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The Public Cost of Private Equity

William Magnuson†

INTRODUCTION

The rise of private equity over the past decade has raised a number of important questions about corporate governance, stakeholder rights, and the role of corporate law in managing and regulating the fast-changing world of business. Critics of the industry have lamented that private equity firms destroy companies by layering on debt, firing employees, and cutting costs at every opportunity.1 Proponents respond that any changes they make to companies—and they dispute the charges about destroying jobs2—are painful but necessary remedies to improve the inefficient and bloated companies that they acquire.3 In the

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face of these controversies, private equity has continued to prosper: new firms are opening up at a rapid pace, money is flowing into the industry, and private equity compensation remains stratospheric.4

Conventional wisdom holds that private equity has resolved, or at least significantly mitigated, one of the fundamental tensions in corporate law: the conflict between management and ownership.5 According to this line of thought, private equity

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firms' corporate-governance structure enables them to manage companies better through (1) creating strong financial incentives for managers to improve company performance metrics; 6 (2) closely and actively monitoring management behavior; 7 and (3) deploying deep industry, capital market, and financial expertise in support of these mechanisms. 8 Taken together, these governing arrangements supposedly create a virtuous cycle of mutually

the large public corporation—the conflict between owners and managers over the control and use of corporate resources" and, as a result, "mak[e] remarkable gains in operating efficiency, employee productivity, and shareholder value"); Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 121, 121–22 (2009) (describing the changes in corporate governance that private equity firms institute in their portfolio companies and concluding that, on average, private equity activity creates economic value); Ronald W. Masulis & Randall S. Thomas, Does Private Equity Create Wealth? The Effects of Private Equity and Derivatives on Corporate Governance, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 219, 219 (2009) (arguing that a large part of private equity's success is "due to the corporate governance advantages of private equity over those of the public corporation"); Joachim Heel & Conor Keohoe, Why Some Private Equity Firms Do Better Than Others, MCKINSEY Q. (Feb. 2005), http://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/why-some-private-equity-firms-do-better-than-others (outlining the key governance changes that private equity firms make to create value in their portfolio companies).

6. E.g., Steven Kaplan, The Effects of Management Buyouts on Operating Performance and Value, 24 J. FIN. ECON. 217, 250–51 (1989) (concluding that the improvements in operating performance that portfolio companies experience after take-private transactions is caused by improved incentives for managers and, in particular, larger equity holdings by managers); Jensen, Agency Costs, supra note 5 (arguing that the heavy debt loads carried by private equity portfolio companies reduce incentives for opportunism by managers); Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 5, at 135 (arguing that managers of private equity portfolio companies face strong pressure to succeed by the knowledge that private equity firms are quick to fire underperforming managers).


8. See Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 5, at 132 (arguing that private equity firms use their industry and operating knowledge to implement value-enhancing changes at their portfolio companies and hire outside experts when they do not have the expertise internally); Masulis & Thomas, supra note 5, at 251–55 (noting that the high compensation offered by private equity firms allows private equity to attract directors with greater financial and industry-specific expertise). When this Article refers to private equity's corporate-governance structure, it is intended that the reader will understand the term to include
shared interests among sponsors, management, and ownership, thereby incentivizing optimal corporate decision-making and the maximization of overall equityholder wealth.

This conventional wisdom about the benefits of the private equity corporate-governance model, however, overlooks the many ways in which private equity in fact exacerbates conflicts of interest between management and ownership. First, the compensation structure for private equity sponsors (that is, the private equity firm itself) creates a classic situation of moral hazard: sponsors capture much of the gain from any profits on their investments, but are largely insulated from any losses. The result is that private equity sponsors have financial incentives to take excessive risk in their investment strategies. Second, limited-partner investors in private equity funds invest in these funds under significantly less advantageous terms than typical investors in public companies. They have limited governance

the entire nexus of contracts that determine the way in which the private equity firm and its related entities are governed. Thus, while some scholars have focused exclusively on the way that portfolio companies are run, and others have focused exclusively on the way that private equity funds are run, this Article intends to address the entirety of the private equity governance structure, from investors to firms to funds to portfolio companies, in order to tease out the incentives and potential misalignments between these entities. For a full look at the distinctions, see infra Part I.A below.

9. Moral hazard is most often described in the insurance context: when individuals have purchased insurance (say, theft insurance) and know that they will not bear the cost of any losses related to the insurance, they will be more likely to take risks, or at least not to take steps to prevent the risks from materializing. See Steven Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 93 Q.J. ECON. 541, 541 (1979) ("Moral hazard refers here to the tendency of insurance protection to alter an individual's motive to prevent loss."). But the general phenomenon of moral hazard, that is, situations in which parties are incentivized to take excessive risk because of their protection from losses, is seen in a wide range of fields and industries. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers' Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247, 255–57 (2010) (banking industry); Ronald J. Gilson & Alan Schwartz, Understanding MACs: Moral Hazard in Acquisitions, 21 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 330, 357–58 (2005) (merger agreements); Albert C. Lin, Does Geoengineering Present a Moral Hazard?, 40 ECOLOGY L.Q. 673, 701–07 (2013) (geoengineering and climate change); Simone M. Sepe, Making Sense of Executive Compensation, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 189, 190–96 (2011) (executive compensation).

10. The limited governance rights granted to investors in private equity funds is all the more surprising given the aforementioned moral hazard problem in private equity's compensation structure. After all, one of the two traditional responses to moral hazard is better observation of the risk-taker's actions (the other being incomplete coverage of losses). See Shavell, supra note 9 ("Incomplete coverage gives an individual a motive to prevent loss by exposing him to some financial risk; and observation of care also gives an individual a motive to
rights, they have little access to information, and they have few avenues for transferring or selling their equity interests in the fund. Finally, private equity funds treat investors differentially, often giving better terms to favored investors. So, for example, an individual investor may enter into a side letter with a private equity fund ensuring that the preferred investor pays lower fees than other, less-favored investors. Or a private equity fund may grant one investor a greater right to access information about company performance, or even a right to veto certain investments.

In sum, the private equity governance model creates a number of corporate-governance costs, these costs are endemic to the private equity industry, and they are largely unrecognized as a potential source of conflict between private equity firms and their investors. This state of affairs presents a puzzle for traditional contract theories, under which agreements willingly entered into by arms-length parties should be expected to maximize joint wealth. In other words, if private equity's governance terms create such substantial harms for investors, why would investors willingly agree to them, rather than negotiate for better terms or simply walk away?

This Article argues that the persistence of private equity's governance costs can be explained as a result of three related phenomena. First, private equity's structure benefits from strong path-dependency effects that lock in the current structure even in the face of changes in external markets. Second, private equity investors face collective-action problems on multiple axes.

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11. See infra Part I.B.
that inhibit cooperation between investors and encourage opportunistic behavior by private equity firms. Third, and finally, the reputational constraints on private equity firm behavior have been systematically overestimated as a tool for aligning the interests of firms and investors.

But these corporate-governance flaws in the private equity model are not inevitable or, for that matter, unchangeable. A number of potential solutions present themselves. One approach is increased regulation of the private equity industry in order to strengthen and better align the interests of private equity firms and their investors. Another approach is increased cooperation among institutional investors outside of the transactional context in order to reset governance and compliance norms and overcome path-dependency problems. Yet another approach is a greater role for independent information intermediaries, such as ratings agencies or third-party consultants, who can step in to help improve the quantity and quality of information provided about private equity funds. It may well be that all of these approaches together are necessary in order to fully resolve the structural problems inherent in the private equity corporate-governance structure.

This Article will proceed in four parts. Part I provides a basic background on the structure of private equity and survey the literature on private equity's so-called governance dividend. Part II sets forth private equity's corporate-governance costs and explains the ways in which current structures create perverse incentives for risk-taking and opportunistic behavior by private equity firms. Part III explains why these governance costs persist despite strong reasons for abandoning them. Part IV concludes by sketching out a set of potential reforms for reducing private equity's governance costs.

I. PRIVATE EQUITY'S GOVERNANCE DIVIDEND?

The private equity industry has seen dramatic growth over the past decade. The number of active private equity firms has increased by 143% since 2000.14 The amount of capital raised by private equity firms has grown from $93 billion in 2003 to $527 billion in 2015.15 Buyout funds are by now ubiquitous, and private equity acquisitions have become a mainstay on the front

14. *Number of Active PE Firms Up*, supra note 4.
The compensation of private equity managers has grown commensurately—Steve A. Schwarzman of the Blackstone Group is estimated to have earned $800 million in 2015, while Leon Black of Apollo Global Management received $200 million. The tremendous growth in the private equity industry has sparked a lively debate about the root causes of private equity’s success. While critics have focused on its favorable tax treatment, its shedding of costly pension plans, and its heavy lobbying of state governments, an increasing number of scholars have argued that private equity’s primary appeal, and its greatest advantage, lies in its unique governance structure. Through a careful admixture of industry expertise, large equity stakes, and performance-based compensation packages, private equity firms have crafted a superior governance model that has brought superior returns to its investors over long periods of time. In other words, private equity’s growth is largely attributable to a governance dividend.

The evidence in support of the governance-dividend theory, however, is decidedly mixed. While there is some evidence that private equity firms institute changes that improve operational metrics in their companies, it is unclear that these improvements lead to superior returns for investors. And in recent years, performance has decreased, with private equity investments
failing to outperform their benchmarks in several studies. This evidence raises questions about the accuracy of governance-dividend theories.

This Part proceeds in three Sections. First, Section A outlines the governance structure of private equity, highlighting in particular the compensation structure for private equity firms. Second, Section B discusses the potential benefits of private equity's governance structure, with a focus on incentives, expertise, and monitoring. Finally, Section C presents the weak empirical evidence in support of the governance-dividend theory of private equity.

A. GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE OF PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTMENTS

In order to understand private equity's so-called governance dividend, it may be useful to begin with a brief primer on the typical structure of private equity investments. This Article focuses on private equity buyout funds, which may be distinguished from other sorts of business models that may also be termed private equity, such as venture capital firms or angel investors, or other sorts of investment strategies that private equity firms engage in, such as distressed debt investments or secondary investments.

Private equity firms are typically made up of small groups of investment professionals, often with backgrounds in large investment banks such as Goldman Sachs and J.P. Morgan, who

23. See infra Part I.C.

24. It should be noted at the outset that any outline of the typical private equity structure will by necessity not cover all the varieties of structures that private equity firms utilize. As any private equity lawyer knows, every deal is different, and so is every fund. However, this Section will attempt to provide a broad overview of the key participants, governing documents, and legal entities that are common to many private equity investments. For additional detail on the structure of private equity transactions, see EILEEN APPELBAUM & ROSEMARY BATT, CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH (CEPR), A PRIMER ON PRIVATE EQUITY AT WORK 9–20 (2012), http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/private-equity-2012-02.pdf; Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 5, at 124–25.

specialize in the acquisition, management, and sale of companies.\textsuperscript{26} They tend to have few employees, low overhead, and minimal expenses.\textsuperscript{27} While a few of the largest private equity firms have gone public, listing their shares on domestic stock exchanges,\textsuperscript{28} most private equity firms are small private companies organized as partnerships or limited liability companies.\textsuperscript{29}

Most private equity transactions follow a now well-established playbook. First, the private equity firm raises money from a set of investors, typically large institutions such as university endowments, pension plans, and sovereign wealth funds.\textsuperscript{30} Second, these investments are pooled into an investment vehicle (the “private equity fund”).\textsuperscript{31} The fund is generally organized as a limited partnership, with the private equity firm serving as the fund’s general partner and making day-to-day management decisions, and the investors serving as passive limited partners.\textsuperscript{32} Third, when the private equity firm identifies an appropriate target company, the fund acquires the target (or “portfolio company”) using a mixture of the pooled investments from the investors and a substantial amount of debt from lenders.\textsuperscript{33} As a result of the acquisition, the portfolio company becomes a highly-leveraged, wholly-owned subsidiary of the private equity fund.\textsuperscript{34} While the portfolio company will often retain its executive officers, it will also enter into a management agreement with the private equity firm, pursuant to which it will pay certain fees to the firm in return for management services.\textsuperscript{35} Finally, after a period of time, the fund will exit its investment, either by selling the

\textsuperscript{26} See Kaplan \& Strömberg, supra note 5, at 121 (distinguishing private equity firms from venture capital firms); Jensen, Eclipse, supra note 5, at 61 (finding large institutions are the primary owners of private debt).

\textsuperscript{27} Kaplan \& Strömberg, supra note 5, at 121.

\textsuperscript{28} E.g., Lloyd L. Drury, III, Publicly Held Private Equity Firms and the Rejection of Law as a Governance Device, 16 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 57, 66–67 (2013) (discussing “Blackstone Group, one of the first private equity firms to sell shares to the public”); Gregory Zuckerman, For Private-Equity Clients, Worries Over Public Listing, WALL ST. J. (June 25, 2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304231204576406052688509710 (listing Apollo Global Management LLC and KKR \& Co., which has already gone public, as well as a slew of additional firms on the verge).

\textsuperscript{29} Kaplan \& Strömberg, supra note 5, at 123 (describing private equity firms).

\textsuperscript{30} Id. at 123–24 (describing private equity funds).

\textsuperscript{31} Id.

\textsuperscript{32} Id.

\textsuperscript{33} Id.

\textsuperscript{34} Id.

\textsuperscript{35} Id.
company to another buyer or taking it public through an initial public offering. The private equity firm will be entitled to a certain percentage of the profits from the sale (the “carried interest,” often equal to twenty percent of the profits), while the investors will be entitled to the remainder. Figure 1 below illustrates a simplified organizational chart of this structure.

Figure 1: Private Equity Governance Structure

A few key features of the private equity structure are important to note. First, while the acquired company is formally owned by the private equity fund, which owns all of the outstanding equity in the company, the ultimate owners are the private equity firm itself and its investors. The respective rights

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36. This, at least, is the intended outcome. In fact, many investments are difficult to exit, as demonstrated by the increasing proliferation of so-called zombie funds that are unwilling or unable to sell their underlying portfolio companies and that therefore continue in existence. See Zombies at the Gates: The Funds that Will Not Die, ECONOMIST (Mar. 23, 2013), https://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21574043-funds-will-not-die-zombies-gates.

37. Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 5, at 124.

38. The portfolio company typically has the private equity fund as its sole shareholder or member, but the private equity fund itself will have a general partner and a number of limited partners that, together, own all of the equity
and obligations of the private equity firm and the investors are set out in the fund’s limited partnership agreement, which will typically include provisions on voting rights, access to information, and transfer restrictions.\(^{39}\) Second, the private equity firm receives compensation in two forms: first, through ongoing monitoring and management fees; and second, through a carried interest, which entitles the firm to share in a portion of the profits from the sale of the portfolio company (the fabled “2 and 20”).\(^{40}\) The compensation arrangements for private equity firms will be discussed in greater depth in Part II.A.

Finally, the simplified model of the private equity structure presented in Figure 1 leaves out two important complicating factors. Most private equity firms create more than one fund, and each fund typically acquires more than one portfolio company.\(^{41}\) This strategy allows the firm to deploy more capital, from a more diversified investor group, and across a broader array of industries.\(^{42}\) However, as one can imagine, the organizational charts for such entities quickly become unwieldy, with intricate ownership tracks and overlapping interests, and can be a potential source of misaligned interests, as will be discussed in Part III.B.

Now that we have a basic understanding of the private equity governance model, we can turn to the arguments about private equity’s governance dividend.

B. STANDARD VIEWS OF PRIVATE EQUITY’S GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE

It is a widespread belief that private equity’s primary appeal, and its greatest advantage, lies in its unique governance


\(^{41}\) Elisabeth de Fontenay, Private Equity Firms as Gatekeepers, 33 Rev. Banking & Fin. L. 115, 121–24 (2013) (“A private equity firm manages one or more private equity funds at once, and each such fund typically holds several companies at once.”).

\(^{42}\) For a discussion about the problems associated with this approach, see infra Part III.B.
According to this view, private equity provides a particularly beneficial form of corporate governance for companies, one that compares favorably to other corporate forms. Through concentrated ownership stakes, active monitoring, and high leverage, private equity firms make use of a number of tools and incentives to reduce the traditional agency costs between management and ownership. The resulting governance dividend allows private equity firms to improve company performance and realize benefits for investors and firms alike.

While proponents of the governance-dividend theory describe the problem from a number of different perspectives, underlying all of these perspectives is a basic dilemma in corporate law—the ownership-management divide. The concept is simple: the managers of a company have different, and oftentimes conflicting, incentives from those of owners. The owners, who by definition own the equity interests in the company, have an interest in maximizing the overall equity value of the company, while the managers have an interest in doing a variety of other

43. See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 5; Davis, supra note 5, at 85–88 (explaining a better governance is created when there is more contact between equity owners and management); Jensen, Agency Costs, supra note 5, 328–29 ("This process results in a complete rethinking of the organization's strategy and its structure."); Jensen, Eclipse, supra note 5, at 62 (arguing that private equity resolves the struggle between owners and managers); Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 5, at 130–32 (describing three changes private equity firms make to investments after purchase); Masulis & Thomas, supra note 5, 241–51 (listing benefits associated with this form of governance); Heel & Kehoe, supra note 5 (explaining changes of governance used to create value in private equity firms' portfolio companies); see also, e.g., Cornelli & Karakas, supra note 7 (exploring positive effects of smaller, more active boards of directors in private equity).

44. See Michael C. Jensen, The Economic Case for Private Equity (and Some Concerns) 3 (Nov. 27, 2007), http://ssrn.com/abstract=963530 (arguing that the structure of private equity "enables the capture of value destroyed by agency problems in public firms—especially failures in governance").

45. It should be noted at the outset that there is some confusion as to who precisely should be considered the management of portfolio companies. In one sense, it is the executives at the portfolio-company level, who, after all, are responsible for most day-to-day decisions at the company. But, it is also the private equity firm itself, which typically is paid a management fee and is actively involved in portfolio company's decisions. Thus private equity is a kind of hybrid where the management-ownership divide is more fluid and ambiguous than one would typically find at a large public corporation. For the classic description of this dilemma, see Adolf A. Berle, Jr. & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property 220–32 (1933).

46. Of course, the owners among themselves may also have differing interests. See Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for Favoring Long-Term Shareholders, 124 Yale L.J. 1554, 1557–66 (2015) (arguing that both short-term shareholders and long-term shareholders may, in certain circumstances, benefit from value-destroying behavior by managers).
things that may destroy that value—for example, maximizing their compensation, entrenching themselves in their positions, or building empires. These agency costs can be pronounced, particularly in a world of public companies owned by dispersed shareholders facing severe collective-action problems.

How, then, does private equity resolve this dilemma? According to proponents of the governance-dividend theory, private equity reduces agency costs through three mechanisms: (1) better incentives; (2) better monitoring; and (3) better expertise.

First, private equity firms strongly incentivize management to run their portfolio companies in ways that maximize equityholder wealth. They do so by: (1) compensating managers at the portfolio companies with large equity stakes in their companies, so that managers will have a strong financial incentive to improve the company's performance; (2) leveraging companies with large amounts of debt, so that managers will have little excess cash flow available for inefficient or wasteful projects; and (3) quickly and frequently replacing officers that underperform, thereby reducing the ability of managers to entrench themselves and keeping constant pressure on managers to pursue value-maximizing business strategies. These governance mechanisms reduce agency costs within private equity companies by


49. The use of the comparative here raises an obvious question: Better than what? The short answer is publicly listed corporations. Most commentators have compared private equity's governance structure with that of the typical publicly-listed corporation. See, e.g., Masulis & Thomas, *supra* note 5, at 219 ("We claim that one major reason for this success is due to the corporate governance advantages of private equity over those of the public corporation."). Of course, private equity firms are not limited to buying public companies, and they often do buy other forms of company, including privately held partnerships, corporations, and limited liability companies.

50. Kaplan, *supra* note 6, at 244–46.

51. Jensen, *Agency Costs, supra* note 5, at 324. The large amount of debt also magnifies the compensation incentives faced by managers: managers will be able to capture a greater percentage of the gains from improved firm performance. See Masulis & Thomas, *supra* note 5, at 228.

52. Kaplan & Strömberg, *supra* note 5, at 131 ("Leverage creates pressure on managers not to waste money, because they must make interest and principal payments.").
aligning the interests of managers and owners and minimizing incentives for shirking.

Second, private equity firms do a particularly good job of monitoring management, both directly and indirectly. By concentrating ownership into a single blockholder (the private equity fund), private equity overcomes the typical free rider problems that bedevil public corporations with dispersed shareholders.53 The private equity fund, unlike a small investor in a public company, has both the financial interest and the industry expertise to closely monitor the behavior of managers, and is a particularly active monitor at that.54 In addition, the large amount of debt placed on portfolio companies serves as a kind of indirect monitor, disciplining managers to focus on cash flow and firm value.55 A further side effect of debt financing is that it brings another monitor into the game, namely, debtholders.56 The debtholders of portfolio companies are typically large, sophisticated financial institutions, and, given the extreme leverage of most private equity transactions, have strong incentives to monitor risky behavior by managers.57 This combination of strong direct and indirect monitoring of management behavior reduces information asymmetries and prevents value-destroying actions by managers.

Finally, some commentators argue that private equity's governance dividend stems from its smarter use of expertise.58 In this view, the private equity model benefits from, and indeed is centered around, the gathering and deployment of expertise—financial, operational, and industrial. Private equity firms specialize in particular sectors (such as technology, health care, or consumer products), and they utilize their substantial experi-

53. Masulis & Thomas, supra note 5, at 228–29.
54. See Cornelli & Karakas, supra note 7 (finding that the boards of private equity companies are smaller and meet more frequently).
55. See Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 5, at 131 (describing leverage as a key ingredient to private equity governance).
56. Id.
57. Masulis & Thomas, supra note 5, at 247.
58. See Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 5, at 132 ("Private equity firms use their industry and operating knowledge to identify attractive investments, to develop value creation plans for those investments, and to implement the value creation plans."); Masulis & Thomas, supra note 5, at 223 ("The general partners act as advisors to the portfolio company's management and as members of the company's board of directors, and draw on their expertise in corporate restructurings and their contacts throughout the industry to assist in creating value.").
ence from other transactions to maximize the value of their portfolio companies.\textsuperscript{59} They supplement this expertise by hiring professionals with operational backgrounds in the industry and retaining outside consulting groups.\textsuperscript{60} Since private equity firms control the boards of their portfolio companies, they can easily add directors to fill specific gaps in expertise, and they can compensate these board members highly.\textsuperscript{61} Experts are often more willing to serve on the boards of private equity companies than on the boards of public companies because of the smaller risk of litigation and the lighter regulatory burdens.\textsuperscript{62}

In sum, an increasing number of scholars have argued that private equity has a corporate-governance advantage over other forms of business organization, and in particular over the public company. They identify this advantage as primarily a question of reducing agency costs between management and ownership. Through concentrated ownership stakes, high leverage, and financial and operational expertise, private equity has discovered a particularly potent form of interest alignment, one that both overcomes the collective-action problems inherent in dispersed-ownership models and incentivizes the key parties to pursue value-maximizing business strategies.

C. EVIDENCE OF PRIVATE EQUITY'S GOVERNANCE DIVIDEND

Does private equity's governance model create value? This is a difficult question to answer empirically, as it requires reliable and representative data on private equity performance and a reasonable set of comparable benchmarks from other companies. Because private equity companies are not subject to comprehensive public-company disclosure regulations, information about their performance is difficult to come by, and firms have

\begin{itemize}
  \item 59. Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 5, at 126–28.
  \item 60. \textit{Id}.
  \item 61. \textit{See} Masulis & Thomas, supra note 5, at 254 ("Another important element of effective board monitoring is the extent to which board members are given greater access to proprietary information in these private-equity firms, which can include more frequent and specialized financial reports.").
\end{itemize}
incentives to disclose favorable information while concealing unfavorable information, thus skewing the data. However, in recent years, a number of scholars have attempted to overcome these issues and test private equity's performance against benchmark companies, relying on information from industry sources, voluntary self-reporting from private equity firms and investors, and commercial data-collection companies.

First, from an operational standpoint, several studies have indicated that private equity's portfolio companies tend to improve across a number of performance metrics post-buyout. They demonstrate improved productivity, better profit margins, greater return on sales, and higher earnings-to-sales ratios. On the other hand, some scholars have expressed doubt about whether these results are in fact caused by any changes that private equity firms enact, suggesting instead that private equity firms tend to target companies that have underperformed in recent years and thus benefit from a reversion to the mean. When compared to similarly underperforming firms that did not experience buyouts, private equity portfolio companies experience smaller, or indeed no, operational improvements. Thus it is unclear to what extent private equity firms improve the operational performance of their portfolio companies, although the weight of the studies appear to conclude that the effect is generally positive.

63. See Robert S. Harris et al., Private Equity Performance: What Do We Know?, 69 J. FIN. 1851, 1851 (2014) (stating that uncertainty about private equity performance is driven by "uneven disclosure of [private equity] returns and questions about the quality of data available for research").

64. Id. at 1855-56.

65. Davis et al., supra note 2, at 3959.

66. Id.


69. See Jonathan B. Cohn et al., The Evolution of Capital Structure and Operating Performance after Leveraged Buyouts: Evidence from U.S. Corporate Tax Returns, 111 J. FIN. ECON. 469, 470 (2014) (concluding "our operating performance results appear inconsistent with the view that [leveraged buyouts] lead to improvements in operating performance, either through the disciplining effects of leverage and concentrated ownership, or through operational expertise supplied by private equity acquirers" (citations omitted)).

70. Id.
Operational improvements, however, do not necessarily lead to improved returns for investors, and another set of studies have focused on this question, with similarly mixed results. A number of studies in the 2000s and early 2010s concluded that private equity outperformed its benchmarks and created economic value for investors. These studies focused on what a limited-partner investor in a private equity fund would have earned, net of fees, compared to a public market equivalent, which is what the investor would have earned if it had invested the same amount of money in the market (typically measured by an index based on the S&P 500). Most of these studies were largely positive about private equity’s performance, finding excess returns to investors of between three and eight percent per year over public market equivalents.

In recent years, however, studies have shown significantly smaller returns for private equity funds. One study from 2015 concluded that the median return for liquidated private equity funds was nine percent higher than S&P 500 public market equivalents over the life of the fund, which, assuming a fund life of ten years, equates to an average annual outperformance of only 0.87%. When assessed against comparable companies that


72. See, e.g., Harris et al., supra note 63.


74. E.g. Ludovic Phalippou, Performance of Buyout Funds Revisited?, 18 REV. FIN. 189, 215–16 (2014) (finding that the average buyout fund underperforms by 3.1% when benchmarked to a leveraged small-value index).

more closely matched the characteristics of the funds, even this minimal outperformance disappeared: the median return for liquidated private equity funds exactly matched that of targeted public market equivalents.76 Another 2015 study, using information provided by institutional investors in private equity funds, concluded that, while private equity fund returns exceeded those from public markets in earlier years, since 2006 their performance was roughly equal to that of public markets.77 Finally, yet another study, focusing on risk-adjusted performance of private equity funds, reached a largely similar result, concluding that “[a]fter adjusting for appropriate risks, we found no outperformance of buyout funds vis-à-vis their public market equivalents on a dollar-weighted basis.”78

Thus there appears to be some evidence that private equity firms institute changes that improve revenue metrics and profitability in their companies. For many years, this appeared to translate into superior returns for investors, as compared with similar investments in broad public market indexes. However, in recent years, evidence has mounted that private equity fails to outperform its basic benchmarks of comparison. This result calls into question the assertion that private equity’s governance model is superior to that of the typical public corporation, suggesting that the corporate-governance dividend may well be overstated. The following Section will examine these questions by looking closer at the governance structure of private equity investments in order to identify potentially unexamined governance costs.

II. GOVERNANCE COSTS OF PRIVATE EQUITY

Private equity presents a unique model of corporate governance. Structured neither as a large, publicly held corporation nor a small, closely held company, private equity is instead something of a hybrid, drawing bits and pieces from both models in order to create a sui generis entity. As described above, many scholars have argued that private equity’s governance structure is superior to other forms of corporate governance.79 In this view,

76. Robinson & Sensoy, supra note 75.
77. See Robert S. Harris et al., How Do Private Equity Investments Perform Compared to Public Equity?, 14 J. INV. MGMT. 14, 15 (2016).
79. See supra Part I.B.
the private equity governance model resolves the most pernicious forms of misalignment between owners and management and leads to better company performance and investor returns. It may then come as a surprise that recent studies have shown that private equity’s returns over the last decade have not exceeded those that would have been earned in a low-cost index fund, particularly given the additional risks and lower liquidity that are associated with private equity funds.

This Section will argue that the conventional view of private equity’s governance dividend is flawed. Private equity’s governance structure, far from eliminating conflicts of interest and moral hazard, exacerbates them. It does so in three ways. First, private equity firms are compensated in ways that incentivize them to engage in opportunistic and risky behavior to the detriment of investors. Second, private equity firms grant severely restricted governance rights to limited-partner investors in their funds. Third, private equity firms do not grant equal and non-discriminatory treatment to all investors in the same fund, instead parceling out differential and advantageous treatment to select favored investors. Put together, these governance mechanisms create a series of situations in which the interests of private equity firms diverge from those of their investors.

This Section will examine each of the three types of governance costs associated with private equity and provide a description of how prevalent these costs are in the industry. It will sketch out some preliminary arguments about these categories and discuss the factors that may heighten, or mitigate, their costs in particular funds. It will argue that, in some cases, private equity’s governance structure causes individually rational institutional actors to act in suboptimal ways over persistent periods of time.

80. Id.
81. See supra Part I.C.
82. To be clear, it is impossible to entirely eliminate agency costs in any plausible scenario involving owners and managers of a company. Principals naturally have different interests than agents, and unless the principals exert complete control over all agent decision-making, misalignments will inevitably arise. This Section, however, will attempt to highlight the primary areas of misalignment within the private equity corporate governance structure, assess the severity of the misalignment, and describe the potentially harmful effects deriving from it.
A. THE MORAL HAZARD OF PRIVATE EQUITY COMPENSATION

Many scholars have argued that one of private equity's primary governance benefits is that it better aligns the compensation incentives of managers with the interests of owners. Because the executive officers of portfolio companies invest more of their money in their companies and are compensated with larger equity stakes as compared with their counterparts at public companies, the argument goes, they have stronger incentives to pursue business strategies that contribute to long-term growth.

However, this focus on the incentives of management at the portfolio company level overlooks the incentives of management at the fund level. It is important to keep in mind that the private equity governance structure has three levels of ownership: (1) the portfolio company at the bottom; (2) the fund in the middle; and (3) the private equity firm and passive institutional investors at the top. While it is true that there are managers at the portfolio company level, there are also managers at the fund level. Each has separate incentives. Thus, a focus solely on the incentives of executive teams at the portfolio company level, without an understanding of the incentives of private equity firms themselves, overlooks the fundamental role that private equity firms play in company decision-making.

A closer look at the incentives of private equity firms reveals a number of striking ways in which agency costs reinsert themselves into the process. Private equity firms are generally compensated in two ways. First, they receive annual management fees, which entitle the firm to a percentage (often two percent) of the capital that is committed by investors and/or the capital that is employed by the fund. Second, they receive a carried interest in the fund, which entitles the firm to a specified percentage (typically twenty percent, although this number can vary) of any

83. See Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 5, at 130–31; Kaplan, supra note 6, at 242; Masulis & Thomas, supra note 5, at 251–52.
84. Masulis & Thomas, supra note 5, at 251–52.
85. See supra Part I.A.
86. Management fees are often structured so that, at the beginning of the fund, the fee is based on the total amount of capital that investors have committed to invest, and, once the investment period has ended, the fee is based on the actual invested capital. Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 5, at 123–24. Private equity firms may also receive a variety of other fees, including transaction fees and monitoring fees, which can vary widely in their application and size, but a full analysis and typology of these fees is beyond the scope of this Article. For a fuller discussion of the various fees charged by private equity firms and their contribution to firm profit, see Andrew Metrick & Ayako Yasuda, The Economics of Private Equity Funds, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 2303, 2319–20 (2010).
profits of the fund. Each of these prongs—the management fee and the carried interest—has agency costs embedded in its structure.

1. Management Fees

Even a cursory glance at the structure of management fees charged by private equity firms reveals the agency costs inherent in the mechanism. A significant portion of private equity firm compensation comes from management fees that are not tied directly to the performance of the underlying companies. A recent study found that approximately two-thirds of a private equity firm’s expected revenue from investments comes from fixed-revenue components, primarily management fees. Thus, private equity firms earn a large proportion of their compensation regardless of how their investments turn out.

More importantly, the structure of management fees creates a set of skewed incentives for private equity firms. Because management fees are based on total capital committed and total capital actually invested, private equity firms have strong incentives to (1) raise as much capital as possible, regardless of the reasonable prospects for putting it to use, and (2) invest as much capital as possible, regardless of the expected performance of the target companies. Both of these incentives create risks for investors—in the form of money committed but unable to be

88. Metrick & Yasuda, supra note 86, at 2305.
89. Id.
used or investments made but unable to be exited—and these risks are not borne by the firm itself. While this risk may be mitigated by the fact that private equity firms benefit from increases in the value of their portfolio companies, and thus do not have incentives to actively seek to destroy value, the majority of the risk is borne by the other investors, while private equity firms reap the gains from boosted management fees.

To illustrate this point, consider a private equity firm, which we will call Empire Capital, that is nearing the end of its investment period. Let us assume that Empire Capital has raised a fund of $1 billion, and its compensation arrangement is the typical combination of a twenty percent carried interest and a two percent management fee. During the investment period, this management fee will be calculated as a percentage of total committed capital (i.e., $1 billion), but after the investment period, the base rate will change (or step down) to a percentage of capital actually invested. For simplicity’s sake, let us assume that the firm has not invested any of its capital yet and is down to a single potential target company, Lemon Corp., which is currently on the market for $1 billion. The firm believes that Lemon Corp. is a risky investment; there is a fifty percent chance that, at the time of exit, the target will decline in value to $500 million, a twenty-five percent chance that it will remain at $1 billion, and a twenty-five percent chance that it will increase in value to $1.5 billion. We will assume that the time between investment and exit will be five years.

92. In reality, most private equity firms will consider many different potential targets, not just one, and analyze their respective strengths and weaknesses before making an investment decision. All else equal, the firm should prefer targets with greater profit potential. However, the presence of multiple potential targets can at best reduce the magnitude of the moral hazard problem, not eliminate it. In addition, in the current environment where private equity firms are sitting on substantial dry powder that must be invested, it is not unreasonable to assume that the universe of acceptable targets, compared to the available capital ready for investment, has shrunk. Indeed, many observers have come to precisely this conclusion. See Private Equity: The Barbarian Establishment, supra note 1.

93. These values are net of all taxes, fees and expenses.

94. Of course, for most private equity investments, the firm does not know precisely when the exit will come—the decision depends on market conditions, industry developments, and company-specific risks. A 2015 study found that the average amount of time between an investment and an exit in the private equity industry was 5.5 years. See Amy Or, Average Private Equity Hold Times Drop to 5.5 Years, WALL ST. J.: PRIVATE EQUITY BEAT (June 10, 2015), https://blogs.wsj.com/privateequity/2015/06/10/average-private-equity-hold-times-drop-to-5-5-years. Therefore, for this example, we will assume that the exit will take place in five years.
The expected value of the Lemon Corp. investment is $875 million, and thus a rational investor would not be willing to pay $1 billion for it. But Empire Capital, importantly, does not internalize the full costs and benefits of its investments. Instead, it is paid based on two metrics: capital invested and profits. If it does not invest in Lemon Corp., it will be obligated to return the capital commitments and thus will earn neither management fees nor any potential carry, an expected value of $0. If it does invest in Lemon Corp., it will earn management fees for the five-year life of the investment (two percent of $1 billion for five years, or $100 million) and also has a twenty-five percent chance of earning carried interest on profits (twenty percent of the difference between $1.5 billion and $1 billion, or $100 million). Thus the expected value of acquiring Lemon Corp. to Empire Capital is $125 million. Despite the fact that the overall expected value of the investment to all stakeholders is negative, acquiring Lemon Corp. is a rational economic decision from the perspective of Empire Capital, given its compensation structure. If it does not acquire Lemon Corp., it will earn nothing, while if it does acquire the company it can expect to earn $125 million.

As this simple example demonstrates, the structure of management fees creates a classic situation of moral hazard. The private equity firm captures much of the gain from a risky investment (it is guaranteed to earn its management fee, which makes up the bulk of its expected earnings), and bears little, or even none, of any consequent losses if the risk happens to materialize. The result is that private equity firms have strong incentives to take excessive risks in their investment decisions. This incentive is particularly strong when the private equity firm is nearing the end of its investment period and is sitting on dry powder—capital that has been committed by investors but that has not been invested—that it must either invest immediately or return to investors. Indeed, in this example, even if Lemon Corp. had zero chance of increasing in value, it would still be in Empire Capital’s economic interest to acquire the company, solely through its return on management fees.

To be sure, this example is simplified and does not take into account the many variations in compensation that are found in limited partnership agreements and side letters with investors.

95. Calculated as fifty percent of $500 million plus twenty-five percent of $1 billion plus twenty-five percent of $1.5 billion.
96. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 47, at 334–37 (discussing the incentives associated with the existence of debt).
One important interest-aligning mechanism in particular should be noted. Private equity firms typically make equity investments in their funds alongside their limited partner investors, and, thus, they face some downside risk to bad investments. The amount invested varies, but is usually around one percent of the total capital of the fund. In the extreme situation where all of a fund's portfolio companies decreased in value to $0, the private equity firm would lose all of its equity investment in the fund.

However, the structure of private equity makes this interest-aligning mechanism a limited one. The amount invested by private equity firms makes up a small percentage of the total capital of the fund, and thus, there will always be a range of expected values in which the private equity firm will have an economic interest in making acquisitions that have net negative returns. So long as management fees remain a significant component of compensation, this moral hazard will persist.

2. Carried Interest

Management fees, however, are not the sole source of compensation-based misalignment. The other important source of compensation for private equity firms is carried interest. Carried interest has been the subject of much debate in recent years, much of it focused on the favorable tax treatment it receives under the U.S. tax code. Less attention, however, has been focused on the powerful ways in which carried interest can create incentives for excessive risk-taking by private equity firms.

As explained before, carried interest is a kind of performance-based compensation arrangement. Through its carried interest, a private equity firm earns a specified percentage of its fund's profits, typically in the range of twenty percent. Carried

97. See Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 5, at 123 (noting that the general partner customarily provides a portion of the fund's capital).
98. Id.
99. Critics have argued that carried interest, which is taxed at the low long-term capital gains rate of twenty percent under the current tax regime, should instead qualify as regular income and therefore be taxed at a top rate of nearly forty percent. See, e.g., Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in Private Equity Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (2008). Proponents of the current, favorable tax treatment of carried interest argue instead that carried interest is sweat equity much like any other interest in a company, and thus rightly qualifies as capital gains. See, e.g., Steven B. Klinsky, The Carried Interest Loophole? What Loophole?, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (July 15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/16/business/dealbook/the-carried-interest-loophole-what-loophole.html.
100. Weisbach, supra note 87, at 716.
interest is often viewed as a way of properly aligning the interest of private equity firms with their limited partner investors. 101 After all, investors commit their capital to private equity funds in the expectation of profits, and they naturally want to incentivize private equity firms to pursue these profits.

But the equity interests held by investors and the carried interests held by private equity firms differ in one important way: the equity interests face downside risk, while the carried interests do not.102 If a portfolio company drops in value and thus the private equity fund loses money, the equity investors in the fund will bear that loss, but the carried interest will simply not be triggered. Thus the private equity firm has upside potential but no downside potential—at worst, its carried interest will be equal to zero.103 As with the management-fee arrangement, this is a classic example of moral hazard.

To return to the example from earlier, let us assume that Empire Capital has purchased Lemon Corp. for $1 billion. After acquiring the company, Empire Capital discovers that its earlier assessment of the range of expected values for Lemon Corp. is incorrect. Instead, it now believes that it has a choice: it can either implement a radical restructuring of Lemon Corp., or it can stay the course. If it stays the course, Lemon Corp. will remain at a value of $1 billion at the time of exit. If it adopts the risky restructuring, there is a fifty percent chance that Lemon Corp. will drop in value to $400 million, and a fifty percent chance that Lemon Corp. will increase in value to $1.4 billion.

The risky strategy has a negative expected value: if Empire Capital adopts this strategy, its expected value will be $900 million, less than the value it could be guaranteed from simply staying the course. Thus the equity investors in the company would prefer that Empire Capital not implement the risky restructuring of Lemon Corp.

101. See Baks & Benveniste, supra note 90, at 3 (concluding that “[t]o preserve the improvements in interest alignment currently underway, the PE market would be served well if it would transition to a clearing mechanism in which top performing GPs are rewarded with increased carried interest” with the goal being to “de-emphasize management fees as a compensation channel for the GP”).

102. See Weisbach, supra note 87, at 716 (noting that the firm earns a percentage of the profits earned by the fund).

103. Of course, private equity firms invest time and energy into their portfolio companies, so to the extent that they do not earn carried interest on their investments, this is a loss in a certain sense (in the form of opportunity costs). It is not, however, equivalent to the loss faced by equity investors, who ultimately receive back less capital than they contributed.
But the economic interests of Empire Capital are different. If Empire Capital stays the course, there will be no potential for profit from the fund, and thus the private equity firm will not realize any carried interest. If, instead, it adopts the risky strategy, there is a fifty percent chance that Lemon Corp. will increase in value to $1.4 billion, in which case it will earn twenty percent of this profit through its carried interest in the fund. To be sure, there is also a fifty percent chance that Lemon Corp. will decrease in value, but this loss is not borne by Empire Capital as its carried interest is effectively a profits interest, and thus cannot drop below zero. Therefore, the expected value to Empire Capital of implementing the strategy is positive (twenty percent of the $400 million profit, or $80 million). The economic interest of Empire Capital, then, is to adopt the risky strategy, even though this strategy is, on average, value-destroying.

The carried interest element of private equity compensation creates a moral hazard problem in the private equity industry that in many ways mirrors the critiques leveled against the banking industry after the financial crisis of 2008–2009. In that crisis, many observers noted that bankers’ pay incentivized excessive risk-taking—bankers stood to receive large bonuses if they made risky, leveraged bets on the housing market, but were insulated from any negative repercussions because their institutions were considered too big to fail. Private equity firms face similar incentives. They too have a financial interest in taking excessive risks because they capture much of the upside (in a typical structure, twenty percent of the profits of the investments) with little of the downside, as they will merely forfeit the possibility of earning their carried interest while still pocketing the ongoing management fees that they have been charging throughout the investment period.

Another way of understanding the problem is to view the carry as effectively an option. Options give their holders the

104. See Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 9 (exploring how banks’ compensation structures produce incentives for excessive risk taking).

right to buy a share at a future date for a specified price.\textsuperscript{106} Options are often viewed as a way to link pay with performance—the options only have value if the stock price rises.\textsuperscript{107} However, it is increasingly recognized that options incentivize excessive risk-taking among public-company executives and lead to measurable changes in a company’s risk profile.\textsuperscript{108} By basing executive compensation on \textit{increases} in share prices, and making them indifferent between different-sized \textit{decreases}, stock options create financial incentives for executives to pursue risky strategies that may have negative expected values. Carried interests create similar, though perhaps less widely-recognized, incentives for private equity firms to increase risk in their portfolio companies.

Many private equity funds attempt to minimize the misalignment created by carried interests through a mechanism called a hurdle rate.\textsuperscript{109} Hurdle rate provisions prevent private equity firms from earning any carried interest until the limited partners have realized a specified profit on their capital contributions. This number is commonly around eight percent, meaning that, until limited-partner investors have realized a return of eight percent on their capital, the private equity firm earns no carried interest.\textsuperscript{110} Hurdle rates provide additional assurance to limited-partner investors that they will realize a reasonable return on their investments before private equity firms earn their carry, but, perversely, they also end up exacerbating the moral


\textsuperscript{109}. See Metrick \& Yasuda, \textit{supra} note 86, at 2310 (discussing how carry hurdles work in practice).

\textsuperscript{110}. See id. at 2312 (using an eight percent hurdle rate in explaining how hurdle requirements are applied).
hazard problem.\textsuperscript{111} Even with a hurdle provision, private equity firms still do not face downside risk, but they now have an incentive to layer on additional risk in order to surpass the hurdle.

\section*{B. Limited Governance Rights for Investors}

The compensation structure of private equity presents a moral hazard that misaligns the economic interests of private equity firms and their investors, incentivizing risky strategies and value-destroying behavior. Parties usually address these types of moral hazard through enhanced monitoring of the relevant behavior. If the party with an incentive to misbehave knows that bad acts will be identified and punished, he may refrain from engaging in the behavior in the first place. But, as this Section will demonstrate, private equity is typified by severely limited governance rights for investors, reducing the ability of investors to monitor private-equity-firm behavior and thereby exacerbating the moral hazard problem.\textsuperscript{112}

\subsection*{1. Lack of Voice}

Investors in private equity funds have very little say in the way that their funds are run.\textsuperscript{113} Unlike shareholders in public corporations, who benefit from extensive voting rights on a variety of matters,\textsuperscript{114} private equity investors have little or no ability

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\textsuperscript{112} For the classic description of the voice and exit problem in governance, see ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, \textit{EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES} 1-20 (1970) (discussing each of these governance problems).

\textsuperscript{113} John Morley, \textit{The Separation of Funds and Managers: A Theory of Investment Fund Structure and Regulation}, 123 YALE L.J. 1228, 1232 (2014) (noting that investment enterprises such as private equity funds tend to "radically limit fund investors' control"); Drury, supra note 28, at 60-62 (discussing investors' governance rights in private equity firms). It should be noted at the outset that many private equity firms argue that limitations on governance rights are required in order to insulate limited partners from liability. After all, Delaware law provides that a limited partner will not be liable for the obligations of the partnership only for so long as they refrain from "participating in the control of the business." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-303(a) (2017). But Delaware law also provides an extensive list of actions that are expressly permitted for limited partners, and this list is significantly broader than any rights granted to limited partner investors in private equity. See id. at § 17-303(b).

\textsuperscript{114} Shareholders in public corporations typically have rights to vote on the election of directors, mergers, acquisitions, and executive compensation pack-
to participate in fund governance. Instead, they delegate near-complete control to private equity firms, which act as the general partners of the fund. The limited-partner investors are restricted to a short list of specifically enumerated voting rights, on such matters as the amendment of the limited partnership agreement, the dissolution of the fund, or the removal of the general partner.\(^{115}\) As mentioned earlier, the rights of investors in private equity funds are defined in the fund’s limited partnership agreement and any side letters that the investors may negotiate on their own.\(^ {116}\) As such, investor rights are largely a creature of contract law, and not state or federal law as one finds with publicly listed companies.\(^ {117}\)

Of course, public corporations also have governing documents that lay out the respective rights and obligations of management and ownership, but there is a substantial public-law overlay that limits and shapes how far public corporations can go in restricting shareholder rights. These public company regulations do not, however, protect investors in private equity funds.\(^ {118}\) Instead, private equity investors only receive the benefits of the participation rights that they can explicitly negotiate for prior to investment.

And it turns out that those rights are few and far between. For example, investors typically have no right to vote on the sale of portfolio companies, even if those companies form a substantial part of the fund’s assets.\(^ {119}\) That decision resides solely within the discretion of the private equity firm. They typically have no right to vote on the board of directors with managerial

\(^{115}\) See, e.g., DOUGLAS CUMMING & SOFIA JOHAN, VENTURE CAPITAL & PRIVATE EQUITY CONTRACTING app. 1, § 5.3 (2d ed. 2009) (providing a sample limited partnership agreement).

\(^{116}\) See supra Part I.A.

\(^{117}\) See Mohsen Manesh, Legal Asymmetry and the End of Corporate Law, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 465, 476–77 (2009) (noting that non-corporations such as private equity funds are “creatures of contract,” representing a voluntary contractual relationship among private parties”).

\(^ {118}\) It should be noted that some private equity firms are publicly listed and thus would be subject to public-company regulation. Prominent examples include The Blackstone Group and KKR. See Drury, supra note 28, at 60 (discussing public offerings by these firms). These firms, however, remain in the minority.

\(^ {119}\) See, e.g., CUMMING & JOHAN, supra note 115, § 5.3 (stating that the manager has full power and authority to act on behalf of the partnership).
authority reserved for the fund. Managerial authority is vested in the private equity firm. They typically have no right to vote on the compensation of executives. That decision also rests with the private equity firm in its sole discretion. These are all rights that, in some form or other, shareholders in public corporations are guaranteed, but that very few private equity investors have.

What rights investors do have in the governance of private equity funds are typically rigorously circumscribed. One common voting right that investors do have is the right to remove the private equity firm from its position as general partner of the fund. But that right is far from absolute. First, it typically must be for cause, meaning that investors can only remove the private equity firm if it misbehaves. This provision, on its face, would seem an unobjectionable way of aligning the interests of private equity firms and investors: the investors promise to keep the firm in place as long as it acts in the interests of the investors, but have the power to remove it if it does not. But limited partnership agreements commonly define cause so narrowly that it can only be invoked in the most extreme cases, such as fraud, willful misconduct, violations of law, felony convictions, or bad faith. Some agreements go even further, requiring there to be a final court determination confirming the general partner’s

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120. Some private equity firms establish "limited partner advisory committees" that have certain limited rights to review the decisions of the general partner. See INSTITUTIONAL LTD. PARTNERS ASS'N, PRIVATE EQUITY PRINCIPLES 13–15 (2d ed. 2011), https://ilpa.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/ILPA-Private-Equity-Principles-version-2.pdf (discussing attributes and best practices for LPACs). But these committees typically have an advisory role and are focused on vetting transactions that involve conflicts of interest for the private equity firm. In addition, not all limited partners have the right to nominate their representatives to the committees; this right is often reserved for the few limited partners with the largest commitments and who have explicitly negotiated for such rights in their side letters.

121. See CUMMING & JOHAN, supra note 115 (detailing the authority of the partnership manager); see also Robert J. Jackson, Private Equity and Executive Compensation, 60 UCLA L. REV. 638, 668 (2013) (analyzing how executive compensation in companies owned by private equity firms differs from executive compensation in public companies).


misbehavior before investors can remove the firm.124 And, adding yet another obstacle, the voting threshold for invoking a for-cause removal is often set at prohibitively high levels—as high as eighty-five percent to ninety-five percent of the vote.125

Put together, these restrictions and limitations effectively eliminate the ability of private equity investors to voice their opinions and participate in essential business decisions of the funds that they own. Near total control is vested in the private equity firm itself. This governance arrangement raises questions about the proper alignment of interests between private equity firms and their investors, and whether institutional investors are adequately able to monitor and sanction private equity firm behavior.

The inability of private equity investors to participate in governance decisions might be less worrisome if they were protected by strong fiduciary duties. Indeed, the default rule in many jurisdictions is that general partners owe the same fiduciary duties to limited partners that directors of corporations owe to shareholders.126 But many limited partnership agreements require investors to waive any fiduciary duties that the private equity firm might otherwise have, thus depriving private equity investors of this judicial check on misbehavior.127

Paradoxically, some scholars have argued that the inability of investors to participate in governance decisions is one of the primary benefits of the private equity model.128 In this line of thought, control of company decisions should reside in the hands of the most efficient and knowledgeable decision-makers.129 Because private equity firms have deep knowledge of the industries

125. See Hudec, supra note 122. Adding to the problem, the private equity firm itself may own limited-partner interests that have a right to vote on these matters, posing an obvious conflict of interest.
127. See de Fontenay, supra note 41, at 181 (noting that private equity firms have “deliberately avoided” fiduciary duties toward their investors); see also Birdthistle & Henderson, supra note 25, at 51–53 (discussing the flexibility to waive fiduciary duty under partnership law); Manesh, supra note 117 (noting that noncorporations rely on contractual rather than fiduciary rights).
129. Id. at 1232–33.
in which they operate and the market conditions necessary for their funds to profit, control most efficiently resides in their hands, and not in those of institutional investors who have neither the will nor the ability to focus on day-to-day affairs at their numerous investments. But this model only works when (1) managers have strong performance incentives; and (2) investors have strong exit rights. Otherwise, the surrender of control can operate as a license for rent extraction by the manager. But, as already described in Part II.A, while the performance incentives for private equity firms may well be strong, they are not perfectly aligned with the interests of investors. The next Section will discuss the lack of exit rights for investors in private equity funds.

2. Lack of Exit

Private equity investors lack a second important protection against overreaching by private equity firms—the right to leave. The right to leave, or exit, an investment is a particularly powerful method for disciplining the behavior of managers. In a public corporation, for example, if large numbers of shareholders sell their shares, the value of the corporation's shares will decline, reflecting poorly on the corporation's management and shrinking the value of management's equity holdings. As long as managers' compensation is tied closely enough to the performance of the company's share price, the threat of exit by large shareholders can serve as a financial incentive for managers to act in the interest of shareholders broadly. In other words, investors' ability to exit a company may serve as an effective substitute for their ability to vote in the company.

Exit or the threat of exit, already a potent tool in disciplining the managers of public corporations, could potentially be even more powerful in the context of private equity, for at least two reasons. First, private equity firms earn a substantial portion of their compensation through management fees, which are calculated as a percentage of the total amount of capital that investors

130. Id.
have committed.132 So, if investors were to withdraw their capital commitments, this reduction would directly affect the bottom line for private equity firms through diminished management fees.133 Second, the other substantial portion of private equity firm compensation is based on the firm’s carried interest, or profits from the sale of portfolio companies.134 If it were to become known that a number of large investors had sold their investments in the firm’s fund, this news could very well adversely affect the reputation of the firm and hinder efforts to entice buyers or undertake an initial public offering for their portfolio companies. The difficulty of selling portfolio companies is a major concern for private equity firms and is one of the reasons for the proliferation in recent years of so-called zombie funds, or funds that have held their portfolio companies for longer than their scheduled holding periods.135

Despite the potentially powerful effects of exit as a method for reducing agency costs in the private equity industry, investors in private equity funds have essentially no ability to sell their investments in a timely way. Most limited partnership agreements provide that limited partners may not transfer their interests in the fund for the life of the fund (often ten to twelve years) unless the general partner consents to the transfer.136 As a result, private equity firms can veto any efforts by investors to sell their interests in the fund. Needless to say, private equity

132. Metrick & Yasuda, supra note 86, at 2309.
133. Of course, after the investment period has ended, management fees typically switch to being calculated as capital actually invested. See supra Part II.A.1.
134. See supra Part II.A.2.
136. See, e.g., CUMMING & JOHAN, supra note 115, § 9.2 (“No sale, assignment, transfer, exchange, pledge, encumbrance or other disposition . . . of all or any part of the . . . Limited Partner’s interest . . . in the Partnership . . . shall be valid or effective without the prior written consent of the Manager . . . ”). Often, the decision of whether to consent to such a transfer resides in the sole discretion of the private equity firm, thus allowing the private equity firm to block transfers for any or no reason at all. To the extent that limited partners negotiate for better transfer terms, these negotiations typically take place in the context of side letters that apply solely to the specific limited partner requesting the better terms, and not in the context of the wider limited partnership agreement itself. See James Gaden, Side Stepping Side Letters?, MAPLES & CALDER (Mar. 19, 2013), https://www.maplesandcalder.com/news/article/side-stepping-side-letters-483.
firms' power to veto transfers renders exit rights largely ineffec-
tual and significantly impairs the potentially disciplining effects
of exit on management behavior.\textsuperscript{137}

It should be noted that exit is a controversial mechanism for
disciplining management behavior. Some scholars, for example,
have argued that greater liquidity actually impairs corporate
governance.\textsuperscript{138} By making it easier for investors to sell their in-
vestments, greater exit rights reduce the incentive for investors
to play a constructive role in the governance of those invest-
ments.\textsuperscript{139} Another reason for restricting exit rights is related to
the trade-off between short-term and long-term profits. The logic
here is that as executives become more attuned to share price
fluctuations, they spend less time focusing on the larger, more
important function of running the company for long-term
growth, and more focused on short-term, illusory bumps in share
prices.\textsuperscript{140} Indeed, the reaction against short-termism in public

\textsuperscript{137} Investors can generally withdraw their capital at the end of the term of
the fund. But a typical term for a private equity fund is ten years, and can some-
times extend for longer. See STEPHANIE R. BRESLOW & PHYLLIS A. SCHWARTZ,
PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS: FORMATION AND OPERATION § 2:18.1 (2011) ("A stand-
ard private equity term ends on the tenth anniversary of the final closing of the
sale of partnership interest by the fund. Thereafter, the general partner may
have the right to extend the term of the partnership for a stated period."). This
means that investors can have their capital tied up for over a decade before they
have any ability to access it.

\textsuperscript{138} See John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional In-
reason for restricting the ability of investors to exit their investments in private
equity funds is that the fund's investments are illiquid. Private equity funds
invest in whole companies, and thus they are not able to sell small portions of
their holdings to satisfy withdrawal requests in the ways that mutual funds and
hedge funds may. However, given the increasing demand for secondary market
sales of private equity interests, it is unclear that a complete prohibition on
sales of fund interests to willing third buyers is necessary or desirable. A robust
secondary market would promote the exchangeability of private equity interests
and could do a better job of holding firms accountable for their actions.

\textsuperscript{139} Id. at 1288-89. Exit and voice are often viewed as alternatives, with
voice serving as a substitute for exit. But in private equity, both of these ave-
nues for cabining managerial discretion are sharply circumscribed.

\textsuperscript{140} See Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 BUS.
LAW. 101, 104 (1979) (contrasting short-term perspectives of professional inves-
tors with long-term interests of shareholders and management); Martin Lipton
& Steven A. Rosenblum, Election Contests in the Company's Proxy: An Idea
Whose Time Has Not Come, 59 BUS. LAW. 67, 78 (2003); see also Sanjai Bhagat
& Roberta Romano, Reforming Executive Compensation: Focusing and Commit-
ting to the Long-Term, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 359 (2009) (recommending changes
to executive compensation structures that incentivize practices creating long-
term value, rather than short-term price appreciation); William W. Bratton &
Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA.
corporations has often been cited as a reason for corporations to go private in the first place. For example, when Silver Lake Management teamed up with Michael Dell to buy Dell Inc. and take the technology giant private, they stated as one of their primary reasons the ability to make changes without concern for short-term price fluctuations and fickle investor demands.141

Regardl ess of whether we believe that executives make better or worse decisions when investors have the ability to sell their investments in the company, the strong transfer restrictions placed on investors in private equity mean that investors lack yet another basic method for protecting themselves from management misbehavior. No matter what they think of a private equity firm’s performance, exit is not an option.

3. Lack of Information

The private equity corporate-governance structure thus lacks two important mechanisms for constraining managers and reducing agency costs: voice and exit. But even if investors are able to negotiate for greater voice and exit rights (a possibility that will be discussed in the Part II.C), they lack the means to exercise those rights effectively. This is because private equity firms restrict the flow of information about the performance and structure of their funds both to and among investors.142 And without comprehensive and timely information about their investment, private equity investors stand little chance of monitoring management behavior.143

L. REV. 653, 696–703 (2010) (discussing information asymmetry between executives and the investing public and the effect on investing patterns). But see Fried, supra note 46 (arguing that managers serving the interests of long-term shareholders may generate less economic value over time than managers focusing on serving the interests of short-term shareholders).


142. See, e.g., CUMMING & JOHAN, supra note 115, § 11 (outlining the limited information provided to limited partners).

143. In a recent review of the private equity industry, the SEC found that “most limited partnership agreements do not provide limited partners with sufficient information rights to be able to adequately monitor not only their investments, but also the operations of their manager,” and that “[w]hile investors typically conduct substantial due diligence before investing in a fund, . . . investor oversight is generally much more lax after closing.” Andrew J. Bowden, Dir., Office of Compliance Inspections & Examinations, SEC, Address at the Private Equity International Private Fund Compliance Forum: Spreading Sunshine in Private Equity (May 6, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2014-spch05062014ab.html.
Investors in public corporations have access to extensive information about the companies that they own. Securities regulations require public companies to file annual reports (10-Ks), quarterly reports (10-Qs), and additional reports upon the occurrence of certain key events (8-Ks). This information covers every conceivable part of a company's business: developments in operations; risk factors; properties; legal proceedings; financial data; management discussion and analysis of financial conditions; executive compensation; related-party transactions; and other information. Put together, these requirements give shareholders an extensive view into the nature and performance of their company.

Private equity investors, on the other hand, do not receive the same extensive disclosures about their investment. Typical limited partnership agreements require private equity firms to provide investors with only barebones information about the fund: annual and quarterly reports that include a balance sheet, profit and loss account, and summary of investments, as well as information about investments bought and sold. This information is not subject to the same rigorous standards of review and liability that public-company disclosures are subject to, and indeed the disclosure practices of private equity firms have been the subject of SEC investigations in recent years.

Some scholars have even argued that important aspects of the private equity structure today can only be explained as an attempt to escape the reach of antifraud rules under the securities laws.

But even the limited information disclosures that private equity investors are entitled to come saddled with myriad caveats and carve outs. For example, some limited partnership agreements go so far as to allow the private equity firm, in its sole discretion, to deny limited partners any information that

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145. See, e.g., CUMMING & JOHAN, supra note 115, § 11 (providing an example of the limited information typically provided to limited partners).
148. See Hudec, supra note 122, at 48 ("Traditional limited partnership agreements do not have expansive information rights and tricky confidentiality obligations make robust information flow difficult to come by.").
might adversely affect the private equity firm.\textsuperscript{149} In addition, investors are often prohibited from even learning about the identities, investment amounts, or investment terms of other investors.\textsuperscript{150}

Not only is the right to information prescribed, but the right to share such information with others is similarly limited.\textsuperscript{151} Limited partnership agreements often include confidentiality provisions with sweeping restrictions on the disclosure to third parties of a wide array of information that is considered confidential, including partnership terms, the identity of other limited partners, and side arrangements with the general partner.\textsuperscript{152} These types of provisions prevent limited partners from discussing business matters with other limited partners, effectively prohibiting the investors from cooperating.

Through these mechanisms, private equity firms have cut the flow of information to investors down to a trickle. With such limited information, investors find it difficult to detect and punish rent-seeking behavior by the private equity firm managers. So even when investors succeed in negotiating for greater exit and voice rights, a daunting task in itself, they struggle to exercise those rights effectively without better information about the behavior and performance of the firm.

If there is any doubt about whether the information problem is purely theoretical, consider the following fact: in the last few years, several prominent private equity firms have been fined by the SEC for improper disclosure and fee practices.\textsuperscript{153} That list

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{149. See Martin I. Lubaroff & Paul M. Altman, Lubaroff & Altman on Delaware Limited Partnerships 5-24 to -26 (2018).}
\footnote{150. See, e.g., Cumming & Johan, supra note 115, § 15.5 (providing an example of confidentiality requirements often placed on limited partners).}
\footnote{151. The confidentiality of limited partnership agreements is a matter of some controversy. Many private equity firms argue that the terms of their limited partnership agreements are a matter of competitive advantage, and any disclosure outside the fund would damage the firm’s ability to invest and generate returns for investors. See Steve Judge, Confidentiality of Limited Partnership Agreements Is Paramount, PE Hub Network (Nov. 3, 2014), https://www.pehub.com/2014/11/confidentiality-of-limited-partnership-agreements-is-paramount. But others have argued that these claims are overblown and that the real reason for the extreme secrecy around limited partnership agreements is that disclosing their tax and fee structures would subject private equity firms to criticism. See Dan Primack, Private Equity’s False Argument for Confidentiality, Fortune (Nov. 25, 2014), http://fortune.com/2014/11/25/private-equitys-false-argument-for-document-secrecy.}
\footnote{152. See Cumming & Johan, supra note 115, § 11.}
\footnote{153. In 2016, Apollo Global Management paid a $53 million fine to the SEC in order to settle allegations that it misled investors about its fees, improperly}
includes three of the four largest private equity firms in the world: Apollo, Blackstone, and KKR.154 The fourth, Carlyle, has received a request from the SEC for additional information about its fee practices.155 This trend of improper disclosures by private equity firms to the detriment of investors suggests that information flows are indeed problematic and, at the very least, must be improved to prevent false or inaccurate disclosures.

C. DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF INVESTORS

As the previous Sections have demonstrated, the structure of private equity carries with it two important governance costs: compensation-based moral hazard and inhibited governance rights for investors, both of which exacerbate agency costs between investors and private equity firms. But one final governance cost of the private equity model not only increases the severity of these problems, but also introduces a separate tension—intra-investor conflict. This is the increasingly common strategy of granting different treatment to different investors.156

It is a bedrock principle of corporate law that similarly situated shareholders should be treated similarly.157 This equal accelerated the payment of such fees into lump-sum payments, reduced the amount available for distribution to fund investors, and failed to fully disclose these practices to investors. See Ben Protess, Apollo Global Settles Securities Case as the S.E.C. Issues $53 Million Fine, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2016, at B3. In 2015, Blackstone Group LP agreed to pay a $39 million fine in connection with insufficient disclosures to investors about the fees it collected from the sale of portfolio companies and discounts on legal fees that were not distributed out to investors. See Lisa Beilfuss & Aruna Viswanatha, Blackstone in $39 Million SEC Settlement, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 7, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/blackstone-settles-with-sec-over-certain-fee-practices-1444238653. Also in 2015, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. agreed to pay $30 million to settle allegations that it had improperly allocated excessive "broken-deal" costs to investor funds. See Mark Maremont, KKR Agrees to $30 Million SEC Settlement, WALL ST. J. (June 29, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/kkr-settles-with-sec-for-nearly-30-million-1435592880.


156. See generally Clayton, supra note 12.

157. See REINIER H. KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 96 (3d ed. 2009) ("The equal treatment of shares (and shareholders) of the same class is a fundamental norm of corporate law."); Victor Brudney, Equal Treatment of Shareholders in Corporate Distributions and Reorganizations, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1072, 1074 (1983) (stating that it is a "part of the received learning about publicly held corporations" that
treatment principle is incorporated in both federal and state law. While certain exceptions exist, most obviously in the case of common versus preferred shares, most shareholders can assume that they are entitled to the same distributions and voting rights as other holders of their class of shares. This principle of equal treatment is motivated by concerns about entrenchment and favoritism, and, more generally, the diversion of corporate assets to majority or controlling shareholders at the expense of other shareholders. In other words, the equal-treatment norm is aimed at preventing value-reducing forms of opportunism by managers and large shareholders.

Private equity firms, however, are not bound by the same norms of equal treatment and, indeed, often grant different and more favorable treatment to certain investors in their funds. While all investors sign the same limited partnership agreement—a document that purports to set forth the relative rights and obligations of the partners—private equity firms also negotiate side letters with individual investors in their funds.

"all shares of a particular class (e.g., common stock) are to be treated as homogeneous claims on enterprise wealth"). But see FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 110 (1991) (stating that "[m]any scholars, though few courts, conclude that one aspect of fiduciary duty is the equal treatment of investors").

158. See SEC Equal Treatment of Security Holders, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10 ("No bidder shall make a tender offer unless: (1) The tender offer is open to all security holders of the class of securities subject to the tender offer; and (2) The consideration paid to any security holder for securities tendered in the tender offer is the highest consideration paid to any other security holder for securities tendered in the tender offer.").

159. See Odyssey Partners v. Fleming Cos., 735 A.2d 386, 406 (Del. Ch. 1999) (concluding that "general principles of our law disfavor[] non-prorata distributions of corporate assets"); Stephenson v. Dreyer, 947 P.2d 1301, 1307 (Cal. 1997) ("Any use to which [majority shareholders] put the corporation or their power to control the corporation must benefit all shareholders proportionately and must not conflict with the proper conduct of the corporation's business.").

160. Needless to say, corporations often have more than one class of shares, and these shares may well have different voting and economic rights. In addition, Delaware law allows boards to discriminate between shareholders in the use of poison pills in order to fend off threats to the corporation. See Moran v. Household Int'l, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).


162. See Clayton, supra note 12, at 252 (noting that "[p]referential treatment of investors is more common than ever in [private equity], thanks to new structures that make it easier to grant different terms to different investors").

163. See id. at 261 (discussing the prevalence of "customized contracting" in private equity).
These side letters can amend, supplement, or even contradict, the terms that are provided in the limited partnership agreement. Through the negotiation of these side letters, preferential treatment is often given to repeat investors or large institutional clients.

Common provisions in these side letters include lower fees and expenses for individual investors, opt-out rights for proposed investments in restricted industries, and greater control and monitoring rights. Some side letters include so-called most-favored-nation provisions, which require private equity firms to give beneficiaries the benefit of any provision included in other investors' side letters, effectively ensuring that they receive any preferential treatment granted to others. Another common provision allows institutional investors to co-invest in portfolio companies, allowing these preferred investors to participate directly in deals originated by the private equity fund. Many of

164. Id. at 263–64.
165. See Marco DaRin & Ludovic Phalippou, There Is Something Special About Large Investors: Evidence from a Survey of Private Equity Limited Partners 5 (TILEC, Discussion Paper No. 2014-010) (finding that a significantly higher percentage of large investors receive side letters and other preferential provisions than smaller investors); Barry Steinman, Private Equity Fund Fees, DUANE MORRIS LLP PRESENTATION, at slide 7 (Aug. 2014), http://www.duanemorris.com/site/static/private_equity_fund_fees.pdf (noting that large investors are often charged reduced management fees).
167. Such most-favored-nation clauses are commonly commitment-based, meaning that an investor only has the right to receive the benefits given to investors that have committed to invest similar or smaller amounts of capital. In this way, smaller investors do not have the right to elect to receive the favorable terms given to large investors. See Zachary K. Barnett et al., Mayer Brown, Most Favored Nations Clauses: Potential Impact on Subscription-Backed Credit Facilities 3 (2015), https://www.mayerbrown.com/files/Publication/fad2b171-3af5-4e21-8e0d-03a1b11d1ee2/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/3f05a730-9157-4777-af22-03d9306ea290/Most_Favored_Nations_Clauses.pdf; Thomas Volet, Most-Favored-Nation Effects in Private Equity: Uncertain, LAW360 (Mar. 2, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/625684/most-favored-nation-effects-in-private-equity-uncertain.
these arrangements go undisclosed to other, less-preferred investors in the fund.169

Given the differential treatment of investors, it is not surprising that limited-partner investors in private equity receive widely varying returns from their investments. One study found that endowments, a group that is generally viewed as a preferred investor by private equity firms, receive twenty-one percent greater returns than the average return for all investors in private equity funds.170 And even within the same fund, investors can receive significantly different returns, based on management-fee discounts and rebates.171

Side letters and other arrangements for differential treatment of investors thus raise the distinct possibility that fund assets will be diverted to preferred investors at the expense of non-preferred investors. This possibility creates a fundamental conflict between limited partners as they attempt to negotiate the terms of their investment. Investors may be willing to accept less favorable terms generally in the limited partnership agreement, as long as they can be assured that they will receive better treatment individually in their side letters.

Perhaps even more importantly, in this age of indirect equity ownership, the prospect of preferential treatment for insider investors minimizes, and may eliminate, the vital role that large, sophisticated investors play as guardians of equityholder rights in the governance process.172 Activist investors have served as important agents for change in the governance practices of public companies today, but they might well never have created this change if managers had had the option of buying them off through privately negotiated side-bargains.173 Generally, large

169. See Reuters, supra note 168 (noting that failing to disclose preferred terms to smaller investors may lead to scrutiny from the SEC).
173. The practice of greenmail, or purchasing a large block of shares and then pressuring a board to buy those shares back at a premium or face a proxy contest, has been roundly condemned and indeed has been the target of several
equityholders have a greater incentive to monitor management behavior than small equityholders because they will be able to capture a greater percentage of the benefits from any changes. But if private equity firms can pay off large investors in return for their looking the other way on marginally higher transaction or monitoring fees, then the incentive for collectively desirable, but individually costly, monitoring decreases.

The argument in favor of preferential treatment for certain investors, of course, is that it allows for more customized pricing and terms. Just as price discrimination by companies can lead to more efficient results, contract discrimination by private equity can increase the scope and size of investments by prospective investors. If a certain investor is prohibited from investing in payday-lending companies, then the private equity firm can grant that investor an exemption from any such investments, without resorting to the extreme measure of entirely excluding the investor from the fund. These kinds of side agreements can improve efficiency and encourage value-creating transactions between willing parties. Thus, where private equity firms can discriminate between investors and charge them different prices, the result may be efficiency enhancing to the extent it allows more investors to participate in the market.

But the very existence of price discrimination in the private equity market is evidence that the market is not functioning properly. It is a widely recognized axiom that where a market is perfectly competitive (that is, good information exists about the market, no barriers to entry prevent new firms from competing, and no other fundamental market failure is present), price discrimination should not be able to exist, as individual firms


174. Some scholars have gone so far as to argue that small investors free ride the monitoring provided by large shareholders, gaining the benefits without paying the costs. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601, 633 (2006).

175. See Clayton, supra note 12, at 155–57 (outlining the effects of offering preferential terms for select investors).

176. See generally id. (suggesting that contract discrimination favors large investors to begin with, and preferred terms may encourage larger and repeat investments).

177. See Lars A. Stole, Price Discrimination and Competition, in 3 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 2221 (Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter eds., 2007).
have no ability to affect market prices.\textsuperscript{178} The presence of price discrimination, on the other hand, is strong evidence that disabling market failures (such as monopoly power or information asymmetries) are present in an industry.\textsuperscript{179} Thus the fact that private equity firms are discriminating between investors, favoring some over others, not only reveals a fundamental conflict among investors, but also reveals that market failures have skewed the industry in a way that benefits private equity firms at the expense of investors.

III. PRIVATE EQUITY AS MARKET FAILURE

As the preceding Part demonstrates, private equity’s governance structure creates significant governance costs in the form of compensation-based moral hazard, limited governance rights, and differential treatment. This governance structure incentivizes excessive risk-taking by private equity firms, restricts the ability of investors to monitor bad behavior, and creates intra-investor conflicts.

Given the extent of governance costs associated with the private equity structure, one might ask why investors put up with it. After all, in a world of freedom of contract, one might expect that investors would refuse to invest under these terms. Institutional investors such as pension funds and endowments are sophisticated parties with repeat exposure to the private equity industry. If they negotiate these terms into the governance structure, or at least tacitly accept them, then perhaps we should conclude that the resulting governance structure is an efficient outcome.\textsuperscript{180}

This Part will argue that the market for private equity contracts is inefficient for several reasons. First, private equity firms benefit from strong path-dependency effects that lock in current structures. Second, investors face collective-action prob-

\textsuperscript{178}. See id. at 2224 (outlining specific market conditions necessary for price discrimination to be economically favorable for a firm); see also B. CURTIS EATON & DIANE F. EATON, MICROECONOMICS 284 (1988) (explaining that price discrimination is only possible for firms with “some degree of market power”).  
\textsuperscript{179}. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 460, 474 (2002) (“Under standard theories of monopoly, with perfect information, firms would have an incentive to price discriminate perfectly (extracting the full consumer surplus from each [consumer]).”).  
\textsuperscript{180}. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 13, at 347 (discussing an “abstract belief that markets for corporate contract terms work efficiently”).
lems that inhibit cooperation. And finally, reputational constraints on private equity firms are not as powerful as many observers have assumed.

A. PATH DEPENDENCE

Under traditional economic theory, parties are expected to negotiate contracts that maximize the joint wealth of the parties, absent transaction costs.\(^{181}\) No rational party would reject a contractual term that creates value as long as it can capture some portion of the surplus value. So, while specific contractual provisions may benefit one side or the other, overall the nexus of contracts should be expected to be efficient and value-creating. As such, one might presume that the private equity governance structure—which, after all, involves sophisticated parties willing to invest substantial time and money into negotiating their investments—would come close to this ideal of efficient bargaining and optimal contracts.

But the efficient-bargaining hypothesis is based on certain assumptions about the nature of the contracts involved and the rationality of the actors that negotiate them. One important exception to its validity, and the focus of this Subsection, is the concept of path dependence. Path dependence refers generally to the idea that allocations or arrangements today are conditioned on past decisions.\(^{182}\) The paradigmatic example of path dependence is the QWERTY keyboard.\(^{183}\) It was first designed as a way of preventing excessive jamming on typewriters, but once enough manufacturers had adopted the keyboard layout and enough typists had become proficient in using it, the costs of switching to another layout became excessively high.\(^{184}\) Typists, who had invested time and money learning how to type quickly and efficiently on the QWERTY keyboard, were leery of buying

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181. See Russell Korobkin, Behavioral Economics, Contract Formation, and Contract Law, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 116, 118 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000) (applying rational choice theory to argue that “contracting parties are assumed to compare the expected financial costs and benefits of alternative contract terms and to base their preference on which term will provide the greatest differential of benefits over costs”).

182. See S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-In, and History, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205, 210 (1995) (“The use of path dependence in economics is [premised on the concept that allocations] . . . exhibit memory; they are conditioned on past decisions”).


184. Id. at 333–36.
keyboards that had different layouts, even when the initial rationale for the creation of the QWERTY keyboard (typewriters that jammed) ceased to exist. In essence, what was a historical accident became locked in by the initial choice of many manufacturers to adopt, and, thus, many typists to learn, the QWERTY keyboard. Today, the QWERTY keyboard is still dominant, even in an era of smartphones that never jam.

Contract terms also exhibit path dependence. Although perhaps not as vivid an example as QWERTY keyboards, standardized contract terms can benefit from increasing returns as more parties adopt the terms, and also entail switching costs once they are widely employed in an industry. For example, if a particular provision has been blessed by the courts as enforceable, or has a widely known interpretation in the industry, then adopting that term provides a level of certainty that may override concerns about whether the term is, in the abstract, the optimal language for the parties in any particular instance. Similarly, the cost of reimagining and drafting contracts from scratch is substantially higher than merely using a precedent from a past deal. Standardized terms also benefit from the fact that many parties have scrutinized the terms, thereby reducing the room for errors or oversights in drafting contracts.

The key point here is that a contractual structure that is adopted at an initial time period can persist into future time periods, even if that contractual structure would not be the optimal structure for parties today if they were drafting from a tabula rasa. It could well be rational for parties to remain with the initial contractual structure because it provides certain ancillary benefits—often referred to as learning or network benefits—that the otherwise optimal, but new, structure does not. In other

185. Id. at 334–35.
186. Id. at 335–36. Some scholars have questioned whether QWERTY keyboards provide a real-life application of path dependence, calling into doubt a number of elements of the story told above. See Stephen E. Margolis & S. J. Liebowitz, Path Dependence, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 17, 17 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
187. See The QWERTY Myth, ECONOMIST (Apr. 1, 1999), http://www.economist.com/node/196071 (noting that once a typist has “learned to type on a QWERTY keyboard, the cost of retraining . . . is not worth paying”).
188. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 13, at 348 (“[C]orporate contract terms can frequently offer ‘increasing returns’ as more firms employ the same contract term.”); see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127 (1999).
words, the ancillary benefits of staying the course with a previous contract structure may outweigh any benefits from switching to a better contract structure.

Private equity governance structures exhibit many of the features we would expect to see if the industry were subject to strong path-dependence effects. The governance structure of private equity firms demonstrates a surprising level of conformity on certain key terms, like the 2 and 20 compensation structure, and survived largely intact even after external shocks like the 2008 financial crisis that forced many other alternative investment managers to radically rethink their business models. The level of complexity of private equity contracts is high, thus increasing the costs of switching to new, untested contractual structures. The difficulty of restructuring these arrangements would involve extensive time and resources and would be subject to great uncertainty.

But it is important to note that the path dependence of private equity’s governance structure does not depend solely on the increasing returns from standardization or the heavy switching costs. There are also deep behavioral reasons for individual actors to continue with these past arrangements even in the face of evidence that the arrangements are no longer optimal.

First, individuals concerned with their reputations have strong incentives to imitate the prior decisions of others in the field, a phenomenon called herd behavior. Both private equity managers and employees of institutional investors that are


192. As one scholar has noted (albeit in a different context), over the last twenty years private equity's acquisition contracts have seen only two significant shifts (adding equity commitment letters and enhanced debt commitment letters). Steven M. Davidoff, The Failure of Private Equity, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 493–94 (2009).


194. See David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy C. Stein, Herd Behavior and Investment, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 465, 465 (1990) (observing that "professional managers will 'follow the herd' if they are concerned about how others will assess their ability to make sound judgements"); see also Kahan & Klausner, supra note 13, at 356 (finding that herd behavior occurs as a consequence of agents' rational attempts to enhance their reputations).
tasked with negotiating governance structures want these structures to succeed (in the sense of realizing profits from their investments), but they also have a separate and personal interest in maintaining, or building, their own individual reputations. Sensitivity to reputational effects can lead to conservative behavior and a preference for the status quo. If managers innovate in their contracts and fail, their reputations will suffer. But if they fail as a result of doing what everyone else is doing, their reputations will not face the same harm because observers will be more likely to chalk the failure up to circumstances outside the individual’s control. Even if the same logic applies to successful outcomes (that is, the market will reward individuals for innovations that succeed), risk-averse individual decision-makers normally do not weigh these benefits as heavily as the potential losses from failure. Thus the cost of innovation is high from the perspective of reputation-sensitive individuals.

Second, once a particular set of contractual and governance structures are in place, the parties may experience a status quo bias leading them to perpetuate current structures over alternative ones. The status quo bias, which has been illustrated in a number of contexts, leads individuals to prefer allocations or arrangements that are viewed as the status quo over alternative

195. See Scharfstein & Stein, supra note 194, at 466 (discussing the relationship between unpredictable components, profitability of investments, and herd decision-making as it pertains to reputational differences of managers). This phenomenon is closely linked with a separate behavioral trait, conformity bias, where individuals tend to conform their beliefs to those of other members of their peer groups. See SOLOMON E. ASCH, Forces in the Modification and Distortion of Judgments, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 450, 483–94 (1952).

196. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 13, at 358 (noting that the “penalty for a bad outcome will often be disproportionately severe in comparison to [the] reward for a good outcome” in the context of standardized contract terms and herd mentality).

197. For a more extensive discussion of the obstacles to contractual innovation, see generally John F. Coyle & Joseph M. Green, Contractual Innovation in Venture Capital, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 133 (2014).

198. See Korobkin, supra note 181, at 121–23 (discussing experiments confirming status quo biases in favor of a default term); Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990) (providing evidence from studies showing an instant endowment effect exists—that the value individuals assign an object increases as soon as the individual is given the object); William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 47–48 (1988) (showing through a series of experiments that individuals disproportionately maintain current or previous decisions).
arrangements, all else equal. Here, where private equity structures have gained such a high level of uniformity, and thus are more likely to be viewed as default or status quo terms, the parties negotiating the terms of private equity investments can be expected to default towards maintaining those structures. Parties that have a strong interest in maintaining these structures, such as private equity firms, will also have an inherent bargaining advantage over others due to this status quo bias.

Third, individuals are strongly susceptible to anchoring effects, providing yet another behavioral bias in favor of prevailing governance structures. A number of studies have shown that once initial reference points, or anchors, have been set, those anchors have a significant impact on parties' judgments, and subsequent adjustments from those anchoring points tend to be small and incremental. A famous example came from a study of housing price estimates. Participants were asked to estimate the value of a house (which they could visit and inspect). Participants were also given an asking price for the house, which was not in fact the asking price for the house, but was instead either substantially higher or substantially lower than the real asking price. It turned out that participants who were given high fictional asking prices estimated the real value of the house to be higher than did participants who were given low fictional asking prices. The differences in valuation were stark: students that were quoted $119,900 as the asking price estimated the house's value at $116,833, while students that were quoted $149,900 as the asking price estimated it at $144,454. In the context of private equity, both numerical and nonnumerical an-

201. Northcraft & Neale, supra note 200, at 87, 92.
202. Id. at 87 (describing the methodology used in both studies).
203. Id. at 92 (referring to the listing price of properties used within the study).
204. Id. at 92–93.
205. Id. at 93 tbl.4.
choring points exist. The source of these anchors is not just previous deals (i.e., the governance structures of previous private equity funds), but also the prevalent practice in the industry of private equity firms providing the initial draft of governing documents. Thus, by the very fact that private equity firms are setting initial expectations about governance structures, these governance structures can anchor the negotiations in a way that ensures that changes will be small and marginal. The expectations of the parties will be affected deeply by the initial anchor points that are established.

Finally, investors in private equity may suffer from an overconfidence bias that leads them to underestimate the likelihood that unfavorable governing arrangements will in fact harm them. Overconfidence bias generally refers to the tendency of people to overestimate their abilities, their control over results, and the likelihood of positive outcomes.\textsuperscript{206} One classic example is that the vast majority of people believe that they are less likely to get divorced than the overall divorce rate suggests.\textsuperscript{207} Studies have shown that overconfidence bias is both pervasive and powerful: it leads venture capitalists to overpay for startup investments,\textsuperscript{208} investors to believe that they can beat the market,\textsuperscript{209} and CEOs to systematically overestimate the returns they can generate from takeovers.\textsuperscript{210} In much the same way, overconfidence bias may explain why investors willingly accept private


\textsuperscript{207} One study of marriage-license applicants found that, while respondents accurately estimated that approximately fifty percent of marriages will end in divorce, when asked about the likelihood of their own marriage ending in divorce, the median response was zero percent. Lynn A. Baker \& Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship Is Above Average: Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 439, 443 (1993).

\textsuperscript{208} See Andrew L. Zacharakis \& Dean A. Shepherd, The Nature of Information and Overconfidence on Venture Capitalists' Decision Making, 16 J. BUS. VENTURING 311, 311–12 (2001) (studying overconfidence in venture capitalists and discussing factors leading to this overconfidence).


equity's costly governance structures. If they underestimate the probability of conflict, they will underprioritize protective provisions in governing documents. If they overestimate the returns from their investment, they will be more likely to accept high fees from private equity firms. Two additional factors suggest that private equity investors are particularly susceptible to overconfidence bias. First, studies have shown that the bias is especially powerful when a decision appears to be supported by a group consensus and when decisions must be made quickly, precisely the conditions that prevail in many private equity contexts. Second, the fact that limited-partner investors are sophisticated investors with substantial resources and devoted personnel exacerbates the problem: overconfidence effects are generally greater in experts than in novices.

For all of these reasons, private equity firms benefit from strong path dependence effects that work to entrench current governance structures. Far from being the result of efficient bargaining between investors and firms, private equity agreements are strongly influenced by the lingering effects of history.

B. COOPERATION PROBLEMS

A separate reason for the persistence of private equity's structure in the face of evident governance costs is the difficulty of coordinating investor action to press for change. Cooperation problems have long been recognized as a source of agency costs in public corporations, but they have received less study in the context of private equity. And yet they are arguably a greater source of agency costs in private equity than they are in public corporations, for at least two reasons: bilateral bargaining and alternative investments.

211. See Kristen M. Blankley, The Ethics and Practice of Drafting Pre-Dispute Resolution Clauses, 49 CREIGHTON L. REV. 743, 763 (2016) (explaining an optimistic overconfidence bias may prevent parties from negotiating alternative dispute resolution clauses in contracts); Russell Korobkin, Psychological Impediments to Mediation Success: Theory and Practice, 21 OHIO ST. J. Disp. Resol. 281, 295 (2006) (finding that while lawyers in mediation recognize bias, most are unwilling to concede they are biased).


Let us assume that investors in private equity firms would prefer to have lower fees, greater governance rights, and easier exit mechanisms. These changes to the private equity structure might cut into private equity firms’ profits, but if investors collectively demanded them, then private equity firms would be forced to concede. Why, then, would investors not cooperate to demand these changes?

The first reason is that large investors now increasingly have the option to negotiate side agreements that grant them special treatment. If an investor has the option to achieve its aims through bilateral bargaining, or alternatively through costly multiparty negotiations that can tend toward compromise and lowest-common-denominator positions, it will likely opt for the former absent some compelling external rationale. Adding to this problem is that investors might well prefer to have other investors not share in the greater governance rights that they manage to negotiate: an investor could benefit from the stability provided by having other investors locked in to their investments, let alone the additional fees paid by unpreferred investors. Thus the rise of bilateral bargaining has reduced the incentive for investors to cooperate in demanding changes to suboptimal governance structures.

Another kind of cooperation problem arises from the existence of multiple funds under a single private equity firm’s umbrella. Private equity firms today often raise multiple funds, with each fund having its own set of investors and its own set of portfolio companies. The multiple fund structure provides investors with a high level of customizability, allowing them to invest in only the funds that they believe are the best fit, but it also creates a conflict of interest. Private equity firms have

215. See discussion in supra Part II.C.

216. See Robert H. Mnookin, Strategic Barriers to Dispute Resolution: A Comparison of Bilateral and Multilateral Negotiations, 8 HARV. NEG. L. REV. 1, 14–18 (2003) (proposing that due to the possibility of parties having a veto power in multiparty negotiations, side deals may be needed to ensure a zone of possible agreement is available).


218. See Birdthistle & Henderson, supra note 25, at 46–47 (describing the potential conflicts that arise when private equity firms oversee multiple funds).

219. Id.
limited institutional capacities for identifying, monitoring, and managing the investments that make up their funds. If a private equity firm has two funds, one with general partner (GP)-friendly terms and one with GP-unfriendly terms, the private equity firm will have strong incentives to devote more time and energy to the fund that has GP-friendly terms, all else equal. After all, if one fund grants the private equity firm a right to twenty-five percent of the profits from investments, while the other fund grants the firm only fifteen percent, the private equity firm would rationally direct more promising portfolio companies into the GP-friendly fund and devote more resources to enhancing its profits. Limited-partner investors, recognizing this dynamic, have little incentive to push for more investor-friendly terms in their own fund unless they can be ensured that the investors in other funds also have similar terms.

Both of these problems (bilateral bargaining and multiple funds) create situations that closely resemble the classic prisoner’s dilemma. Jointly, the parties would be better off if they could cooperate, but separately, each party has an incentive to defect and reap the rewards. In the real world, many prisoner’s dilemma-type situations are resolved because interactions are repeated, outcomes are observed, and cheating can be

220. A GP-friendly term is a term that favors the interests of the GP over those of the limited partners. A GP-unfriendly term is a term that favors the interests of the limited partners over those of the general partner. Higher management fees, for example, would be GP-friendly, while lower ones would be GP-unfriendly.

221. This dynamic is more than just theoretical. Studies have shown that the inclusion of GP-friendly terms in private equity governance documents affect fund performance and behavior, including the efforts that private equity firms expend on their investments, the riskiness of investments that funds make, and the timing of exits from those investments. Niklas Hüther, Is the Whole Greater Than the Sum of Its Parts? Behavioral Effects of Management Compensation (Sept. 18, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.fmaconferences.org/Nashville/Papers/sum_of_parts_nh.pdf; Niklas Hüther et al., Paying for Performance in Private Equity: Evidence from Management Contracts 18–20 (Feb. 18, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.rhsmit.edu/files/Documents/Departments/Finance/seminarspring2015/robinson.pdf (finding better investment performance for funds that include GP-friendly deal-by-deal contracts, suggesting this could be due to higher-risk investments throughout the fund’s life and due to a reduced incentive for general partners to exit early).


223. Id.
punished. But with private equity, all of these conditions are dubious. Interactions are much less frequent (once an investor has committed to a fund, its capital is tied up for the duration of the fund, which is often ten to twelve years). Outcomes are harder to observe: private equity firms often do not disclose the terms of side deals they reach with individual investors, or the structure of other funds. And finally, even the identity of other investors is often confidential. So, even if an investor determines that other investors have cheated and negotiated better terms on their own, it is unclear how punishment could be meted out. All of these difficulties highlight the magnitude of the cooperation problems that investors face in their investment decisions.

C. REPUTATION

As the previous Sections have demonstrated, private equity firms have interests that do not fully align with those of their investors, and the investors have little ability to monitor and control the actions of the firms in order to deter misbehavior. This creates strong agency costs and may incentivize excessive risk-taking and rent-extraction by private equity firms to the detriment of investors. Despite the governance costs created by current private equity models, there are strong currents pushing against reform. Both path-dependence effects and cooperation problems contribute to entrenching current governance structures in place. Which brings us to one final constraint on private equity behavior: reputation.


227. CUMMING & JOHAN, supra note 115, at 63.

228. For a discussion of the importance of reputation to private equity firms and the ways that private equity firms use their reputations in the debt markets, see de Fontenay, supra note 41, at 134–39.
It is often said that reputation serves as a powerful constraint on private equity firm behavior. Firms raise new funds regularly, and if they earn a reputation for mistreating their investors, they will find it difficult to find new investors willing to commit their capital to them. Thus private equity firms should value their reputations highly and seek to avoid actions that would damage those reputations. So, even if investors commit their capital to private equity firms carte blanche, the argument goes, they can take comfort in the fact that firms have nonlegal incentives to maximize investor value even in the absence of explicit contractual constraints.

But there are reasons to doubt that reputation is as effective a mechanism in private equity as many make it out to be. First, reputation can only constrain a party’s behavior if the party believes that others will receive information about the party’s past behavior and base their decision making on that past behavior. In other words, reputation is only as good as the information that underlies it.

As amply discussed in previous sections, the private equity industry is built around tightly controlled flows of information. Private equity firms rarely make information about their investments and governance structures available to the public. They also tightly control the flow of information to their own investors. In this atmosphere of extreme confidentiality, it is unsurprising that a number of studies have found

229. See Matthew D. Cain et al., Broken Promises: The Role of Reputation in Private Equity Contracting and Strategic Default, 40 J. CORP. L. 565, 565 (2015) (finding that “private equity firms and targets rely on reputation to fill intentional contractual gaps”).
230. Id. at 575–76.
231. See id. (explaining reputation and the potential for repeat transactions are front-end incentives while penalties for failure to perform and higher buyout pricing are back-end consequences of misbehavior).
234. See discussion in supra Part II.B.3.
235. Id.
236. Id.
that private equity firm disclosures systematically tend to overstate fund performance. This noise surrounding information about past performance renders it difficult for current investors, let alone potential investors, to identify and accurately assess information about private equity firm behavior. Of course, in egregious cases of misbehavior by private equity firms, such as outright fraud or theft, the information may well come out, but in other cases of less severity (for example, less than diligent monitoring or marginally higher than expected fees), past misbehavior may be overwhelmed by other, optimistic information disclosed by the fund.

Second, reputation is not a monolithic trait. Private equity firms do not have purely good or purely bad reputations. They have reputations for possessing certain traits and taking certain actions. Some have reputations for industrial expertise: Silver Lake, for example, is known for its deep expertise in the technology sector, while EnCap Investments is known for its oil and gas investments. Private equity firms also have different reputations with different audiences. For example, private equity firms care deeply about their reputation with banks, as their acquisition model is premised on the ability to receive loans at low interest rates. Thus they have an interest in not defaulting on their debts, as doing so will make it more difficult to access the debt markets in their next funding round. They also care about their reputation with target companies, as they regularly buy companies and participate in auctions for companies. Thus they have an interest in not backing out of acquisition agreements with target companies, as doing so will make them less


238. For example, in the SEC’s investigation of Apollo Global’s fee practices, it came to light that one of Apollo’s executives was twice caught “improperly charging personal items and services” to Apollo’s investors. See Protess, supra note 153.


241. See de Fontenay, supra note 41, at 134–39.

242. For a discussion of the role of reputation in constraining private equity behavior vis-à-vis target companies, see Cain et al., supra note 229, at 578–79.
credible partners for potential targets.

Given the multiplicity of reputations that private equity firms maintain, it is unclear whether, in any given case, private equity firms will place greater value on their reputation vis-à-vis investors than their reputation vis-à-vis creditors, targets, or along any of the many other dimensions of reputation. It is not difficult to imagine that these reputations may sometimes conflict. For example, it may at times make sense for portfolio companies to default on their loans, but private equity firms, cherishing their reputations with banks, may refuse to do so if they fear that it will make future capital raises more difficult. Or, it may make sense for a fund to back out of a merger agreement with a target if the market has shifted and the deal no longer looks like a profitable one, but a private equity firm may refuse to terminate the agreement if doing so will make it more difficult for its other funds to close their deals. The point here is not that a private equity firm’s reputation with investors is unimportant, but rather that it is one set of a larger set of reputations that private equity firms seek to maintain, and that in many cases, it may well be overlooked in favor of maximizing these other reputations. Thus blanket assertions that investors can rest assured that, whatever their contractual protections, reputation will ensure that private equity firms seek to maximize investor wealth, are overstated.243

One final reason why reputation may be ineffective in constraining private equity firm behavior is that individual decision-makers within firms often have interests that diverge from those of the firm itself. It is well known that reputational constraints on misbehavior often break down in endgame scenarios: that is, if an individual knows that he will never need to interact with a counterparty again, he is more likely to cheat and pocket one-time gains at the expense of the counterparty.244 After all, reputation is only valuable to the extent it can be used in the future. This incentive is amplified when gains from misbehavior are large and the costs are uncertain or not fully internalized.245

243. See id. at 593–94 (finding beyond certain boundaries, reputation is not a sufficient enforcement mechanism).


In the context of private equity, while private equity firms themselves may have indefinite time horizons, the individual managers do not. Managers retire, they change jobs, and they have other interests. For all these reasons, the reputational incentives of individual managers are not fully aligned with those of the firm where they work. Given the stratospheric levels of compensation prevalent in today’s private equity industry, these incentives can sharply skew the interests of individual managers to the detriment of investors. Even if the manager misbehaves in a way that damages the firm’s reputation, the manager himself, who has limited time horizons, will not fully internalize the cost of this harm. The rewards to individuals from excessive risk-taking are so high, and the costs are so uncertain, that managers may well adopt strategies that do not align with the interests of their investors.

This Part has argued that private equity’s governance costs, far from being the result of efficient bargaining between sophisticated parties, are instead the result of market failures at the heart of the industry. Private equity structures exhibit strong path dependence, resisting reform even in the face of dramatic changes in the market. They also create collective-action problems for investors, who face steep obstacles to cooperating in efforts to pressure private equity firms to change their ways. Finally, reputation is not an effective bulwark against opportunistic behavior by private equity firms, given the variegated content of that reputation and the differing reputational incentives of particular individuals that make up the firm. The next Part will take up a final question: what steps can be taken to improve private equity’s governance structure?

IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

The governance structure of private equity creates a number of pernicious misalignments between the interests of private equity firms and their investors. These misalignments include compensation that incentivizes excessive risk-taking, governing documents that strongly constrain the rights of investors, and

91 (2014) (predicting a shift from informal community enforcement to formal court enforcement “as the value of trade between distant or dissimilar transactors increases”).

246. See, e.g., Alden, supra note 4.
opportunities for disparate treatment between favored and disfavored partners. While the contract terms of privately negotiated agreements might not typically be a matter of public importance, we have a strong reason to care about the plight of private equity investors, namely, that the majority of private equity investors are pension funds, endowments, and sovereign wealth funds, who handle money for the benefit of the public. Thus private equity's governance costs are in a real way public costs. We should care deeply about resolving them. To that end, this Part sets forth several proposals for improving the corporate governance of private equity and mechanisms for implementing those changes.

A. GOVERNANCE CHANGES

Two general governance changes present themselves. The first focuses on the particular governance costs of private equity and attempts to reach better substantive outcomes in these areas. The second focuses on the process and procedure of arriving at negotiated agreements and attempts to fix the breakdowns in process that lead to these suboptimal results. The benefit of the first, substance-based approach is that it directly addresses the fundamental misalignments between management and investor interests. The benefit of the second, process-based approach is that it refrains from imposing external rules of behavior on privately negotiated deals and instead creates environments more conducive to efficient bargaining.

1. Improving Outcomes

Several substantive reforms could reduce private equity's governance costs. First, private equity structures could be revised to skew private equity firm compensation in favor of pure equity interests in their funds, as opposed to management fees and carried interests. As described above, management fees create an incentive for firms to raise as much capital as possible, regardless of the reasonable possibilities for its investment, and

247. See supra Part II.
249. These two approaches bear similarities to the command-and-control versus market-based approaches to regulation. See Thomas W. Merrill, Explaining Market Mechanisms, 2000 U. Ill. L. Rev. 275. However, as will be explained further below, it may be possible to mitigate private equity's governance costs through changes implemented outside of traditional legislative action.
then, at the end of the investment period, to ensure that as much of that capital is actually used to acquire companies, regardless of the reasonable possibilities of profits on the acquisitions.\footnote{250}{See supra Part II.A.1.}

Carried interests also create strong incentives for private equity firms to take excessive risk, as private equity firms capture much of the upside from profitable undertakings, while bearing none of the downside in the case of loss.\footnote{251}{For further discussion, see supra Part II.A.2.}

Pure equity interests—that is, a percentage ownership of the partnership interests in the private equity fund—more closely align the interests of private equity firms with the interests of their investors, as they require private equity firms to share in the upside and downside of their investments.\footnote{252}{See Bebchuk \& Spaman, supra note 9, at 262–64.}

Second, private equity structures could be reformed to grant limited-partner investors greater governance rights, including voting, transfer, and information rights. Investors would not necessarily need broad governance rights in all of these areas in order to ensure that they are protected from misbehavior or shirking by private equity firms. Instead, greater governance rights in one area might obviate the need for greater governance rights in another. For example, voice (voting rights) could serve as an effective substitute for exit (transfer rights),\footnote{253}{Anna T. Katselas, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 93 Neb. L. Rev. 313, 318–19 (2014).} and thus if investors have a liquid market in which to dispose of their interest in private equity funds, they might not need strong rights to vote on fundamental business matters, and vice-versa.\footnote{254}{See Coffee, supra note 138, at 1281–82 (discussing the potential trade-off between liquidity and control).}

Third, private equity structures could be changed to require private equity firms to grant equal treatment to all investors. This requirement, while certainly far from the norm, is not as foreign a concept as it might appear at first blush. Private equity firms already grant many favored investors so-called most-favored-nation provisions in their side letters, thereby ensuring that these investors can benefit from any privileges or rights that the firms grant other investors.\footnote{255}{Volet, supra note 167.} Extending most-favored-nation status to all investors would resolve many of the problems associated with preferential treatment and would allow less sophisticated investors to benefit from the expertise of more sophisticated ones.
2. Improving Information

A separate approach to mitigating private equity's governance costs would be to improve the information provided to investors. Indeed, it is hard to imagine that enduring change could be achieved in the private equity industry without more and better disclosure to investors. The SEC has repeatedly fined private equity firms (including many of the largest and most prestigious firms) for improperly disclosing fees and expenses to investors. Basic and accurate information about the compensation of private equity firms and the expenses charged to investors is an essential part of reforming private equity's structure. But it is not enough.

In order for investors to assess the risks of their investment, and to mitigate agency costs, investors must be provided with full information about partnership terms, side arrangements (if any), and fund activities and performance. Such information might require changes to the confidentiality provisions in many limited partnership agreements today. But without such information, governance rights could be neutered by limited disclosure. Better information would lead to better monitoring, allowing investors to observe the behavior of private equity firms and identify misconduct.

Just as importantly, a more accurate and comprehensive disclosure regime would improve the quality of the bargaining process in private equity. By reducing the problems of asymmetric information that bedevil current negotiating frameworks, greater information about fund structures can help ensure that bargaining achieves efficient outcomes. Efficient bargaining is based on the premise that both sides understand the costs and benefits of the terms that they are negotiating over. If one side cannot accurately assess its potential gains and losses, the bargaining process can break down, leading to inefficient, one-sided

256. Protess, supra note 153.
257. For an example limited partnership agreement, see CUMMING & JOHAN, supra note 115, at 63–64.
258. See Anita Indira Anand, An Analysis of Enabling vs. Mandatory Corporate Governance: Structures Post-Sarbanes-Oxley, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 229, 249 (2006) ("It is difficult for investors to make informed decisions if there is no disclosure requirement, since firms may choose not to disclose information relating to governance in which investors are interested.").
259. But see OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE (2014) (arguing that mandated disclosure does not lead to better informed decisions by consumers of the information).
agreements. Full disclosure would require both the terms and conditions of the particular investor’s investment, but also any side arrangements or special treatment of other investors, as well as any potential conflicts of interest with other funds. These sorts of disclosures have been widely recommended in the context of investment banks and should be extended to private equity as well.

B. MECHANISMS FOR CHANGE

These proposed governance changes could greatly improve the alignment of interests between private equity firms and their investors and thereby reduce private equity’s governance costs. But given that private equity’s governance structure has been stubbornly resistant to change, the question arises what mechanisms can be used to promote change in the industry. Three answers present themselves.

The first is regulation. When markets are not functioning properly, governments often step in to correct market failures and create incentives for socially optimal behavior. This was the impetus behind Dodd-Frank, the sweeping reform of Wall Street that followed the 2008 financial crisis. A Dodd-Frank for Private Equity would institute more comprehensive regulation of the financial incentives and disclosure requirements of private equity firms, and likewise include investor protection reforms intended to ensure that limited partner investors are not saddled with oppressive restrictions. But just as Dodd-Frank was criticized for imposing excessive compliance costs on banks, regulatory reform of the private equity industry risks weighing down an industry that is heavily dependent on streamlining and efficiency. The difficulty is finding a form of regulation that


261. See Andrew F. Tuch, Banker Loyalty in Mergers and Acquisitions, 94 Tex. L. Rev. 1079, 1154 (2016).


reduces private equity's governance costs without burdening firms with costly and unnecessary red tape.

Which leads to the second mechanism for inducing change: namely, greater investor cooperation. In order to overcome the path dependence and anchoring effects that have hardwired current governance structures in place, large limited-partner investors could come together to coordinate investment policies, by, for example, promulgating model private equity governance terms or template limited partnership agreements. While not having the force of law, these best practices would, at a minimum, provide strong *social* reasons for changing current structures. They would show that other investors believed these approaches to be optimal, and they would provide reassurance that any provisions included in the model terms had received close attention and scrutiny by top practitioners in the field. If a few large investors, such as CalPERS and Teachers Retirement System of Texas, adopted these forms as their standard documents, they could provide smaller investors with much-needed leverage in the negotiation process. Just as importantly, these private-sector efforts could serve as an alternative to and a guidepost for public sector regulation.

A third and final mechanism for instigating change is information intermediaries. Private equity firms have interests


266. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 13, at 350 (discussing reasons why standard contract terms are used).

267. See Organization, CalPERS, https://www.calpers.ca.gov/page/about/organization (last updated June 29, 2015), (claiming to be the nation's largest public pension fund).


269. Information intermediaries are third parties that verify information provided by the parties to a transaction. They are often viewed as an engine for increased market efficiency by reducing the cost of gathering and analyzing complex information. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 Va. L. Rev. 549, 618–21 (1984); Ronald J. Mann,
that do not always align with those of their investors, and the reputational constraints on their misconduct are not as robust as one might hope. But there are ways to make reputation play a stronger role in improving private equity's governance without relying solely on the reputation of the private equity firm itself. Independent information intermediaries, such as ratings agencies or third-party consultants and advisors, could step in to help align the interests of private equity firms and investors by staking their own reputations on successful outcomes. They could examine firm management, fund structures, and compensation incentives to provide an independent analysis of the quality of fund investments to potential limited partners. The success of these information intermediaries would depend directly on their reputation for accurately assessing fund structures, and thus their reputation would not be fragmented and conflicted in the ways that private equity firm reputation is. Just as proxy advisors today have significant influence on the investment decisions of institutional investors, and thus place strong pressure on companies to adopt more investor-friendly governance practices, information intermediaries in the private equity sphere could serve as a strong force for improved governance structures.

These three mechanisms for reform—regulation, investor cooperation, and information intermediation—could serve to


271. One might ask why limited-partner investors are not sufficiently sophisticated to perform this analysis themselves. While one might hope that large institutional investors would have the capacity to assess the costs and benefits of their investments, in practice they often rely on the advice of specialists in making their investment decisions, in effect outsourcing many investment decisions to outside experts. See Legislative Proposals To Enhance Capital Formation, Transparency, and Regulatory Accountability: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. & Gov't Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 114th Cong. 2 (2016) (statement of the Society of Corporate Secretaries & Governance Professionals and the National Investor Relations Institute), https://www.niri.org/NIRI/media/NIRI/Advocacy/Society-NIRI-Statement-to-HFSC-Subcommittee-Proxy-Advisory-Firm-Reform-Act-FINAL-VERSION-5-25-2016.pdf (concluding that "[p]roxy advisory firms exert undue influence in the proxy voting process, as they generate voting recommendations for their clients, and, in fact, make voting decisions for some of their clients").

overcome the forces that have entrenched private equity’s problematic governance structure. In doing so, they might lead to important, and beneficial, changes in the way that the private equity industry works.

CONCLUSION

It is often argued that private equity’s success can be best explained as a result of its uniquely beneficial governance structure, one that reduces agency costs to a minimum and closely aligns the interests of management and ownership. This Article has argued that private equity’s so-called governance dividend is overstated and that, in fact, private equity’s structure creates a number of intractable governance costs. These governance costs include compensation structures that incentivize excessive risk-taking by private equity firms, minimal governance rights for investors, and opportunities for favoritism and discrimination. We should care deeply about these costs because the public is heavily invested in private equity, through pension funds, endowments, and sovereign wealth funds. This Article has suggested a number of reforms—from improving information flows to reducing conflicts of interest—that could help improve private equity’s governance structure, but it is hoped that these suggestions are merely a starting point of a longer conversation.