzos and Karoly study relied. That language is too general to

609. 335 N.W.2d 834 (Wis. 1983).
610. See, e.g., BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS MANUAL 505:891 (December, 1988).
611. 368 N.W.2d 666 (Wis. 1985).
614. Griess, 776 P.2d at 752.
615. Allen, 699 P.2d at 282-84.
616. Id. at 284.
617. Id. (stating the requirements to be the absence of a remedy and a discharge in violation of well-established public policy).
suggest a public policy exception exists. *Griess* cited *Allen* for both this language and for the proposition that Wyoming has been “cautious” in modifying the at-will rule.\textsuperscript{618}

2. *Implied Contract*

I cite *Mobil Coal Producing, Inc. v. Parks* (8/13/85).\textsuperscript{619} Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this case. Krueger does not cite a case for this exception.

3. *Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing*

This exception was not adopted in the period under study.

\textsuperscript{618} *Griess*, 776 P.2d at 753-54 (citing *Allen*, 699 P.2d at 284 and 277).
\textsuperscript{619} 704 P.2d 702 (Wyo. 1985).
Appendix C: Econometric Details

In this appendix I provide those details of the data analysis used in Part II which do not relate to dating the common law changes. The data on individuals and their jobs comes from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), one of two panel data sets which include information on job tenure. The PSID offers the advantage of providing panel data covering the period of interest. The disadvantage is the presence of some inconsistency in the PSID's tenure data. Despite this problem, the PSID has two advantages for the analysis of the impact of the common law erosion of the at-will rule. First, it contains a large nationally representative sample. Second, unlike the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), it includes prime age men, who are most likely to be affected by the changes in the at-will rule.

Since the PSID does not explicitly identify employers, I identify when an individual changes employers through other variables. Brown and Light found that the method of deriving job

620. The other is the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). A year's delay in obtaining approval from a university official for obtaining the restricted NLSY data set containing geographic information prevents inclusion of NLSY data here. A future paper will present those results.

621. See James Brown & Audrey Light, Interpreting Panel Data on Job Tenure, 10 J. LAB. ECON. 219, 220 (1992). Briefly, the sources of the inconsistency are the lack of information about employers, reporting errors, the ambiguous wording of the questions about job tenure, and the coding of the answers. Id. at 220-22. The inconsistency makes evaluating the effect of tenure on job duration difficult and requires relatively strong assumptions to make the data usable.

622. Interview years 1979 and 1980 present additional problems. The PSID questionnaire for 1979 and 1980 did not contain a job tenure question. The question took the general form: "How long have you worked for your present employer?" INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH, A PANEL STUDY OF INCOME DYNAMICS: PROCEDURES AND TAPE CODES 16 (WAVE XIV, 1981) [hereinafter ISR]. The answers could be recorded in either years or months, see id., leading to a potential rounding error where a job which began in January of year \( t \) is reported in a March interview for interview year \( t \) as having 2 months' tenure and in a March interview for interview year \( t + 4 \) as having 4 years' tenure, rather than 50 months. Rather than simply discard all observations for these two years, which would lose information on some changes in the law, I adopted the following procedure:

If the subject was in the sample for 1978 and the job-ending question and time-in-position question did not indicate a job change, I incremented the tenure reported in 1978 by elapsed calendar time. If the subject was not in the 1978 sample, then I used the tenure reported in interview year 1981 for those present in the sample for that year, subtracting elapsed calendar time. For those not present in either 1978 or 1981, but present in either 1979 or 1980 or both, and whose job-ending question indicated the job had not ended, I relied on the time-in-position data to assign the tenure values.
changes can significantly affect the results. Because of this sensitivity, I use two different methods to determine when jobs end and present results for both. In Method T, I record the end of a job wherever reported tenure drops in consecutive months or where an individual reports not working in a month following a month in which employment is reported. In Method P, I use the position questions to identify the end of a job.

623. Brown & Light, supra note 621, at 221. One method is to use discontinuities in reported tenure to identify changes of employers. As Brown and Light found, however, reported tenure is not correlated well with elapsed calendar time, suggesting that job changes cannot be identified simply by assuming that whenever reported tenure is less than elapsed time since the previous interview a new job has begun. Id. A second method of partitioning the data into jobs uses the PSID's data on current position. Beginning in interview year 1976, the PSID contained a question which asked about tenure in the current position. ISR, supra note 622, at 15 (WAVE IX, 1976). If the answer was less than 12 months in interview years 1976-1983, then the interviewer also asked about why the previous job ended. See id. In interview years after 1983, the individual was asked when the present position began, and the questions about why the last position ended were asked if the date reported was January of the preceding year or later. See, e.g., id. at 13 (WAVE XVIII, 1985). By using the existence of an answer to these questions, the data can be partitioned into jobs. The question asked was a variant on the following example from interview year 1980: “What happened to the job you had before—did the company go out of business, were you laid off, promoted, were you not working, or what?” Id. at 14 (WAVE XIII, 1980). The answers which were coded individually were: (1) Company folded, etc.; (2) Strike, lockout; (3) Laid off, fired; (4) Quit, resigned, retired, pregnant, etc.; (7) Other; (8) Job done; (9) Not applicable, don’t know; and (0) Inappropriate (which includes those still working for the employer). Id. The 1988 responses were: (1) Company folded, etc. - 1%; (2) Strike, lockout - 0%; (3) Laid off, fired - 1.7%; (4) Quit, resigned, retired, pregnant, etc. - 9.4%; (7) Other - 0.3%; (8) Job done - 0.5%; (9) Not applicable, don’t know - 0.4%; and (0) Inappropriate (which includes those still working for the employer) - 86.7%. Id. at 184 (WAVE XXI, 1988). Even aside from any measurement error in self-reports of firings, the PSID questionnaire does not separate firings from layoffs. As Brown and Light show, this results in quite different job assignments than produced by the change in tenure method. Brown & Light, supra note 621, tbl. 3, at 231.

624. Roughly consistent with Brown and Light’s Partition T, this method finds more ends to jobs than their method since it does not require that the following month be reported to be on a new job. See Brown & Light, supra note 621, at 223-26.

625. This method is similar to Brown and Light’s Partition P. Id. at 226-28. As discussed earlier, the PSID data on jobs are less than perfect. See supra note 621. Two approaches are possible in handling inconsistencies in job-related data. One would be to force consistency by choosing the first or last observation of a job as the source of information on the job. An alternative rule for forcing consistency would be to choose the values consistent with the majority of observations of the job. See Brown & Light, supra note 621, at 232 (describing ways to implement these varying methodologies). This would be necessary if the unit of analysis were the job. Since the unit of analysis in this case is not the job, but rather a month on a job, I used an alternative method. For each observation, I calculated which job-months were covered by that observation. This was necessary as individuals are not always interviewed during the same month of the year. For example, a person could have been interviewed in March 1977, in April 1978, and in
Since this Article seeks to exploit the cross-state, cross-time variation in the employment-at-will rule, the location of a person at a particular time is crucial since it controls assignment of the legal-environment variables. Although, as with other parts of the PSID, the data are less than ideal in this regard, a few reasonable assumptions are sufficient to locate most individuals.626

Finally, I

March 1979. The job information from the 1978 interview would apply to the period April 1977-April 1978, while the job information from the 1979 interview would apply to the period May 1978-March 1979. The information from that observation was then attributed to the applicable months.

A similar method of division of data was applied to personal data with two important differences. First, some data on individuals are not collected each year. Education, for example, is collected only when a individual becomes head of a family unit and in certain other years. All heads of households were asked about education in 1968 and 1975 or in the initial year a head is present. ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR PROGRAM, INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH, USER GUIDE TO THE PANEL STUDY OF INCOME DYNAMICS D-8-9 (1984). Second, some information is collected on a calendar-year basis, rather than on an interview-year basis. For example, individuals are asked whether they have moved since the last interview, but are asked what their family income was for the last calendar year. Compare, for example, interview year 1988 questions A18 ("Have you (HEAD) moved any time since the spring of 1987?"") and G13 ("How much did you (HEAD) earn altogether from wages or salaries in 1987, that is, before anything was deducted for taxes or other things?"). ISR, supra note 622, at 9, 35 (WAVE XXI, 1988) Calendar-year data are distributed among job-months on a calendar-year basis. A job-month observation may contain data from interview year \( t \) on a job, but from interview year \( t-1 \) or \( t+1 \) on personal characteristics. Data collected less than annually were distributed beginning at the time of collection.

626. Ideally, the PSID questionnaire would ask individuals where they lived in each month of the past year. Next best would be questions about the number of moves combined with some information about when the individual moved. What the PSID actually contains is a set of two questions:

1. Have you (HEAD) moved since the spring of 19xx? ISR, supra note 622, at 14 (WAVE XXI, 1988); Id. at 10 (WAVE XX, 1987); Id. at 10 (WAVE XIX, 1986); Id. at 10 (WAVE XVIII, 1985); Id. at 8 (WAVE XVII, 1984); Id. at 16 (WAVE XVI, 1983); Id. at 14 (WAVE XV, 1982); Id. at 14 (WAVE XIV, 1981); Id. at 12 (WAVE XIII, 1980); Id. at 12 (WAVE XII, 1979); Id. at 25 (WAVE XI, 1978); Id. at 11 (WAVE X, 1977); Id. at 12 (WAVE IX, 1976).

If the answer is yes, the individual is asked:

2. What month was that? Id. at 14 (WAVE XXI, 1988); Id. at 10 (WAVE XX, 1987); Id. at 10 (WAVE XIX, 1986); Id. at 10 (WAVE XVIII, 1985); Id. at 8 (WAVE XVII, 1984); Id. at 16 (WAVE XVI, 1983); Id. at 14 (WAVE XV, 1982); Id. at 14 (WAVE XIV, 1981); Id. at 12 (WAVE XIII, 1980); Id. at 12 (WAVE XII, 1979); Id. at 25 (WAVE XI, 1978); Id. at 11 (WAVE X, 1977); Id. at 12 (WAVE IX, 1976). The month moved has been asked only since 1975, making determining pre-1975 location impossible for interstate movers.

This can be combined with information on the current state and state from the past year, if the individual were the head of household and in the sample in the immediately prior year, and the interview dates for both years, to assign a state to each month of the period between interviews.

This is less than ideal for several reasons. First, an individual may not appear in the
used information only from interview years 1976\textsuperscript{627} through 1988.\textsuperscript{628} Table C-1 and Table C-2 give the descriptive statistics

prior year sample as a head of household. For those individuals who both moved during the past interview year and became new heads of household in that year, I discarded months prior to the move since the prior state was unknown. Second, all we know about movers is that they moved at least once during the past year. As they may have moved several times and lived in more than two states, this procedure may incorrectly assign those individuals to states during months between moves. For example, suppose an individual lived in New Jersey at the time of his 1978 interview, in March. He moved to Pennsylvania in July 1978, and then back to New Jersey in January 1979. The procedure described above will incorrectly assign this individual to New Jersey for the entire time between March 1978 and his 1979 interview.

This problem is less serious than it seems, however. It potentially affects only the movers. (Twenty-two percent of individuals in interview year 1988, for example.) JAMES N. MORGAN, PANEL STUDY OF INCOME DYNAMICS 1968-1988 (WAVES I-XXI) [computer file] (Survey Research Center prod.) (Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research dist. 1991). Some multiple movers may be relocating only within the same state, in which case they have been correctly assigned. In addition, as described above, observations are based only on months during which an individual is employed. A multiple mover who is motivated by job search, for example, would therefore only be in the sample while he is employed. Since locating a job would end the search, and presumably the moves as well, the months during which he is searching and misassigned will not be in the sample.

Interview year 1982 presents an additional problem. In that year the PSID questionnaire asked only if the individual moved, not in what month the person moved. ISR, supra note 622, at 14 (WAVE XV, 1982). (The omission appears to have simply been an oversight.) This presents a problem for those individuals who both moved and changed states. Since the location is critical to the assignment of the legal variables, the observations for interview year 1982 for these individuals were dropped from the sample.

A final problem with location comes from the method of bracketing the interview dates. Until interview year 1980, the interview date is present in the data as a code representing a range of dates. For brackets which fall entirely within a single month, the month assigned was the month containing the bracket period. The bracket dates for an additional set of respondents (55.3% of 1976 respondents, 64.5% of 1977 respondents, 39.5% of 1978 respondents, and 35.7% of 1979 respondents, MORGAN, supra) included one to three days (most brackets contained 14 days) from a second month. These were assigned the month in which the majority of days fell. A small number of respondents had dates given as after July 1st (2.3% of 1976 respondents, 1.2% of 1977 respondents, 0.5% of 1978 respondents, and 1.0% of 1979 respondents, id.) and were assigned to July. Finally, a very small number were listed as "not applicable" or "don't know" (0.1% of 1976 respondents, 0.4% of 1977 respondents, 0.3% of 1978 respondents, and 0.4% of 1979 respondents, id.); these individuals were dropped.

627. I also used location information from interview year 1975 to locate people during 1975-76.

628. Pre-1976 interviews did not include sufficient detail to locate individuals who moved during the year. Data from PSID interview years 1968-74 has more serious problems with job tenure. See Brown & Light, supra note 621, at 239-45 (discussing various problems associated with this body of data). The consequences of excluding pre-1976 data are relatively small. As Table C-3 shows, only a small percentage of changes in the law under all three dating methods used occurred before January 1976, and thus relatively few states who switch are not potentially present in both pre- and post-change status.
for the samples. Additional tables which report results not reported in the body of the Article are available from the author.

**Table C-1  Descriptive Statistics, All Observations**

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### Table C-2  Descriptive Statistics, Under Forty

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<td>0.02 (0.15)</td>
<td>0.19 (0.39)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLERK</td>
<td>0.08 (0.27)</td>
<td>0.04 (0.10)</td>
<td>0.06 (0.23)</td>
<td>0.04 (0.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPER</td>
<td>0.11 (0.30)</td>
<td>0.29 (0.45)</td>
<td>0.10 (0.30)</td>
<td>0.29 (0.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOPER</td>
<td>0.06 (0.23)</td>
<td>0.10 (0.31)</td>
<td>0.06 (0.23)</td>
<td>0.10 (0.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>102,143</td>
<td>31,800</td>
<td>101,948</td>
<td>31,680</td>
</tr>
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