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IN DEFENSE OF THE COMPATIBILITY OF FREEDOM AND EQUALITY

Filip Spagnoli

I. INTRODUCTION

In this paper, the Author endeavors to find philosophical arguments in favor of the link between freedom and equality and against the traditional opposition between these values. The Author's thesis is that the best way to defend this link is the adoption of a certain definition of freedom, namely freedom as autonomy, self-rule, and self-development. Other types of freedoms are more difficult to combine with the demands of equality.

An important part of the link between freedom and equality will be the law and the state. Protection by the law, security because of the law, the creation of a public space by the law, and political participation in a democratic state based on the law are all factors which combine in producing an equal liberty for all, liberty in the sense of self-rule, freedom of choice, and the possibility to determine your own life and to develop yourself.

II. FREEDOM VS. EQUALITY

This concludes the discussion of the system of human rights and the means to make rights real. One thing that has been presupposed and taken for granted until now is the importance of human rights. The Author already mentioned that it is not the Author's intention to deal with this topic within the limits of this volume, but it seems unfair to avoid the question altogether. Why are human rights so important that we need to know how to make them real? Why do we need to understand them? The Author's lapidary answer until now has been that human rights protect a number of universally important values such as peace, prosperity, freedom, equality, diversity, identity, and belonging. What the Author failed to say is how they can do that. The Author thinks that one can agree that an in-depth answer to such a question merits a separate discussion. Indeed, the Author can point to another publication dealing only with this question.¹ What the Author can offer in the space of this book is just one example. In this chapter, the Author will try to show how human rights can protect freedom and equality, two values which the Author thinks are universally important and cherished. This will give the reader an idea of the importance of human rights.

Over the last centuries, it has become kind of a tradition to juxtapose freedom and equality and to view these two important human

1. *See infra*, note 2.

values as almost tragically opposing goals, one inevitably leading to the limitation of the other. For example, one can point to the way in which the claims of equality, as they are expressed in economic rights and income redistribution, limit the freedom of the wealthier parts of the population. Moreover, the struggle against poverty has often become the overriding preoccupation and even an excuse for violations of freedom rights. Non-economic injustices are often readily accepted once people are convinced that these injustices are needed to combat economic injustices. Another example of the way in which the struggle for equality limits the freedom of certain groups is given by some kinds of affirmative-action programs. And finally, the principle of non-discrimination may require limiting the freedom of expression of those who promote racism or other forms of discrimination.

Conversely, freedom can also limit equality. The unfettered free market tends to produce economic inequalities. When the unequal distribution of talent and starting capital is not checked by government intervention then the outcome tends to be more economic inequality. In most cases, economic equality as prescribed by economic rights is not the automatic product of voluntary *caritas* or free solidarity. There is no Invisible Hand. Freedom alone does not guarantee economic equality. It often even diminishes it. Some government intervention and coercion is necessary in order to redistribute wealth. An absolute protection of property—a freedom right—threatens economic equality. If absolute freedom of expression includes the protection of hatred and racist speech, inequality, discrimination, and even genocide may result.

III. UNLIMITED AND LIMITED NEGATIVE FREEDOM

Contradictions between cherished goals always have something tragic. Much of our great literature since the Greek tragedies deals with such contradictions (love and loyalty, duty and love, family and loyalty, love and faith, etc.). My thesis is that the contradiction between freedom and equality is caused by a certain way of understanding freedom, and the only way out of our tragedy is the adoption of a more complex and complete definition of freedom.

The definition to which object to has been most clearly stated by Thomas Hobbes in the following excerpt of his *Leviathan*: “By LIBERTY, is understood, according to the proper signification of the word, the absence of external Impediments: which Impediments, may oft take away part of a mans power to do what he would.”²

The definition of freedom as the ability to do what you want has become the common sense understanding of the word. It is a negative definition because it focuses on the absence of impediments, con-

2. THOMAS HOBBS, *LEVIATHAN* 91 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press, rev. student ed. 1996) (1651). 770

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straints, or limits on actions (limits imposed by other human beings, by the state, by nature, or perhaps even by our own passions). It is obvious that an absolute version of this kind of freedom is possible only outside of the state and the law.

However, is it possible at all? And if so, is it acceptable? For some of us it may be possible. It is not possible for the many victims who are the inevitable result of this kind of freedom. If everybody can do as he or she likes, then we create offenders and victims and only the offenders are free. Victims obviously cannot do as they like. And we can all become victims. Not even the strongest among us can do as he likes, because he has to sleep now and again and we are weak when we sleep. Unlimited and lawless freedom as in the definition of Hobbes cannot and should not exist. It is self-destructive and immoral—as Hobbes himself clearly understood.

Only anarchists still believe in this kind of freedom, which is license rather than liberty. Libertarians, proponents of the minimal state, free marketers, and liberals in the European sense of the word adopt a limited version of the Hobbesian freedom. They rightly worry about the victims, and they agree to have laws which limit freedom for the sake of security and hence for the sake of the freedom of others. No freedom without security. Hence they try to equalize freedom.

Freedom for them is always freedom in the state and freedom within the limits of the rule of law. In a situation of lawlessness, I can only do as I like if I am the strongest of all. Without laws, there is no freedom for all. If I accept the law, then I will gain security, survival, and limited freedom. If I do not accept the law, then I will only create the freedom of the fox in the chicken-house, and I will probably not be the fox.

According to this school of thought, all coercion is bad, but some kind of coercion is necessary. If people were always friendly to each other, the state would not be necessary, and people would not have to accept a limitation of their freedom. State coercion in the form of laws limits freedom because it forces people to act in a way that is contrary to their wishes. In this worldview, it is accepted that coercion can actually promote freedom. Coercing one person, and thus limiting his or her freedom, can promote the freedom of other persons, namely the freedom of the “chickens.”

However, because of the importance of freedom as the ability to do as you like, the proponents of limited negative freedom want to keep the area of the law and the state as small as possible. Liberalism, if we may use this term as a label for these people,³ believes that the only way in which the state can promote freedom is by guaranteeing the security of the weak. The state should only protect the weak against

3. Libertarians seems too narrow a term given the marginality of this school of thought compared to the widely held view on freedom which I try to describe here. 771

the strong. In this way, it makes it possible for the weak to do as they want. It puts the freedom of the weak on the same level as the freedom of the strong who can do what they want even without protection.

For the rest, the state should not do anything and should keep itself as inconspicuous as possible. It should create an area which is free from state coercion and in which people can do as they like. In a certain sense, this freedom is a stateless freedom even though the state must act to protect it. The area of non-interference must be as large as possible in order to allow freedom to become as comprehensive as possible. Freedom and politics can only go together insofar as politics guarantees freedom from politics.⁴

Contrary to anarchists, liberals believe—correctly I think—that the area of freedom or noninterference cannot be unlimited because this would result in insecurity, chaos, and war. But in a sense both anarchism and liberalism believe in unlimited freedom. For the former it is an ideal for the future, for the latter it is something which belongs to a perhaps mythical past (the time of the “contract”) and which can only be desirable in the unlikely event that human beings learn to behave and to respect each others’ security.

Liberalism thus creates a separation between the unfree area of the state and the law on the one hand, and the free area of the rest of life on the other hand. I will object to this separation and will claim that the state can be an area of freedom and that involvement in the state can promote freedom.

IV. EQUAL FREEDOM

Is the problem of freedom and equality solved by liberalism? Law and the security that it produces indeed equalize freedom. But are our values really harmonized, and is the tragedy resolved? Not quite. The Author can see at least three problems remaining. The first one is poverty. Poor people cannot do what they want, and the laws which protect their physical security against the free actions of others will not help them. Their situation is not primarily caused by the limitations imposed on them by the actions of others. And the provision of social security is much more controversial than the provision of physical security, which is bizarre given that both kinds of security have the same purpose, namely the equalization of freedom in the sense of the ability to do as you want. We see here that the state, by intervening and reducing poverty, can promote freedom.

A second problem with the limited Hobbesian freedom is revealed by the bigot. Take the example of the bigot who is not poor but does not want anything else in life than watching sport, drinking beer, and shouting at his wife. He can do as he wants, but is he free? Here we

4. HANNAH ARENDT, *TUSSEN VERLEDEN EN TOEKOMST* 79 (1994).

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see that it may be necessary to redefine freedom and not only to limit it. Freedom means not only the ability to do what you choose, but also, and in the first place, the fact of having significant choices, the ability to expand the options you can choose from, the ability to make an educated choice between examined options and to choose the options which are best for yourself and for the people around you. In other words, freedom is the ability to choose the options which make ourselves better persons and allow us and our fellow-humans to self-develop.

Now, how do you widen the available choices and check if what you want is really what you want? Only if all possible options and choices are flooded with the light of publicity and education. When you see which options are available, when you hear people discussing the merits of different options and objects of volition, only then can you make an educated choice. This publicity, and hence freedom as the possibility to develop yourself, requires a legal system. Legally protected human rights for example open up the world of culture, art, science, history, education, etc. They open up the options, show the merits of all options, and hence can improve your volition. Constraining rules are also enabling rules. By limiting certain kinds of behavior they make other behavior possible, for example, public discussion of objects of volition. Only in a public space protected by legal rights, where everybody is equal and where everybody can speak and listen in an equal way, can we examine our opinions and options and can we self-develop.

The law is necessary because if there is no external control, then rights will be violated, security rights but also rights which protect the public space in which choices can appear. Some people will be victims of others and will not be free, not in any sense of the word. They cannot do as they like and they have no public life. And we can all be victims in certain circumstances. Laws and obedience are not just obstacles or impediments, limits on our freedom or elements of oppression. They are prerequisites for public life and therefore prerequisites for freedom as well because freedom needs public life.

Laws do not only limit the actions of people; they also link the actions of people because they create a public life. And these links make freedom possible. Laws are rules for public life and should not disappear. The state is a mechanism to coerce people, but this is not necessarily negative. On the contrary, coercion creates possibilities. The state creates, by way of coercion, the prerequisites for public life—such as security and human rights—and therefore creates the possibility of freedom.

A third problem with the limited freedom to do as you want is that this concept disregards a longstanding tradition that views freedom as autonomy. Individual autonomy, or the sense of having some measure of control over your own life, is something different from the

limited or unlimited individual freedom to do as you like. It is a more communal and less individualistic notion since it requires political self-government through democratic participation.

Like freedom in the sense of self-development, and unlike freedom as the (limited) ability to do as you like, autonomy is not separated from the state; it is not a freedom outside of the state. It is necessarily a part of the state and cannot survive without it. People usually engage in self-government within state institutions, local or national. By determining the laws and rules which govern their lives, they govern themselves. In a democracy, the coercion of the law is the coercion of people over themselves. If people make their own laws, then obeying the law means obeying yourself and having control over your life.

In this respect, autonomy can be said to resemble freedom as the ability to do as you like, because people who obey themselves do as they like. They decide for themselves and they are autonomous. They do not obey an external force and they are free from external rules and external coercion. All this is also demanded by the Hobbesian definition. The difference with the Hobbesian definition is that autonomy does not result from the isolated exercise of an individual will outside of state control. In autonomy, the ability to do as you like is mediated through political participation and legislation. This is comparable to the way in which this ability is mediated through public life in the notion of freedom as self-development (you can only do as you like when you know about the options and when the options appear in public).

Central to autonomy is the law. The law is an extension and expression of the people and of their convictions. Obeying a law is then merely a matter of internal coherence, of being in agreement with your own convictions and internal laws regarding the actions that can or cannot be done. People obey the law because they can recognize their convictions in the law and they can recognize their convictions because they make the law themselves. In a democracy, the people find the laws in themselves and agree with the laws which they obey. A law that forbids me to do what my conviction also forbids me to do, does not limit my freedom.

However, the law in a democracy is not merely a simple expression of the will and the internal law of the people. People do not just recognize their prior convictions in the laws. The law, or better the common act of legislation, helps to form these convictions. Political participation shapes the will of the people. It is a more educated will than the will of an isolated individual because the political deliberations that precede the act of legislation have an educational effect. People get informed about alternatives, pros and cons, etc. So autonomy is similar to freedom as the ability to do as you want, but in a sense it is a better version of it because the quality of human volition is improved by it, just as it is improved by publicity. Freedom as self-

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development improves volition by offering a public space in which to examine the objects of our will and to widen the options. Freedom as autonomy improves volition by allowing people to act together and establish laws.

If we temporarily put aside the problem of the democratic minority, then we see that autonomy is a very equal kind of freedom. There is an equal right to political participation, an equal identification with the law, the equal examination of options and pros and cons, etc.

Is self-control an individual ability or one which is exercised together with others? It is clear, I think, that a community which governs itself gives more self-control to its members than individuals who try to achieve this self-control independently. Cooperation makes it easier to solve certain problems. If self-control means determining your own life, then it also means being able to decide something and to solve problems. Autonomy is therefore best served by democratic political participation and cooperation.

If we look at freedom in this way, we can say that a tyrant is not more free than his subjects. Perhaps he is more free because he has a greater ability to do as he likes. But a tyrant does not have access to a political and public space which is indispensable for freedom in the sense of autonomy or self-development. Such a space needs the protection of democracy and human rights and the equal participation of all, and is therefore incompatible with tyranny:

The point of Herodotus' equation of freedom with no-rule was that the ruler himself was not free; by assuming the rule over others, he had deprived himself of those peers in whose company he could have been free. In other words, he had destroyed the political space itself, with the result that there was no freedom extant any longer, either for himself or for those over whom he ruled.⁵

The problem can also be framed in terms of the good life. Is our good life something individual and outside of politics and the public space, or is it something more communal? Does it mean that our private space has to be protected against others or does it also need others, their points of view, their criticism, and their cooperation in shaping our lives? I think the latter is the case because without the public space in which others can appear and without the political space in which we can cooperate with others, our volition is of inferior quality. We may be able to do what we want, but what we want is not what would be best for us.

But what about the democratic minorities? Do they have equal freedom, equal autonomy? Of course, in a democracy there is always a minimum of external control. Only the majority exercises voluntary self-legislation, self-control, and self-obedience because only the majority accepts and desires the law voluntarily. The minority, or even

5. HANNAH ARENDT, *ON REVOLUTION* 31 (Penguin Books 1990) (1963).

individuals belonging to the majority, can decide to disagree with the law because they do not identify with it or because they have a moment of weakness which disables the internal law.

The minorities' disagreement with the law does not necessarily force them to break the law; they can decide to respect the law because they do not wish to be punished, because they like order and predictability, or because they have an attitude of respect towards the law in general. But even if they do not break the law, this law is forced upon them by themselves. They do not have self-control or autonomy. There is indirect external control and coercion, and hence not even freedom in Hobbes' definition. They don't obey themselves and cannot do as they like. The law does not come from the inside. It is not a part of the people in question even if they respect or accept it voluntarily for the reasons given above.

However, we can point to the fact that in a well functioning democracy everyone is now and again in the minority, which means that there is more or less equal autonomy across the population and over a longer period of time, and hence equal freedom. And secondly, although the minorities do not accept all majority laws, they are likely to accept the fundamental laws such as human rights that open the public space for majority and minority alike, and that therefore offer the minority freedom as self-development, even while taking away, temporarily, freedom as autonomy.

The laws that exist—and that the Author, as a member of the minority, does not accept—limits the Author's freedom in a certain sense. They limit the things the Author can do and the ways in which the Author can act, they limit the Author's self-control, but they do it in such a way that a public space comes into existence in which the Author's freedom can unfold, freedom as self-development.⁶

V. FREEDOM AND THE STATE

Freedom in every sense of the word—including the freedom to do as you like, at least if we want this to be an equal kind of freedom—needs the state and the rule of law. So entering into a state—metaphorically of course—is not the limitation of freedom but the start of it. For the proponents of the limited version of Hobbes' negative freedom, the state cannot create freedom. It only equalizes it by taking away some of it. The state always limits freedom because it is no more than a mechanism for coercion and security and hence takes away some of our power to do as we like, justifiably but also regrettably.

This reasoning implies some sort of natural or pre-political freedom which exists before and outside of the state, and which is partly surrendered in exchange for security by the theoretical or historical entry into the state-system (the so-called "contract"). But this natural free-

6. ARENDT, *supra* note 3, at 81.

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dom is a highly contestable concept, and not only because it is very unlikely that man lived in a situation of natural and unlimited freedom in those prehistorical times in which states or laws did not exist. At best, this natural freedom was or is highly unequal and other kinds of freedom were entirely impossible because there was no self-government and no public life, or at least no stable, equally accessible, and predictable public life protected by the state and the law.⁷

It is equally unlikely that the disappearance of the state will result in more freedom. A war of all against all is much more likely. The “chickens” among us need protection, and protection is best provided by an impartial third party in order to avoid the spiral of revenge caused by self-defense. This third party is almost always, and perhaps inevitably, the state. But even the limitation (rather than the disappearance) of the state to what is strictly required by the provision of protection, security, and peace, will not result in more freedom. Social security, political participation, and the protection of the public space are also requirements of freedom. A limited state may not be able to provide these institutions and may therefore harm freedom. Freedom is created on the basis of and after the law. The entry into a state is the foundation and the beginning of freedom instead of the surrender of freedom. “The state is the actuality of concrete freedom. . . . Society and state . . . are the only situations in which freedom can be realised.”⁸

Only a state can create self-government and a public space in which autonomy and self-development can become possible. Freedom is situated in the state and in politics. Instead of a necessary evil—necessary because of human nature and evil because of the limitations on freedom—we can see the state as something positive and the creator of freedom.

So paradoxically, freedom can only exist together with obedience because only a state with its rules and laws can make freedom possible, both a simplistic negative freedom that is limited and hence equalized for all, and a freedom that is more than the simple ability to do as you like. Obedience to rules opens up the public and political space in which people can develop and can take control over their lives. Freedom is, therefore, not incompatible with power and coercion.

The state not only restricts freedom, its elimination or limitation will not give us freedom, not even at the basic level of the ability to do as we like, at least if we want this ability to be equally distributed. A state limited to the provision of security will not provide this equality. Economic intervention by the state is also necessary. An equally lim-

7. If there is no natural freedom, there may be natural rights. Rights and freedoms are not necessarily the same thing, even though the word “liberties” is often used as a synonym for the word “rights”.

8. ROSS HARRISON, *DEMOCRACY* 114 (1996).

ited freedom, autonomy, and self-development may not be safe in the hands of anarchists, libertarians, free marketers, or proponents of the minimal state. All these kinds of freedom require more than constant attacks on the state. They require active involvement of the state, either to equalize freedom or to create its preconditions and institutions. In particular, social security, political rights, and civil rights are tools for this involvement, but only the latter are acceptable for the proponents of the minimal state.

Freedom in every sense of the word needs all types of human rights, economic, civil, and political. The minimal state ideology only accepts state interventions for security when physical security is threatened by the freedom of others or by state violations of freedom rights. The goal is to force the state to limit its own interference and to force it to limit the harmful use of freedom by other citizen. It is politically controversial that the state should actively interfere to build a public space and a political system of self-government, to equalize the access to this space and system, particularly economically, and to equalize the ability to do as you want beyond the equalization offered by security. Economic rights and affirmative action do not always enjoy majority support. But if coercion is justified for the sake of security, then why not for social security and anti-discrimination?

[W]hy is avoiding coercion a supreme end that dominates all other ends? What makes noncoercion superior to justice, equality, freedom, security, happiness, and other values? If any of these ends are superior to noncoercion, then would not coercion be justified if it were the sole means in some situations for achieving the superior value? Alternatively, if one believes that the world of values is not dominated by a single absolute end but is . . . a pluralistic universe, then one must make judgments about trade-offs between coercion and other values.⁹

From the libertarian point of view, the state cannot promote freedom. It always harms freedom because it is no more than a mechanism of coercion necessary to oppress evil originating from the state or from the free actions of our fellow citizens, and coercion always takes away the power to do as you like. Libertarians accept that some freedom is taken away by the state; they accept that freedom and security need to be balanced against each other and that freedom needs to be equalized and protected against the freedom of others. However, freedom is most important, and state coercion for security and equality should therefore be kept to a minimum. Other values, such as autonomy, self-government, self-development, and economic equality, which depend on state intervention and coercion, tend to get less attention in this worldview, even if they can be seen as prerequisites for freedom in a more profound sense of the word, in a sense that

9. ROBERT A. DAHL, *DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS* 45–46 (Yale Univ. Press 1989).

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is different from the sum of the unhindered activities outside of the state and the law.

So the question is what kind and what degree of coercion we are ready to accept as a trade-off for our other values? If the freedom to do as you like is the only or the supreme value, then it seems that only coercion for security is acceptable. If you agree that not only insecurity and the freedom of others but also economic inequality can destroy the ability to do as you like, you may be willing to accept some kind of state coercion for the protection of economic security. And if you value autonomy, self-government, and self-development, you may also accept state coercion for the creation of an equally accessible public and political space.

Freedom on the one hand, and coercion, law, power, politics, and the state on the other hand, are not incompatible, and one is not defined by the absence of the other. Freedom does not begin where politics, the state, and coercion stop. Pushing back politics, the state, and coercion can diminish freedom instead of increasing it. Freedom from politics may result in the end of freedom. Freedom is not the art of anti-politics. However, freedom and power are not just compatible. Freedom in the sense of autonomy is a kind of power, namely power over your own life.

Of course, it is obvious that not every kind of coercion by the state or the law is beneficial. A state which coerces in order to steal from the people or oppress them, for example, can never promote freedom. Only a state that respects the longstanding principles of the rule of law, including human rights, can protect freedom because only such a state can promote security, self-government, autonomy, public life, etc.

Freedom does not follow automatically from the coercion of the law. The law must be the right kind of law:

- it must protect human rights, in particular the security rights of possible victims but also the rights of the poor;
- it must protect the public space as a necessary condition for freedom in the sense of self-development, and it can do so because it protects human rights;
- and it must be the product of the people if it is to promote autonomy.

The desire to keep state interference restricted is entirely justified. The number of limits on actions should indeed be as small as possible. The power of the state cannot be absolute or unlimited—we need a civil society, a free space beyond the reach of the limited state—but the minimum number of limits on actions is much larger than the number of limits necessary for security. Security is not the only value. Poverty as well can impair freedom, even at the basic level of the ability to do as you like. Hence, laws which eliminate poverty and redistribute wealth (as is demanded by economic rights) can also be

acceptable limits on actions. Moreover, reducing the state to something very small and eliminating politics from society as much as we can, can harm political life and freedom in the sense of autonomy, at least as long as we continue to deny the distinction between politics and the state.

It is obvious that the extra-political sphere should not be considered as the only stronghold of freedom. Limiting politics, the state, and coercion should not be our only worry. We should also try to make politics compatible with self-government, autonomy, and self-development and we should try to see state coercion as something which is necessary for our freedom.

Coercion, if it is to promote equal freedom in different senses of the word, has to be:

1. Self-coercion when possible because of autonomy and self-control, and if not:
2. Limited coercion, limited in the sense of:
 - Compatible with human rights, especially the rights of the minority because the minority, while lacking autonomy, can use human rights for freedom in the sense of self-development.
 - Limited to what is necessary for equal freedom, security, and public and political life.
 - Legal coercion because otherwise it will not be limited. (A law is limited by definition. Coercion by persons is much more arbitrary and unlimited than coercion by the law because the meaning of personal commands is not as well defined or as stable as the meaning of laws. Personal commands can be anything, whereas a law is what it is, it is written down, in a very specific manner, and it remains the same, otherwise there would be no reason to write it down. A tyrant also coerces, but he coerces in an unlimited way. In general, he does not use laws, or if he does, he uses them in an improper way. The meaning of his laws is unlimited, unpredictable, and changing. Moreover, his laws violate human rights and are aimed at particular groups in society and are not general or neutral as they are supposed to be.)
3. Equal coercion (legal coercion is by definition equal coercion; the law rules over and coerces everybody in the same way).

Much of political philosophy is an attempt to answer the following question: how do we promote freedom without stumbling into anarchy, and how do we use power without stumbling into tyranny? If we believe that freedom gravitates towards anarchy, then we assume that freedom is no more than the ability to do as we like and that we should abolish all rules or as many rules as possible in order to protect freedom. Then we quickly discover the problem of anarchy, and not to mention the problem of the inequality which this kind of freedom produces. If insecurity, chaos, and war are a threat to the freedom of

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some (to the freedom of the weak who can no longer do as they like), then they are also the ultimate expression of the freedom of others. Insecurity and anarchy are the consequences of our ability to do as we like and hence the consequence of our freedom.

However, if we redefine freedom as autonomy and self-development, or even as the equal ability to do as you like, then we see that freedom needs rules and hence the danger of anarchy is averted. If power and coercion gravitate towards tyranny, then we assume that they are evil—maybe necessary but certainly evil—and that we should try to contain them as much as the development of human nature permits. However, if we accept that power and coercion not only constrain but also enable, that they create a public and political space which can be used for the development of freedom, then we start to see the state in a more positive light, and we can put aside the fear of tyranny.